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SUMMARY  
The thesis analyses the relationship between the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher 
Education (QAA) and universities in England. It considers why the QAA still appears to 
be misunderstood and controversial, eighteen years after its establishment. 
Differing representations of the QAA necessitates it using significant time and resources 
to explain its status and its relationship with the higher education (HE) sector. These 
representations also inhibit the maturation and refinement of the quality assurance 
system in England.  
The professional issue explored is: why is the QAA viewed and portrayed differently 
depending on who is making the assessment and in what context? The aims were to 
provide an improved understanding of how different types of universities and their staff 
perceive, construct and appropriate the QAA and to provide a reference point for quality 
professionals to assess their own university’s institutional practice. 
The theoretical framing of this issue draws upon Bernstein’s (1996) concepts of the 
pedagogic device and contextualisation. Empirically, thirty-two semi-structured 
interviews were undertaken between July 2009 and June 2011, supplemented by 
extensive documentary analysis. The experiences of staff at different levels within three 
types of English university and from the QAA itself were explored in this way. 
In answering the four research questions, the findings suggest that the universities 
consider it legitimate for the QAA to undertake certain roles, such as safeguarding 
academic standards, while other roles should be the sole responsibility of the 
universities. Reasons why the QAA is viewed differently include: the power related to 
perceived institutional position in the HE hierarchy of prestige, the public nature of the 
QAA’s reports, contestation within the Pedagogic Recontextualising Field, and the 
multi-dimensional nature of the QAA’s relationships.  
The research also suggests that the recontextualising process that the QAA undertakes is 
complex. Through a process of engagement, facilitation and negotiation with the 
different elements of the higher education sector, the QAA attempts to balance the 
interests of a number of different stakeholders within the Official Recontextualising 
Field and the Pedagogic Recontextualising Field. The complexity is added to by the 
frequent contestation within and between these groups. 
The findings also indicate that the different types of university, identified within the 
research have different capacities to recontextualise the QAA’s messages at institutional 
level into the local setting. The extent to which the messages are mediated appears to be 
predicated on a number of factors. There is also a degree of recontextualisation 
undertaken at subject level.  
Similarly, the extent to which the QAA has influence over what universities do also 
seems to be linked to the type of university. Although there appears to be some sector-
wide influence in relation to internal university quality assurance structures and the 
specialist quality assurance language used.   
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CHAPTER ONE  THE STIMULUS, AIMS AND PURPOSE OF THE 
RESEARCH  
1.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I begin the research story by outlining the original stimulus for the 
research, and identifying the professional issue that I go on to explore in the thesis. I 
also discuss the aim and purpose of the research and why it was valuable to undertake. I 
introduce the focal point for the study, the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher 
Education (QAA) and set out the professional and academic contexts for the research. 
Finally, I describe what is to come in the rest of the thesis.  
1.1 The stimulus and professional issue 
‘….here we go again!’ I’m at a very nice drinks reception prior to my husband 
receiving his national teaching fellowship and I’m playing the dutiful wife.  
It’s been a very pleasant evening so far gently chatting with the other guests, 
all of whom appear to be academics. When asked what I do, I nonchalantly 
say ‘Oh, I work in University admin’ and move the conversation on swiftly. I 
look over to my husband, as usual we’ve drifted away from each other whilst 
chatting, he’s looking nervous, so I head back over to him and give his arm a 
reassuring squeeze. Then from my left comes the question and in a tone 
which means there is no escape ‘So Elaine, what do you do for a job?’ I 
pause, take a very deep breath, put on my warmest smile and say…..... ‘I 
work for the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education…………’, there’s 
absolute silence….. 
The following day there’s an organised trip to the Victoria and Albert 
Museum, the weather is reasonable and so the organisers ask if we’re happy 
to walk. I recognise quite a few of the academics from the previous evening 
and ‘that moment’. During the trip a number of them come up to me and say 
(quietly) that they’ve been a reviewer for the QAA and really enjoyed it and 
felt it a worthwhile role. For the briefest of moments the QAA is a positive 
entity. 
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These two types of reactions to the QAA were fairly common in the seven years that I 
had worked at the Agency. We were interchangeably seen as both Dr Jekyll and Mr 
Hyde, often depending on the stance taken by the media and/or the politicians on a 
particular day. It meant that working for the QAA felt like walking a tightrope, trying to 
keep the views of all those with vested interests in higher education in balance. This 
was not helped by the various myths about the Agency within the higher education 
sector: these appeared to be self-perpetuating, although why this was the case was not 
always clear.  
Why after more than ten years since the QAA was established, and seven years since its 
move away from the controversial subject level review of universities, was there still 
such variation in how the role of the QAA was understood, and how the Agency was 
perceived? At the time, I expected that as the QAA matured those working in the 
universities might have a better understanding of it, its purpose and rationale.  
The overarching professional issue for the research is therefore why is the QAA viewed 
and portrayed differently depending on who is making the assessment and in what 
context? An analogy for me is an organisation with a series of different faces reflecting 
different stances, which are visible to certain onlookers at certain times.  
The pertinence of the professional issue is that the different representations mean that 
the QAA has to devote significant time and resource to reiterating its actual status and 
purpose, as well as clarifying the nature of its relationship with the universities. The 
position being that the QAA does not work in isolation from the higher education 
sector, but is sponsored and guided by the sector’s representative bodies and academic 
experts. The consequences of these multifarious representations for the QAA are three 
fold: it reduces the QAA’s resources available to focus on assuring academic standards 
and quality; for senior managers it means that the QAA operates in an unstable and 
changing context depending on which representation is most prevalent, making strategic 
3 
thinking and planning difficult; and for the QAA staff, it means that they end up being 
process orientated spending their time being conduits and interpreters between the 
universities, the Government and the public.  
The premise of the research is an acceptance that external quality assurance by the QAA 
is an inherent part of higher education and one to which I subscribe. The research 
therefore will not discuss whether quality assurance is a legitimate part of higher 
education, or what is meant by the notion of quality in higher education. Nor will the 
research explore the link between the funding of higher education and the status of self-
governance of universities and external quality assurance mechanisms. All of these 
discussions can be found elsewhere1. 
1.2 Scope and Terminology 
At this point, it is helpful to discuss briefly the scope of the research and the 
terminology used in the thesis.  
The scope of the research is the universities in England, although reference is made to 
the United Kingdom where appropriate. England was selected because although the 
QAA has a UK-wide remit, devolution across the UK means that the QAA’s review 
methods and guidance materials function under slightly different contexts within 
different higher education systems. Trying to account for these differences would make 
the analysis of any data problematic. In addition, most of my experience working at the 
QAA was in relation to higher education in England. As an important part of the 
professional doctorate is a reflection on my professional experience, it seemed 
appropriate to focus on England alone. 
                                                 
1 For example, see Silver and Silver (1986); Green (1994), Harvey (1995, p8ff); York, 1996; 
Melrose (1998, p41ff), Newton (2002); Barry and Ginns (2007); Van Kemenade, Pupius and 
Hardjono (2008), Filippakou (2009), and Saarinen (2010). 
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The research took place between July 2009 and June 2011, although reference is made, 
at appropriate points in the thesis, to more recent events in order to enhance the 
research’s currency. This was a period of some significant change for the QAA as I 
discuss in more detail in section 1.5.1.  
I use the term universities in relation to institutions which have the right to use the 
protected title ‘university’ in their name. This right will have been achieved either by 
the granting of a Royal Charter or Papal Bull2, or through legislation. 
I use the term higher education providers to refer to the broader range of organisations 
that provide higher education programmes in England. In addition to the universities 
these include Further Education Colleges and for-profit private providers. 
I refer to the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education as both the QAA and 
the Agency. 
1.3 Aims of the Research 
With the professional issue in mind, the overall focus of the research is the QAA and its 
relationship with the universities in England and the Government. At the start of the 
research a single aim was identified: to provide the QAA with research-based 
intelligence to support it in its strategic planning for the next ten years of operation. At 
the time I began the professional doctorate, the QAA was shortly to celebrate its ten 
year anniversary. I thought that the new understanding gained from the research could 
enhance the QAA’s operation. For example, understanding how a university is likely to 
perceive and interpret the QAA can be used to establish the degree of compliance that 
an individual higher education provider is likely to apply in relation to the QAA’s 
guidance. Once established, the Agency can determine the amount and type of support 
                                                 
2 An instrument issued by the Pope to found or recognise a university. Examples are the 
University of Aberdeen (Graham, 2008, p28), as well as the Universities of Glasgow and St 
Andrews. A Papal Bull was issued to the University of Oxford to recognise it (Anderson, 2006) 
and the status of the University of Cambridge similarly recognised in 1430 (Simon, 1979, p44). 
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necessary to ensure that individual institutions (continue to) take responsibility for 
safeguarding academic standards and quality. Blind compliance to the QAA’s guidance, 
as in the UK Quality Code, misses the point of quality assurance in higher education. As 
Brown (2004, p151) notes, quality ‘is best protected by institutions’ own quality 
arrangements, which reflect and reinforce the values and professionalism of staff and 
the individuals within them’. Therefore they should be thinking about the ‘what’, ‘how’, 
and ‘why’ they are trying to do in relation to safeguarding academic standards. In doing 
so, they will meet their responsibilities through having the powers to set their own 
academic standards and award degrees under their own auspices (Williams, 2009, p4). 
Without sufficient engagement and thought on the part of providers, politicians and the 
government are more likely to demand a move away from the current collaborative 
regulatory system to a more inspectoral one (see section 1.4 below).  
Life, however, was not quite as straight forward as planned and in 2011 I left the QAA 
to move to New Zealand. Two and half years and several earthquakes later, I was back 
in the UK working for a university in a quality management role. In effect I was now on 
the other side of the table to the QAA. As a result, a further aim became clear in order to 
support such quality professionals. The aims of the research therefore were: 
i) to provide those working at the QAA with an improved understanding of how 
different types of universities and staff within them perceive, construct and 
appropriate the Agency. 
ii) to provide a reference point against which quality professionals can assess their 
own university’s institutional practice, in order to provide more effective support 
to colleagues in developing and implementing quality assurance processes, 
which are appropriate to the values and culture of the institution and contribute 
to the improvement of the quality and standards of teaching and learning in that 
institution. 
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Underlying these aims was also the very personal nature of the stimulus of the research. 
This meant that I was not only a researcher, but also a participant in the research itself. 
This had implications not only for the conceptualisation of the professional issue, but 
also for the research questions, as well as the research methodology. It was clear that a 
qualitative approach was the most appropriate research strategy as I wanted to explore 
the experiences of staff in the universities and the QAA. This is an issue to which I 
return in more detail in Chapter four. 
In meeting the above aims, the research thereby achieves the purposes of professional 
doctorates which ‘aim to develop an individual's professional practice and to support 
them in producing a contribution to (professional) knowledge’ (QAA, 2008a, p25). The 
research adds to the empirical data about the QAA by providing an insider perspective 
of the Agency itself, in addition to the university perspective. I also wanted to provide 
an insight from different levels within the universities, and from those within the QAA. 
Research in how quality assurance is viewed in universities has involved interviewing 
academics and senior managers3. If such research includes a QAA perspective, it 
usually involves interviews with the Chief Executive or other members of the 
Directorate4, rather than those who undertake the work directly with the universities, the 
Assistant Directors.  
In addition, the research aims to broaden the scope of the empirical data available. A 
review by Harvey and Williams (2010) of the research published in the Journal ‘Quality 
in Higher Education’ over 15 years, suggests that much of the previous empirical 
research in relation to the QAA has focused more on the Agency’s specific review 
                                                 
3 See, for example Morley (2004) and Evans-Bibby (2004). 
4 The Directorate is the senior management team of the QAA. 
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methodologies or guidance materials5, rather than on the role of the Agency itself and 
how it is perceived across and within universities, and within the QAA. 
With the professional issue and the three aims of the research in mind, four research 
questions were developed. Broadly these explore how the role of the QAA is 
understood, how it is translated into local university settings, the degree of influence 
that the Agency has over what universities do, and how the Agency mediates the 
requirements of key stakeholders in developing its guidance and review methods. These 
questions are set out in more detail in Chapter three (see section 3.3). 
1.4 The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education 
The QAA was established in 1997 with the remit to promote public confidence that the 
quality of provision and standards of awards in higher education are being safeguarded 
and enhanced (QAA, 2000, p1). The Agency is funded predominantly through contracts 
with the UK funding bodies and by subscriptions from universities and other higher 
education providers. The Agency has multiple stakeholders and multiple roles based 
around its quality assurance, enhancement and advisory functions. 
Although it is depicted in the press as a ‘watchdog’, the QAA does not hold statutory or 
regulatory authority. It operates on the premise that universities are legally independent, 
self-governing autonomous bodies and as such have primary responsibility for setting 
and maintaining academic standards and quality (Education Reform Act, 1988; Further 
and Higher Education Act 1992). 
Since 1990, the external quality assurance of UK higher education has been based on a 
system of collaborative regulation which incorporates elements of institutional self-
regulation, which is a non-negotiable requirement for the universities (Stoddart, 2004, 
pxi), and external assessment undertaken by academic peers (Jackson, 1997, p121). 
                                                 
5 Guidance materials such as the National Qualification Frameworks and subject benchmark 
statements. 
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According to Jackson (1997, p122-123) this system is based on university self-interest 
and consensual agreement with the government. Deem, Hillyard and Reed (2007, p189) 
suggest this consensual regulated autonomy was adopted because of the persistent 
failure of academics to suggest any viable alternative. Morley (2003, p165) describes 
this phenomenon as the ‘TINA effect’ – ‘there is no alternative’. 
1.5 Context for this Research 
1.5.1 Professional context 
The data collection for the research was undertaken between 2009 and 2011, a time 
when the QAA was under the spotlight following a series of uncoordinated events in the 
summer of 2008 which raised significant concerns about falling academic standards. 
These events resulted in intense media and political interest and significant 
recrimination (Williams, 2009, p24-26; Brown, 2010, p129; Jackson and Bohrer, 2010, 
p77). The events of that summer marked the end of a period of relative stability for the 
Agency after the cessation of subject level review in 2001 and the resignation of the 
Agency’s first Chief Executive the same year. During that period the Agency was 
deemed to be doing a good job, in an appropriate manner and at a reduced cost 
(HEFCE, 2005b).  
The events of summer 2008 and the subsequent fallout meant that by the time my data 
collection began, the Chief Executive at the QAA, the Chief Executive designate and 
other members of the senior management team had appeared before the Innovation, 
Universities, Science and Skills (IUSS) Select Committee. The QAA was subsequently 
criticised in the resulting report for focussing ‘almost exclusively on processes, not 
standards’ and therefore not safeguarding academic standards fully (House of 
Commons, 2009a, p5, p97); for not operating appropriate mechanisms to investigate 
concerns raised by individuals or organisations about higher education (House of 
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Commons, 2009a, p96); and for drifting into a role of promoting the brand UK Higher 
Education (House of Commons, 2009a, p97). Within the Agency there was a sense that 
difficult times were ahead (see Chapter two). It was already a time of significant change 
for the QAA, with the appointment of a new Chair of the Board in the spring of 2009, 
and the recent appointment of a new Chief Executive due to take up his post in early 
October 2009. In addition, as a result of the IUSS Select Committee’s review and 
report, although not fully supported by the Government, both the HEFCE and the higher 
education sector’s representative bodies (UUK and GuildHE) had to defend/justify their 
roles in relation to quality assurance, albeit from different perspectives. In the case of 
the HEFCE the consequence was a more hands-on approach to working with the QAA 
(see section 3.2.4). 
Subsequently, the Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student 
Finance (the “Browne Review”) in 2010 made its recommendations in relation to a 
revised funding mechanism for higher education. In addition to recommending that 
students should make a larger contribution to the cost of their learning, the Review also 
recommended that the QAA should be merged with the HEFCE, the Office for Fair 
Access, and the Office of the Independent Adjudicator to form a single Higher 
Education Council (Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student 
Finance, 2010, p46). While the Government rejected this suggestion for a single 
Council, this recommendation reflected the Agency’s potentially precarious position. 
The subsequent higher education policy of the new coalition Government and the White 
Paper ‘Students at the Heart of the System’ (DBIS, 2011) marked the further 
marketisation6 of the higher education sector7. For example, the White Paper 
proposed/endorsed the lifting of the cap on tuition fees to a maximum of £9,000 for 
                                                 
6 In this context, ‘marketization’ is described  as the application of the economic theory of the 
market to the provision of higher education (Williams, 1995) 
7 Brown and Carasso (2013) suggest that the higher education system in England first moved 
towards a marketised based system from the 1980s onwards.  
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institutions; universities being able to recruit as many students as they liked with A-
levels at the grades AAB or higher; opening the sector to new providers subject to 
achievement of the QAA’s taught degree awarding powers; and changing the status of 
students within the higher education system.  
In addition, the White Paper also signalled an intention to review the arrangements for 
external quality assurance in England; this was to be led by the HEFCE and sponsored 
by the sector’s representative bodies. The review itself, however, took place after the 
research data were collected. 
1.5.2 Academic context 
The study was conducted at a time when researchers identified the vastly complex and 
contested nature of the quality assurance of higher education in the UK (Newton, 2002, 
p47; Brown, 2004; Cheng, 2009; Filippakou and Tapper, 2008, p84), with some 
describing it as only serving a bureaucratic, administrative and resource allocating 
function (Evans, 2004; Morley, 2004, Cheng 2009, p200; Harvey and Williams, 2010, 
p24), Others on the other hand were able to demonstrate instances of genuine 
improvement in academic standards (Horsburgh, 1999; Dill, 2000, Morley, 2003, p170, 
Harvey, 2006, p289). Increasingly, researchers were considering the consequent 
implications of the further marketisation of the sector and the implications for its 
regulation (Alderman and Brown, 2005, p314; Barnett and Coate, 2005, p29, Brown, 
2011). Some researchers spoke of there being little real value to quality assurance while 
institutional reputation remained the key influence on students and employers (Locke, 
2011, p77-81). The failure of quality assurance to stimulate academic staff and student 
engagement was also being discussed (Turnbull, Burton and Mullins, 2008, p15). 
Researchers such as Harvey and Stensaker (2008, p427) identified the lack of a quality 
culture within universities as a significant problem in a rapidly changing higher 
education system.  
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What is evident from these two context related sections is that the research was carried 
out at a particularly turbulent and uncertain time for the QAA. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis comprises eight chapters. Chapter two sets out the context for the research in 
more detail by firstly introducing the development of regulation and audit in the public 
service sector in the UK, before going on to discuss the introduction of quality 
assurance in higher education. In doing so, the chapter begins to explain the historical 
antecedents which influenced the formation and subsequent evolution of the QAA. It 
also begins to problematise the professional issue identified and explore the relationship 
between the QAA, the universities and the Government.  
Chapter three discusses the theoretical framework used to explore the research 
questions. It provides the rationale and justification for drawing on the work of Basil 
Bernstein, before identifying the key concepts to be used and identifying the four 
research questions. It concludes by applying the analytical framework to five examples 
of the Agency at work, in order to clarify the issues to be explored. 
Chapter four outlines the methodology adopted for the research and the data collection 
techniques used. It discusses the implications of undertaking research within my 
employing organisation and in universities which it reviews. The chapter describes the 
coding and analysis processes used. I discuss the limitation of the research in the 
concluding chapter of the thesis (Chapter eight).  
Chapters five, six and seven present the analysis of the empirical data, in relation to how 
the role of the QAA is perceived and understood: the guardian of academic standards 
and institutional autonomy; a structural engineer influencing the internal university 
structures and power relations; the nature of the recontextualising process undertaken by 
the QAA; the existence and consequences of ‘mission creep’; the difficulty of 
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perceptions versus reality about the QAA; and the challenges of mutuality within a 
quality assurance system. Chapter seven then goes on to discuss how the 
‘recontextualising’ process which is undertaken by the different universities and the 
degree of influence the QAA has over what universities do. The Chapter ends by 
reflecting on whether the research questions have been answered.  
The final chapter discusses the broader implications of the research findings in the 
context of the overarching professional issues. It also discusses the implications of the 
research for the Quality Assurance Agency and those working in the universities as 
quality professionals. In doing so the final chapter considers the view from both sides of 
the table.  
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CHAPTER TWO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE QUALITY 
ASSURANCE AGENCY FOR HIGHER EDUCATION  
2.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I will briefly discuss the introduction of a quasi-regulatory framework to 
public sector services in England to set the context, before discussing the historical 
antecedents of the Agency itself. This will begin to suggest possible reasons why the 
QAA might be viewed multifariously.  
I will also begin to translate the overarching professional issue into a series of more 
focused issues, which in turn will form the research questions set out in Chapter three. 
In doing so, I will highlight the complex nature of the Agency’s relationship with the 
universities, the HEFCE, and the Government.  
While I discuss the evolution and purpose of external quality assurance in higher 
education, I do not debate what is meant by ‘quality’ in higher education teaching. This 
is a concept which is notoriously difficult to define, is highly contested and is constantly 
being (re)constructed (Badley, 1992, p21; Barnett, 1994, p68; Saarinen, 2005, p12). As 
noted in the previous chapter such discussion can be found elsewhere. 
As this first part of the chapter describes the historical differentiation in the status of 
higher education providers in relation to their external quality assurance requirements, 
the second broadens this discussion to consider the stratification that is found in the 
higher education sector in England. The purpose of this is to begin to explain why a 
comparative approach based on different ‘types’ of universities is an appropriate 
consideration in the research methodology. In this context, the chapter suggests a means 
of categorising the some 100 universities in England at the start of the research. 
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2.1 The Emergence of External Quality Assurance in England 
The introduction of external review in higher education can be traced back to the late 
1970s8 in the context of the public higher education sector, and to three key factors. 
Firstly, there has been significant change in successive governments’ ideology with 
regards to the public sector and the welfare state (Scott, 1995, p71). The increasing 
dominance of what is now referred to as ‘managerialism’ in government policy has 
meant that the arrangements to demonstrate accountability and transparency in the 
public sector, particularly from the 1980s onwards, have changed from informal 
mechanisms based predominantly on trust, to more formalised procedures based on 
concepts imported from the private sector. These procedures have often used 
independent bodies as the means of implementing and monitoring performance (Power, 
1994, p15, p16; Scott, 1995, p78). A prime example is the establishment of the National 
Audit Office and the Audit Commission with their many audits: academic audits, 
governance audits, health and safety audits, sustainability audits, data audits, forensic 
audits. All of which has meant that scrutiny and judgement is now commonplace in the 
public sector. In turn this has led to a progressive weakening of the elite professional 
bureaucracy in the public sector, replaced by greater reliance on the market and direct 
public service delivery to the consumer (Power, 1997, p43; Henkel, 2000, p4; Deem, 
Hillyard and Reed, 2007, p6, 7-10; McGettigan, 2013, p2). The concept of ‘audit’ is 
now a naturalised part of the public sector, along with new power relations between the 
government-backed ‘inspectorates’ undertaking the audits, and those being audited 
(Shore and Wright 2000, p59).  
                                                 
8 For a discussion about the establishment of internal and external mechanisms to safeguard 
academic standards in universities in the nineteenth century see Silver and Silver (1986, pp10-
15). 
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Secondly, the expansion of the higher education sector from its original elitist form to a 
‘mass system’9 in 1988, and then to a ‘universal system’10 in 1994 (Becher and Trowler, 
2001, p4; Parry 2001, p122), has led to greater demands being placed on public funding. 
In turn the Government has had little choice but to seek evidence of value for money in 
order to meet its responsibility to the tax payer (Frazer, 1992, p16). The escalating cost 
of higher education has encouraged, and to some critics necessitated the persistent 
review of the quality of provision within the sector (Moodie, 1986, p1). 
The massification of the sector has also been accompanied by a greater diversity of 
students entering universities, and a broadening of the curriculum to meet market 
demand and economic imperatives set by the government. These two factors have 
contributed to increased public and ministerial concern about their potential negative 
impact on academic standards and reputation of the sector (Moodie, 1986, p3; Becher, 
1989, p140; Frazer, 1992, p16; Trow, 1996, p208; Williams, 1997a, p111).  
Thirdly, as the economic and global ‘value’ of knowledge and therefore its contribution 
to the UK economy has increased, the relationship between higher education and the 
external world has changed significantly (Becher and Trowler, 2001, p11; Parry, 2001, 
p120; Singh, 2002, p575; Deem, Hillyard and Reed, 2007, p5). The government now 
takes a greater interest in protecting higher education as an entity. For example, the right 
to award degrees and use the title ‘university’ were protected by legislation in the 
Education Reform Act (1988) and the Further and Higher Education Act (1992) (UUK, 
2010, p32).  
2.1.1 Implications for the universities 
Although still relatively autonomous compared with many public sector institutions 
(Deem, Hillyard and Reed, 2007, p1), Parry (2001, p18) suggests that from 1979 
                                                 
9 when participation rates surpassed 15 percent in 1988 (Becher and Trowler, 2001, p4) 
10 when participation rates exceeded 40 per cent in 1994 (Parry, 2001, p122) 
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onwards the formal independence of universities, in relation to strategic and operational 
matters, was significantly eroded. The higher education policies of Thatcher’s 
Conservative Government in the 1980s meant that the concepts of stronger corporate 
management, effectiveness, efficiency, value for money and audit entered the sector’s 
vernacular (Power, 1994, p2; Deem, 1998; Shore and Wright, 2000, p57; Parry, 2001, 
p118, 119; Deem, Hillyard and Reed, 2007, p5).  
The Jarratt report (1985) was commissioned by the Committee of Vice Chancellors and 
Principals (CVCP)11 in part to forestall further government intervention through 
efficiency reviews seen elsewhere in the public sector. In the eyes of knowledgeable 
observers it symbolised acquiescence by the sector to the introduction of the principles 
of managerialism across universities (Scott, 1995, p66).  
The introduction of what can be characterised as managerialist practices into higher 
education saw a reordering of authority within the universities, with the effect that the 
power held by academic self-governance lessened (Scott, 1995, p66; Williams, 2009, 
p10). Internal changes within the governance of universities saw a transition from the 
‘donnish’ university, to the ‘democratic’ university, and towards the ‘managerial’ 
university (Scott, 1995, p4). For academics the implications were significant: 
‘…for many, if not most, academics there has been a fundamental loss 
of control – over work organisation and professional culture… 
universities [have been] transformed from “communities of scholars” 
into “work places”.’ 
(Deem, Hillyard and Reed, 2007, p2) 
Scott (1986, p145) suggests that there was also a more practical reason for such 
changes. The continuing expansion of the universities in particular, meant that as 
organisations they required more centralised and active management and administration 
                                                 
11 CVCP was the representative body for universities at the time. Its history can be traced back 
to the early 19th Century and informal meetings of university vice-chancellors followed by its 
formal mandate being secured in 1930. CVCP’s successor body Universities UK (established in 
2000) has some 133 members (UUK, 2011). 
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systems. Williams (1992, p142) also suggests that there was increasing frustration in the 
government, with the ‘old’ universities in particular which were accused of being 
‘unaccountable, unresponsive, non-relevant, badly managed and generally ill-fitted to 
meet the needs of the new entrepreneurial world’ (Williams, 1992, p142). Increasingly, 
the government looked for mechanisms to keep surveillance over higher education in 
order to maintain the momentum of greater accountability and efficiency (Parry, 2001, 
p120; Filippakou, Salter and Tapper, 2010, p549). In this context, some form of external 
assessment mechanism in relation to teaching and learning was required.  
2.2 External Regulation of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education 
While the focus of this research is the QAA and its relationship with the universities and 
the government, the Agency has strong historical antecedents which influence many of 
its principles/values and the way it works. The following section therefore outlines 
briefly the key developments leading up to the establishment of the QAA in March 
1997. For a more detailed analysis see Henkel (2000); Brown (2004) and Williams 
(2009). 
Before the QAA 
From the mid-1960s until the inception of the QAA in 1997, a dual system of quality 
assurance in higher education existed in England: one informal for the universities and 
one for the remainder of the publically funded sector (see Figure 1). For some of the 50 
or so autonomous universities the external examiner system12 was a source of review, 
although this was not consistently applied (Becher, 1991, p155; Williams, 1997b, p80). 
The University Grants Committee (UGC) established in 191913, was a body dominated 
                                                 
12 Reliance was placed on the external examiner system, introduced in the UK in the 19th 
Century, to ensure comparability of standards of awards within disciplines and across 
institutions (Williams, 1992, p142). It remains a key component of internal quality assurance 
processes today, albeit with continued criticism in some quarters. 
13 UGC operated until 1988 and was deemed to have been successful in maintaining standards 
of the university system (Shattock, 1986, p50). 
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by senior academic staff, and acted as a buffer between the Government and the 
universities. It provided advice to the Government regarding resource allocation, based 
in part on information gathered from its quinquennial visits to the universities to assess 
the institutions’ proposed priorities for the next five years (Shattock, 1986, p47; Silver 
and Silver, 1986, p15). In exchange for this buffer, universities were to keep national 
needs in mind when developing their academic programmes and priorities (Halsey, 
1969, p136; Parry, 2001, p118).  
In this context, according to Brown, institutional quality assurance in the universities 
was ‘still largely a tacit process, with small and varying amounts of formality and 
codification’ (2013, p423). In contrast, public sector higher education institutions14 
operated from the mid-1980s under the auspices of the National Advisory Body for 
Local Authority Education (NAB) in relation to resource allocation, and from the 1960s 
the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA)15 and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
(HMI) for the award of degrees and teaching effectiveness and use of resources (Silver 
and Silver, 1986, p23).  
 
                                                 
14 The public sector included the polytechnics and higher education colleges. 
15 Established by Royal Charter in 1965. 
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Education Reform Act 1988
 
Figure 1 Adapted from QAA (2008b) The history of the Quality Assurance Agency 
for Higher Education  
The Government’s acceptance of the Lindop report16 in 1985 reduced the burden for 
some polytechnics somewhat by enabling certain institutions to award degrees on behalf 
of the CNAA. This was however, predicated on the institution being validated by 
CNAA to do so, and on them undertaking their own internal quality assurance processes 
(Brennan, 1989, p137). The Lindop report, according to Williams (2009, p9), was less 
than complimentary about the role of the universities in safeguarding academic 
standards of the provision they validated. It recommended that there should be a single 
body charged with maintaining oversight of university validation in general. 
                                                 
16 The Lindop report was the Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Academic Validation 
in Public Sector Higher Education, chaired by Sir Norman Lindop. 
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Realising the emerging threat to their academic autonomy, the universities, through 
their representative body, CVCP, sought to take the initiative and undertook a number 
of activities with the aim of: demonstrating the quality of university higher education, 
vindicating current practices and making sufficient recommendations to show that the 
sector was responsive to the environment 17 (Booth and Roper, 1992, p 277; Williams, 
1992, p143). For example the Reynolds report (1986) ‘Academic Standards in 
Universities’ reaffirmed and reinforced the importance and value of the external 
examiner system as a means of maintaining comparability (Silver and Silver, 1986, p15; 
Trow, 1996, p205). It also incorporated three formal codes of practice for the sector on: 
the external examiners system; postgraduate training, research, and appeals; as well as a 
paper on universities’ internal procedures for monitoring academic standards (Williams, 
1992, p143; Henkel, 2000, p69).  
In 1990 CVCP set up their own ‘external’ quality assurance function, in an attempt to 
pre-empt the perceived threat from the government to introduce an inspection regime 
(Williams, 2009, p1; Brown, 2013, p424). The Academic Audit Unit (AAU) was 
established in October 1990 and undertook reviews of universities at institutional level 
(institutional audit) using a small cadre of auditors nominated by their vice-chancellors 
from 1991 (Williams, 2009, p4). The reviews were on a voluntary basis and there was 
no evaluative judgement. Reports were not published and recorded ‘points for further 
consideration’ rather than recommendations (Sursock, 2011, p118). This deliberate 
‘gentle’ approach, based on a spirit of courtesy, modesty and respect, was seen by its 
Director as the only way to maximise the likelihood of acceptance and respect within 
the sector (Williams, 2009, p8).  
The establishment of the AAU was a clear example of CVCP, under its then leader 
Professor Stuart Sutherland, leading the university sector, acting to safeguard its 
                                                 
17 CVCP set up the Academic Standards Group to look at the issue of quality and standards, 
chaired by Philip Reynolds, former Vice-Chancellor of Lancaster University. 
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academic autonomy, and being allowed to do so by the government. However, the Unit 
only operated for 18 months. But its formation established the precedent of the higher 
education sector owning the body that undertakes external review on its behalf, a 
precedent that is still visible in the governance and operation of the QAA today. 
In 1992, the Further and Higher Education Act marked another significant development 
in the quality assurance of higher education, with the re-designation of polytechnics as 
universities, the abolition of the CNAA, and the establishment of the new Funding 
Councils for England, Scotland and Wales18. Each had a statutory responsibility to 
assess the quality of education provided by the institutions they funded (HMSO, 1992, 
p53; Morley, 2004, p15). Each Funding Council was required by the legislation to have 
means to satisfy itself that the higher education they purchased on behalf of the public 
represented good value. Each of the three Funding Councils set up an internal quality 
assessment group to undertake quality assessments, based on a methodology developed 
in spring 1992 by HMI. In England the reviews were conducted through the Teaching 
Quality Assessment (TQA) method which used a sampling basis to look at courses and 
resulted in judgements being made in relation to six ‘aspects’19 of higher education 
provision and in published reports (Morley, 2004, p15) (see section 3.2.1).  
Due to time constraints, the Government did not attempt to rationalise the existence of 
AAU and the new Funding Council in 1992, and the AAU was followed by the Higher 
Education Quality Council (HEQC) - an organisation that continued to be owned and 
funded by the higher education sector itself. In keeping with this, the HEQC undertook 
the institutional level audit of universities’ (old and new) quality assurance mechanisms 
                                                 
18 The Funding Councils replaced the short lived (1988-1992) University Funding Council and 
the Polytechnics and Colleges University Council which replaced the UGC and NAB 
respectively. 
19 The six elements considered were: curriculum design, content and organisation; teaching, 
learning and assessment; student progression and achievement; student support and guidance; 
learning resources; quality management and enhancement. These were graded on a four point 
scale and provided that each aspect was graded 2 or better, the quality of the education was 
approved (QAA, 2009b). 
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and structures (Williams, 2009, p10). Reports continued to be judgement free and 
unpublished until 1995 when a report to HEQC by Coopers and Lybrand recommended 
that outcomes in HEQC academic audit reports be differentiated by level of urgency 
(Brown, 2013, p425; former QAA colleague, personal communication, 2015). 
In addition, the HEQC also provided the universities with guidance materials to support 
them in developing their quality assurance systems. Such guidance was, as is the case 
with the QAA, drawn directly from the academic expertise within the sector and within 
the HEQC itself. 
In this context it is possible to suggest that the HEQC remained part of the sector or at 
the very least was at its edge. In contrast, the Quality Division within the HEFCE was 
very much an arms-length agent of the Government and deemed to be more of a threat 
to academics as they were assessing the quality of teaching directly. Such assessments 
were exceedingly controversial and disliked, despite the use of academic peers within 
the reviewing teams (Morley, 2003, p17). Morley also suggests that some within the 
sector viewed subject level review a ‘valuable opportunity for organisational 
development and reflection’ (2003, p17), but this was only a minority. 
In 1995 the outcome of the Barnett Review, commissioned by the HEFCE to review 
TQA, recommended that the review method be abolished, or moved from a sampling to 
a universal basis. There was a suspicion within the sector that Barnett was trying to 
‘break the system’ with his latter suggestion for a universal approach (former QAA 
colleague, personal communication, 2015). The latter approach was accepted by the 
HEFCE and a new method ‘subject review’ was established. This decision increased the 
burden of external review and resulted in pressure from a number of vice-chancellors on 
the Secretary of State who in turn requested that the various systems be amalgamated, 
not least to reduce recurrent costs (Morley, 2004, p17). In the period between the 
announcement and the establishment of a Joint Planning Group (JPG) to develop 
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detailed proposals for a single agency, there were a number of heated discussions and 
examples of the sector through its representative bodies, particularly CVCP, influencing 
the Government. Indeed, Brown (2004, p105) provides some interesting examples of 
the Government having to withdraw proposals or alter plans in the light of significant 
objections from CVCP. Brown also notes however the warning the Minister for Higher 
Education issued to CVCP members at its conference in 1995, stating that the 
consequence of failure to agree on a new system would be the continuation of the 
current one (Brown, 2004, p106). Such actions exemplify the complex power 
relationship between the Government and the universities not least because of the 
autonomous status of the universities.  
Within the JPG it was ultimately agreed that the purpose of the new single agency 
should be to ‘provide a service for assuring the quality of higher education and 
standards of programmes and awards for higher education institutions in England, 
Northern Ireland and Wales and, if appropriate, HE institutions in Scotland’ (HEFCE, 
1996). In return for the promised reduction in the assessment burden, the universities 
had to accept that their ownership of the system would be reduced and shared with the 
Government via the Funding Councils (Brown, 2013, p427). This marked a move away 
from ownership of its own quality assurance body, HEQC, by the higher education 
sector alone. The critical issue was whether this single agency would mark a further 
shift away from the sector being able to influence its own regulatory system and 
towards greater control by the Government. 
The JPG met between January and November 1996 to develop plans for the new 
agency. Membership included representatives from CVCP, the Standing Conference of 
Principals (SCOP)20, the Committee of Scottish Higher Education Principals, and the 
Funding Councils. Assessors from the Government departments were also present. 
                                                 
20 The representative body for higher education colleges is now GuildHE. 
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There was however no direct representation from HEQC on the Group (Brown, 2004, 
p110-111). HEQC’s input took place mainly at a more operational level through the 
working group set up to develop the more detailed plans. This pattern, of excluding 
HEQC from strategic level decision-making by the representative bodies of the sector 
and the HEFCE (the Government) has been repeated for the QAA, particularly in the 
period after 2009 (see section 3.2.4).  
After some significant negotiations, the QAA was incorporated in March 1997 as ‘an 
independent entity, legally owned by the representative bodies of the institutions but 
funded by a combination of institutional subscriptions and funding council payments’ 
(Brown, 2013, p427). Its new Board, new Chief Executive and staff formally took over 
HEQC’s functions on 1 August 1997. This meant that although the QAA is independent 
in its operation, the national strategies to which it works are decided upon by the 
representative bodies acting on behalf of the sector and the Funding Councils acting on 
behalf of the Government (Williams, 2009, p16-17). In this context the QAA is, 
according to Williams, one of its former Chief Executives, simply an advisor (Williams, 
2009, p17). He states that the QAA’s role is ‘to turn strategy into operational reality’; 
and in doing so protect the boundaries of autonomy of the universities, once they have 
been (re)negotiated with the HEFCE (Williams, 2009, p17), although the QAA’s first 
Chief Executive might not have seen the Agency’s role in quite the same passive way 
(former QAA colleague, personal communication, 2015). This is potentially an 
interesting dilemma. Part of the QAA’s role appears to be closely linked to the sector - 
protecting the boundaries of the autonomy of the universities, yet most of its work is 
contracted by the HEFCE, as the QAA’s primary funder and an agent of the 
Government21.  
                                                 
21 After 2010, HEFCE contribution to the QAA’s overall budget reduced as the Agency 
undertook contracts for other Government Departments. For example QAA’s work for the 
Home Office in relation to Highly Trusted Status and Review for Educational Oversight for 
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Equally, within the QAA’s operationalisation process, there is input from the sector and 
the Funding Councils through the structure of the QAA’s Board of Directors, which at 
its inception comprised four representatives appointed jointly by the representative 
bodies for higher education22, four representatives appointed jointly by the Funding 
Councils23, and six independent members including the Chair, appointed by the Board. 
Officers of the Board comprised the Chief Executive of the QAA and members of the 
Directorate. Observers were from the relevant government department (Brown, 2004, 
p122), although this has since been opened to officers of the Funding Councils or 
equivalent, the officers of the representative bodies, the Higher Education Academy and 
a student representative nominated by the National Union of Students. Over time further 
changes have taken place to reflect changes to the structure and funding of the sector. 
For example, the inclusion of a representative on behalf of the further education 
colleges delivering higher education provision24 and a change in the status of students 
from observers to full members (see section 3.2.3). 
With these structures and historical antecedents, the QAA sits in a complex position 
between the sector, the Government and their agents, and students.  
The mandate for much of the QAA’s work arose from the National Committee of 
Inquiry into Higher Education25 (1996-1997) (NCIHE) chaired by Lord Dearing26, and 
commissioned by the Government to: 
                                                                                                                                               
privately funded organisations recruiting overseas students onto higher education or related 
courses. 
22 Currently – Universities Scotland (previously Higher Education Scotland), Universities UK 
(previously CVCP), Higher Education Wales and GuildHE (previously SCOP). 
23 Department for Employment and Learning (Northern Ireland), Higher Education Funding 
Council for England, Higher Education Funding Council for Wales and Scottish Funding 
Council. 
24 The representative from the further education colleges is nominated by the UK Council of 
Colleges subject to approval by the Board. 
25 A separate Standing Committee chaired by Ron Garrick (the Garrick Inquiry) was established 
to advise the National Committee on the distinctive nature of the education system in Scotland. 
26 Lord Dearing was the Chancellor of the University of Nottingham 
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 ‘make recommendations on how the purposes, shape, structure, size and 
funding of higher education, including support for students, should 
develop to meet the needs of the United Kingdom over the next 20 years’ 
(NCIHE 1997, p5) 
The Committee was established in May 1996 by the Government with the 
agreement of the Opposition in the light of the increasing (financial) crisis 
facing the higher education sector and threats by the universities to take things 
into their own hands (Watson and Bowden, 2007, p7-8). 
Although not all of the recommendations from the Dearing review were accepted by the 
Government27 in relation to quality assurance, the QAA’s agenda was significantly 
wider than that of HEQC (Brown, 2004, p116). It included the need to: 
 assure the quality of higher education provision;  
 verify standards of awards against recognised standards of awards; 
 develop/maintain external reference points such as a qualifications framework28;  
 develop a code of practice relating to particular areas of activity, such as 
collaborative provision and postgraduate work; 
 develop sources of public information about the quality of programmes through 
for example programme specifications29;    and 
 advise government on the award of degree-awarding powers.  
(NCIHE, 1997, chapter ten).  
The QAA therefore had two main areas of work: quality assurance and development. 
This mandate also places the QAA in an interesting position. On the one hand through 
its quasi-regulatory function, it operationalises the Quality Assurance Framework set 
                                                 
27 The recommendation for the QAA ‘to manage a strengthened external examiner system’… 
and ‘establish a UK-wide pool of academic staff from which institutions must select external 
examiners’ (NCIHE 1997, paragraph 10.93) was rejected by the Government after taking 
soundings with the representative bodies. However, concerns about the reliability and 
independence of the external examiner system have been raised periodically since then – for 
example in the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Select Committee’s (IUSS Select 
Committee) review of the Student and Universities (House of Commons, 2009a). 
28 A proposed framework was outlined in the Dearing Report (NCIHE, 1997, Chapter ten). 
29 Programme specifications provide public information on the nature of courses, the intended 
outcomes of the programme, the knowledge, understanding and skills that a student will be 
expected to have upon completion and potential exit points during the programme of study. 
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out by the higher education funding bodies and the sector’s representative bodies – a 
mixture of the Government and the sector working together to set the Framework. It 
also advises the Government (the Privy Council) on matters relating to degree-awarding 
powers and university title. In this context it is working solely, but at arms-length, for 
the Government.  
On the other hand, the QAA’s mandate requires the Agency to work closely with higher 
education institutions and their representative bodies to draw on their expertise in 
developmental work leading to guidance such as the Academic Infrastructure30/UK 
Quality Code for Higher Education31. In developing these documents, the QAA acts as a 
facilitator bringing together staff from higher education institutions. As Brown (2004, 
p141) notes, however, the outcomes of these activities still relate to the QAA’s 
regulatory function and concern remains within the sector that they are a means to 
introduce standardisation, leading to a loss of autonomy, diversity and innovation in the 
sector.  
Even from this brief description of the QAA’s role it would suggest that from the outset 
the QAA holds some form of mediating role between and with the Government and the 
higher education sector.  
  
                                                 
30 The Academic Infrastructure was a set of nationally agreed reference points, developed in 
conjunction with UK higher education sector, which until 2014 gave all institutions a shared 
starting point for setting, describing and assuring the quality and standards of their higher 
education courses (QAA, 2009a). The Academic Infrastructures was made up of Subject 
benchmark statements, the Code of practice, the Frameworks for Higher Education 
Qualifications, and Programme specifications. 
31 The UK Quality Code succeed the Academic Infrastructure in academic year 2012/13. 
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2.3 The Wider Context: the stratified sector 
As noted in Chapter one, the overall professional issue being considered why the QAA 
is viewed and portrayed differently depending on who is making the assessment and in 
what context. The research is focused in England only and it is well documented that 
the sector is highly stratified and increasingly diverse (see Figure 2), with a perceived 
hierarchy of prestige based predominantly on institutional reputation formed from a 
variety of factors including the reputation of individual academics (Halsey, 1961, p341; 
Bernstein, 2000, p60; Becher and Trowler, 2001, p5). Although as Holmes (2001, p32) 
suggests, nobody is really keen to discuss the implications of the perceived hierarchy of 
prestige in higher education, including the student learning experience. 
 
Figure 2  Types of institution in the UK higher education sector. 
 
In England in 2014 there were some 337 higher education providers, of which 133 can 
award their own degrees32 (DBIS, 2014). Of these, seven organisations are privately 
                                                 
32 An organisation without degree awarding powers must work in formal collaboration with one 
that does. 
Higher Education Sector 
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awarding powers 
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owned33; the oldest is the University of Buckingham which has held degree awarding 
powers since its incorporation as a university in 1973 and receipt of its Royal Charter in 
1983. The most recent is RDI, a for-profit organisation that specialises in distance 
learning provision. There are 101 institutions that can formally call themselves 
universities (DBIS, 2014), a title that has been protected by government legislation 
since 1998. Between 2012 and 2014, three private providers gained the right to use the 
title ‘university’: BPP University, Regents University London, and the University of 
Law. Since gaining university title BPP University and the University of Law have been 
bought out by other companies. Such action caused some significant anxiety for the 
Government, and resulted in the QAA stating in its most recent review method (Higher 
Education Review) that a review would be triggered if a change of ownership takes 
place34 (QAA, 2014a, p10).   
The institutions described above only touch on the diversity that exists within the sector. 
Each will have their own mission, values, purposes and reputation and because of their 
reputation (predominantly) they will also perceive that they hold a different position 
within the perceived higher education hierarchy of prestige. This position will 
determine how well the institution is influenced by external factors. For example, those 
institutions considered to be towards the bottom of the perceived hierarchy of prestige 
are more likely to be responsive to market demand for particular courses or curricula. 
This is because the reputation of the university is not sufficient to attract applications 
from students alone. It is the offer available to students which will differentiate the 
university from its competitors and generate student demand for places. Those towards 
the top of the hierarchy, in contrast, can rely on the university’s reputation to attract 
applications from students. Demand outstrips supply and students are selected rather 
                                                 
33 Ashridge Business School; BPP University; College of Estate Management; RDI; Regents 
University London; Richmond, the American International University in London; University of 
Buckingham; University of Law. 
34 The review must take place within four years of the change in ownership occurring, this may 
be the originally schedule review (QAA, 2014a, p10). 
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than recruited. Any influence from the market on the provision is more of an 
unconscious or selective incorporation (Bernstein, 1996, p74; McGettigan, 2013, p154; 
McLean. Abbas and Ashwin, 2013, p271). 
In the context of external quality assurance, it is suggested that a similar demarcation 
based on position in the perceived hierarchy will steer how different higher education 
providers perceive, construct and appropriate the QAA. What is less clear is on what 
basis, and the extent to which this is done.   
2.4  Empirical Considerations 
One of the key dimensions of the professional issue being considered is the relationship 
between the QAA and the universities. Each of these will have its own unique response 
to the Agency. This however, is impossible to deal with empirically; so drawing on the 
literature regarding the development of higher education in England35, I identified three 
‘ideal types’ of universities. These then formed the basis for categorising the different 
universities in England before selecting three universities to approach to participate in 
the research (see Chapter four).  
Other means of classifying the sector are available, but they were considered either too 
complex for selecting only three universities, or too generalised and based on historical 
timings. For example the notion of ‘old’ and ‘new’ universities which is predicated by 
the status of universities as at July 1992 when the Further and Higher Education Act 
marked the unification of the university and public sectors in UK higher education, and 
the single largest establishment of ‘new’ universities. An additional category sometimes 
used is ‘the noughties’ to describe institutions who gained university title from the 
beginning of the twenty-first century onwards. The timing of gaining university status 
does not necessarily reflect the values and culture of the university.  
                                                 
35 See Briggs, 1969; Halsey, 1969; Reeves, 1969; Minogue, 1973; Brubacher, 1977; Salter and 
Tapper 1994; Halsey, 1995; Scott, 1995; Anderson, 2006; Graham, 2008. 
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Scott (1995, p44-50) outlined a framework identifying 12 sub-sectors in the British 
university system and at least five further sub-groups if you include the colleges of 
higher, further education and other private providers36 (Scott, 1995, p49). While this 
framework is overly complex for the purposes of this research, the description of a 
number of the sub-sectors was helpful in drawing up my three ‘ideal types’. Other 
frameworks came to light after the data collection period, for example that used by 
Ashwin, Abbas, and McLean (2012) who identified four types of universities: selective, 
prestige, community and diversity.  
In reviewing the literature, including Halsey’s (1995, p56) notion of the ‘traditional’, 
the ‘liberal’ and the ‘modern’ university, I identified three ‘ideal types’ of universities: 
the ‘doctrinal’, the ‘secular’, and the ‘vocational’ university. Each are characterised by a 
number of factors including: their historical antecedents, governance structures, 
curriculum37, culture and values, affiliation to a mission group and susceptibility to 
external influences.  
At this point two important caveats need to be stressed. Firstly, the ‘ideal types’ of 
universities are purely theoretical models. In reality a university will demonstrate 
characteristics from each type as they continually adapt to the changing landscape. For 
example many ‘vocational’ institutions, in reality, offer a broad curriculum at both 
undergraduate and postgraduate levels (Scott, 1995, p31), often because of the lure of 
the image of what a traditional university should be (see section 2.4.3). 
                                                 
36 The sub-sectors and sub-groups are: 1) the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, 2) 
University of London, 3) Victorian Civic universities, 4) Redbrick universities, 5) Sui generis 
institutions of Durham and Keele, 6) Technological universities, 7) the Scottish universities, 8) 
the University of Wales and the University of Glamorgan, 9) Queen’s University and the 
University of Ulster in Northern Ireland, 10) the Open University, 11) Old ‘new’ universities, 
12) New ‘new’ universities, 13) Colleges of higher education and the subgroups of multi-
faculty, liberal arts, mixed economy, specialised, 14) Further education colleges, 15) Corporate 
classrooms. 
37 To assess the nature of a university’s curriculum, I used top level JACS codes to classify 
academic subjects. The Joint Academic Coding System was devised by the Higher Education 
Statistics Agency and the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service. 
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Nevertheless, certain defining characteristics of each model can be seen more clearly 
within the culture and values of universities in England. It is my hypothesis that these 
characteristics contribute to the capacity of universities to recontextualise the QAA and 
its messages. 
Secondly, when talking about the source of authority for a particular type of university, 
it should be recognised that since medieval times, universities have always operated 
within a political system. Therefore the relationship between intellectual authority and 
political authority has been continually (re)negotiated to different extents as 
circumstances change (Finch, 1997, p146). What has changed perhaps is the degree to 
which the universities influence these negotiations.  
2.4.1 The ‘doctrinal’ university 
Knowledge 
The ‘doctrinal’ university has its foundation in the Christian-Hellenic tradition where 
the purpose of higher education is to produce good citizens and train the elite as future 
leaders and train the learned professions (Salter and Tapper, 1994, p9).  
The ‘doctrinal’ university is a community of scholars in which individual students seek 
fuller personal development. There is a desire for knowledge, for self-expression, for 
the satisfaction of intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual needs, and for a fuller life 
(Ministry of Reconstruction, 1918, para 2). Education at this level is identified with a 
concern for excellence that emphasises the innate worth of a non-utilitarian and ‘pure’ 
knowledge. The associated image is heavily redolent of the medieval link between 
religion and knowledge (Eliot, 1936, p173; Newman, 1965; Graham, 2008, p12). The 
historical relationship within the monastic foundation between clergy and laity is 
replicated in the ‘doctrinal’ university by the relationship between tutor and taught. 
Teaching is based on a lecture-tutorial system, where teaching is more intimate. Low 
staff:student ratios are the norm. Students are inherently drawn from the best public 
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schools, and are intelligent, motivated and on graduation enter well paid (elite) jobs 
(Palfreyman, 2001, p11, p19). 
Governance 
In the ‘doctrinal’ university governance takes place within the exclusive setting of a 
self-governing community of scholars in which the preservation of standards and the 
definitions of excellence fall within the sole prerogative of senior members of the 
academic body (Martin, 1969, p85). The demos (one don, one vote) ensures that the 
academics are really in charge with even the rank-and-file academic able to challenge 
and control the university’s Vice-Chancellor and governing body (Palfreyman, 2001, 
p22), what Scott (1995, p62) refers to as the ‘donnish’ style of governance.  
Curriculum 
The primary objectives of this type of university are both narrow and inward-looking 
(Martin, 1969, p85). As Eliot notes (1949, p174) ‘the first educational task of the 
community [of scholars] should be the preservation of education within the cloister, 
uncontaminated by the deluge of barbarism outside’. 
The curriculum therefore is predominantly made up of disciplines which Bernstein 
(2000, p54) describes as singulars (see section 3.1.4) and which are predominantly 
specialised knowledge structures. These might be the ‘hard pure38’ disciplines such as 
physics, chemistry, or the ‘soft pure’ ones of sociology and psychology (Biglan, 1973, 
p198). The singulars are strongly insulated from external influences, although this does 
not necessarily mean that they are isolated from the outside world. Bernstein suggests 
that such disciplines were linked to the development of nationalism, Britain’s 
international position and the management of the empire (Bernstein, 2000, p54). 
The curriculum in the ‘doctrinal’ model is perceived to be superior to those developed 
elsewhere because it favours the moral over the scientific: 
                                                 
38 The concepts of ‘hard’ - ‘soft’ and ‘pure’ – ‘applied’ are dimensions of Biglan’s framework to 
characterise subject matter in different academic areas (1973, p198, 201-202). 
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 ‘It may well be doubted whether we would ever have regarded any 
acquaintance with the material forces of nature as good substitutes for 
the intellectual culture derived from classical studies, or as equal to them 
in discipline value.’  
(Fitch, 1987, p141) 
 
‘The longer the older universities in this country can maintain some 
standard of classical education, the better for those who look to the future 
with an active desire for reform and an intelligent acceptance of 
change….the hierarch of education should be a religious hierarchy. The 
universities are too far gone in secularisation, they have too long lost any 
common fundamental assumption as to what education is for, and they 
are too big.’  
(Eliot, 1936, p173)  
While as noted in the caveats above, the ‘doctrinal’ university is just a theoretical ‘ideal 
type’, its image of tradition influences significantly how it is perceived, even though 
universities such as Oxford and Cambridge have broadened their curricula significantly 
and now have more in common with a number of ‘secular’ universities.  
As noted earlier, due to the culture of the close relationship between teacher and taught, 
learning is based on a lecture and more critically the tutorial system. The latter of which 
perpetuates the status of the student as a novitiate. Teaching is in small groups and on a 
more personal foundation (Minogue, 1973).  
External influence 
The ‘doctrinal’ university’s power base arises originally from its close proximity to the 
Church and the regulative discourse, and subsequently its support from the Crown and 
the aristocracy (Halsey 1969, p131). Its continued role in producing Britain’s senior 
civil servants, politicians and industrialists safeguarded its autonomy up until the 1950s 
and 1960s (Halsey, 1969, p131, p137). As Salter and Tapper (1994, p8) suggest, 
‘University and state were joined by a seamless web of shared understandings and 
values’, matters were resolved informally. The notion of the universities not being 
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trusted by the Government, let alone pressured, was unthinkable (Salter and Tapper, 
1994, p8).  
Historically the ‘doctrinal’ university has significant wealth arising from endowments. 
Once the Government began to fund the higher education system in the UK, such 
wealth could be used as a lever of power, demonstrating a lack of reliance on the State 
for the continuation of the university (Palfreyman, 2001, p17). 
Examples 
Key examples in England of the ‘doctrinal’ model are the medieval and elite 
universities of Oxford39 and Cambridge40. These universities are operated on a quasi-
autonomous and powerful college basis with its membership of an elected Head 
(Warden, President, Rector, Provost, Master), senior scholars (Fellows) and junior 
students (Scholars, Commoners, Pensioners), epitomising the scholarly governance 
structure of the ‘doctrinal’ university (Palfreyman, 2001, p9). The historical link 
between church and college was marked; fellows in Holy Orders carried on well into the 
nineteenth century the tradition of monastic education. Any new areas of curriculum 
development were only justifiable if linked to the purposes of God (Reeves, 1969, p65-
66).  
The demand in the early nineteenth century for an expanded provision of higher 
education in England witnessed the adoption of the ‘doctrinal’ model in centres outside 
Oxford and Cambridge. New institutions such as King’s College in London (1828) and 
University College Durham (1831) were established; the latter having been founded 
through the initiative of the Dean and Chapter of Durham Cathedral. 
Increasingly, however, the dominance and exclusivity of the ‘doctrinal’ university 
education came under attack. For example, non-Anglicans deplored the Church of 
                                                 
39 Oxford University was established in 1167 in response to English students being barred from 
attending the University of Paris (Palfreyman, 2001, p9). 
40 Cambridge University was established in 1209 in the light of difficulties with the local 
population in Oxford and the migration of some scholars to the safer enclave of Cambridge 
(Reeves, 1969, p69). 
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England’s monopolistic hold over higher education; comparisons were also drawn with 
the position in Scotland, where the four universities41 were independent of the Church 
of Scotland. Accordingly, there was a move in England to break the traditional link 
between Church and university, aided by the Royal Commissions on Oxford and 
Cambridge (Salter and Tapper, 1994, p9). However, the notion of higher education as 
being an elite pursuit and universities a community of scholars remained (Salter and 
Tapper, 1994, p9).  
Although the ‘doctrinal’ university sits more closely with the concept of the Humboldt 
University in Germany, where the community of scholars undertook intellectual inquiry 
(research) entirely for its own sake42, this ‘ideal type’ of university acknowledges the 
link between higher education and society, in as much as the university develops the 
elite who are well trained for their work and more able to make a positive contribution 
to society: it civilises the individual (Newman, 1965, p xxxi; Reeves, 1969, p61). 
Academic quality was taken as read, with the experience of its academics and peer 
review, in its purist form, being sufficient to uphold academic standards. 
2.4.2 The ‘secular’ university 
Knowledge 
The initial characteristics of the ‘secular’ universities43 were seen in not only the break 
away from the Church of England, but also a cultural shift in the purposes of higher 
education towards a more liberal-technical ideology: where higher education was still 
an elite occupation and pure knowledge was valued more highly than applied 
knowledge, but with the balance shifting towards the latter (Halsey, 1969, p129; 
Holmes, 2001, p30- 31; Rich, 2001, p49-50). There was increasing emphasis on the 
                                                 
41 St. Andrews (established 1413); Glasgow (1450), Aberdeen (1494), and Edinburgh (1582). 
42 In contrast the Napoleonic university was part of the state and staffed by civil servants with 
the purpose of creating knowledge and providing education to benefit social and economic well-
being (Brubacher, 1977, p6; Graham, 2008, p12). 
43 Initially these were university colleges with their degrees awarded by the University of 
London. 
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advancement of knowledge and the scientific nature of knowledge, rather than 
knowledge for purely moral purposes (Salter and Tapper, 1994, p10). Nevertheless the 
‘secular’ university still had an important role in civilising the student to ensure they 
were able to contribute to the improvement of society (Briggs, 1969, p 112-113). 
Curriculum 
In relation to the curricula, the ‘secular’ university does not abandon the curricula of the 
‘doctrinal’ university in its entirety, but proportionately greater emphasis is placed on 
practical subjects both hard and soft. So the teaching of classics and history (singulars) 
is complemented by the study of subjects which are linked to the local needs of industry 
within the community (regions) (Briggs, 1969, p98). However, greater emphasis is 
placed on the outward looking regions, based on the stronger institutional links with 
what Bernstein (2000, p56) describes as fields of practice. The curriculum is less well 
insulated from the influence of external bodies.  
In the ‘secular’ university professorships in divinity, civil law and rhetoric, seen in the 
‘doctrinal’ university, are replaced by ones in agriculture, chemistry, dyeing, metallurgy 
and textile technology (Whitaker, 1900). The occurrence of such chairs reflected local 
industrial specialisms (Reeves, 1969, p77).  
The mixed nature of the curriculum within the ‘secular’ university means that the 
management of both singulars and regions, each with their own place in the perceived 
hierarchy of prestige, is likely to be more challenging and demanding. The emergence 
of the professional and specialist administrator is necessary to support such demands 
(Fielden, 1976, p51; Rich, 2001, p56). 
Governance 
The closer links of the ‘secular’ university with both local industry and the local 
government in the municipality, meant that the ‘secular’ university was more ‘town and 
gown’ rather than the ‘ivory tower’ of the ‘doctrinal’ university with greater integration 
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of the university into the community. Anderson (2006, loc 128 of 4994) suggests, 
however, that difference is not as stark as often presented, noting that the medieval 
universities were both ‘vocational and utilitarian in character. In terms of governance, 
such close links historically resulted initially in a powerful lay majority on the 
universities’ governing councils. Although as a degree of university income came from 
the Government this was mediated by a more ‘democratic’ style of governance (Scott, 
1995, p15, p63). Academic senates increasingly directed university business, chaired by 
the vice-chancellor and made up a greater proportion of academic staff, rather than 
professoriate, which meant that management was by consensus (Scott, 1995, p63-64). 
External influence 
Another characteristic of the ‘secular’ university is an acceptance of greater 
involvement of outside agencies, particularly from industry and the professions in issues 
of curriculum content, academic standards and determining excellence. Initially this 
stemmed from the status of university colleges which, unable to award their own 
degrees, accepted the University of London (1836) as their examining body (Silver and 
Silver, 1986, p12). It also stemmed from the requirements of external professional 
bodies such as the Inns of Court and the General Medical Council, which validated the 
curriculum delivered by the university. 
This external influence, however, is still within the context of respect for the autonomy 
of universities, albeit having to be defended more overtly as the close relationship 
between the state and universities begins to fragment. This stems from the Government 
changing its policy towards higher education, as it realises that state influence if not 
control of higher education is necessary to achieve its developing economic ideology 
(Salter and Tapper 1994, p11).  
Due cognisance has to be taken of a series of external influences which because of the 
reliance on patronage, funding and validation means that this ‘ideal type’ of university 
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is more vulnerable to the changing demands of the external bodies. Not least because 
such universities lack the significant endowments of the ‘doctrinal’ universities 
(Holmes, 2001, p31). The ‘secular’ university is not insulated from the Government and 
industry to the same extent as the ‘doctrinal’ university.  
Examples 
Historical examples of ‘secular’ universities include the University of Hull whose 
embryonic college received considerable support from the local authority (Bamford, 
1978, p37-39); University of Birmingham (1875) with its strong links with Cadburys; 
University of Bristol (1876) with its links with Frys and Wills, and the University of 
Nottingham (with Boots) (Anderson, 2006, loc 1334 of 4994). 
2.4.3 The ‘vocational’ university 
Knowledge 
If the purpose of the ideal ‘doctrinal’ university is represented by the notion of academic 
freedom, and the ‘secular’ university the respect for local needs, the purpose of the ideal 
‘vocational’ university is to meet the economic, political and social needs of society. It 
is to provide greater skills-based higher education, within a more sophisticated schema 
of professional education (Minogue, 1973, p53). The emphasis is on teaching and 
applied research, often securing a stronger financial base for the university (Gledhill, 
2001, p95). Opening the opportunities for a broader range of students to enter higher 
education is an important part of the university’s missions (Gledhill, 2001, p97).  
The distinction between the ‘doctrinal’ and ‘vocational’ university is perhaps best 
summed up by a quotation from Edward Short, Secretary of State for Education and 
Science on 25th April, 1969: 
 ‘Broad theories about the purpose of the university can be polarised 
into two extremes. There is what I call the ivory tower theory, where 
learning is pursued and teaching undertaken in glorious disregard for 
the world outside….. On the other side, there is the bread and butter 
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theory where the demands of earning one’s living are the only 
determinants of what is taught or researched.’  
 
Governance 
The pattern of internal administration in the ‘vocational’ university is the key difference 
in the governance structures from the ‘doctrinal’ and ‘secular’ universities. No longer is 
the university managed solely through the academic senate or senior management 
positions filled by academic staff on a roll-over basis (Henkel, 2000, p55; Gledhill, 
2001, p99). In the ‘vocational’ university the powerful Executive is led by the Vice-
Chancellor (the Chief Executive), and is made up of posts such as Deputy Vice-
Chancellor, Pro-Vice Chancellor, and Academic Registrar that are managerial 
appointments (Scott, 1995, p64, p69; Henkel, 2000, p55). Professionals have replaced 
the academic amateur. Similarly other elements of the university’s administrative 
function are professionalised, in order to support the executive leadership. 
This shift from a collegial form of governance to a more bureaucratic structure, which 
emphasises the importance of management, rather than decision making through rituals, 
evolution and private networks, has resulted in a new type of academic, the academic 
manager. Such a person, while having an established academic reputation, is not usually 
a professor, and is appointed because they have the bureaucratic skills to undertake 
managerial tasks, rather than to act as the patriarch to colleagues and such as the head of 
department (Henkel, 2000, p235-236). Academic influence prevalent in the democratic 
‘secular’ university might, in the ‘vocational’ university, rely more readily on the 
influence of the trade unions in keeping with their historical antecedents and the nature 
of the managerialistic form of governance (Scott, 1995, p66). 
In turn this also changes perceptions of excellence. Where the ‘doctrinal’ model and, to 
a lesser extent, the ‘secular’ model equates excellence with the worth of a certain 
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educational ethos. In the ‘vocational’ university excellence is related to efficiency and 
effectiveness, and assessed through regulation (Scott, 1995, p66).  
Curriculum and external influence 
In the ‘vocational’ university the curriculum is dominated by regions and generics (see 
section 3.1.4) in order to meet the perceived demands of employers and the economy. 
Academics still hold responsibility for the development of the content and pedagogic 
discourse in the majority of cases, but this will be influenced by external agencies and 
demands of the market. The nature of the language within the curriculum will also be 
different, with greater reference to competencies and skills.  
This combination of regions and particularly the inclusion of generics within the 
curriculum, places the ‘vocational’ institution towards the ‘lower status’ end of the 
perceived hierarchy of knowledge status with generics focus on competence rather than 
academic understanding (Bernstein, 2000, p53-55; Ashwin, Abbas and McLean, 2015, 
p612). Nevertheless, the legitimisation of new subject areas is a key consideration for 
the ‘vocational’ university; criticism of developing ‘trivial subjects’ is common-place 
(Minogue, 1973, p60). Such legitimisation is often through external confirmation of 
their intrinsic worth. Equally, demonstrating that academic standards are being 
maintained is essential and testing by external bodies is passed off as rational, and often 
welcomed (Filippakou and Tapper, 2010, p485). 
Scott (1995, p31) however warns of over simplifying the demarcation between what I 
have called the ‘secular’ and ‘vocational’ universities in terms of knowledge base. He 
notes that the key demarcation between these two types of institutions is more 
administrative than educational in nature, even in the context of the ‘ideal type’. 
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Examples 
The origins of the new ‘vocationally’ orientated university are mixed. Some have 
developed from the former Colleges of Advance Technology (CAT)44 established from 
1956 in response to the universities’ reluctance to meet the Government’s developing 
economic ideology (Salter and Tapper, 1994, p14; Scott, 1995, p14). Examples included 
the Battersea CAT; Birmingham CAT; Bradford Institute of Technology; and Bristol 
CAT45. All of these colleges became universities following the review of the pattern of 
full-time higher education in Great Britain, the Robbins Review (Committee on Higher 
Education, 1963, piii). The examples given became the University of Surrey, Aston 
University, the University of Bradford and the University of Bath respectively.   
Other examples of the ideal ‘vocational’ university are the former polytechnics, for 
example Liverpool John Moores University, given university status as a result of the 
Further and Higher Education Act of 1992. Others were colleges of higher education, 
for example, University of Lincoln. The elevation to university status of former teacher 
training institutions, for example the University of Gloucestershire, has been followed 
by the ‘promotion’ of other specialist institutions such as the University for the Creative 
Arts.  
If there are common links amongst this variety of organisations, it is their experience of 
some form of external intervention in issues of instruction and teaching (Gledhill, 2001, 
p99) due to the historical antecedents of the ‘vocational’ university. The experience of 
the public sector institutions (the polytechnics and colleges of higher education) in 
                                                 
44 A number of local technical colleges, ‘of high standing’ were designated as College of 
Advanced Technology in 1956 and funded directly by the Ministry of Education (Briggs, 1969, 
p102). 
45 Other Colleges of Advance Technology that received university status in the light of the 
Robbins Report (1963) included: Brunel CAT - Brunel University; University of Wales Institute 
of Science and Technology (later part of Cardiff University); Chelsea CAT - Chelsea College of 
Science and Technology (part of the University of London then later subsumed into King's 
College London); Loughborough CAT - Loughborough University; Northampton CAT 
(London) - City University London; Salford CAT (the Royal College of Advanced Technology) 
- University of Salford. 
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relation to external agencies, such as the local authorities, the National Advisory Board 
(NAB) and the Council for National Academic Awards46 (CNAA) meant that they were 
well used to their operation being overseen or even directed by those outside the 
academy/university (Scott, 1995, p81). The role of such agencies is discussed further in 
the next chapter. 
2.4.4 Academic drift 
As noted at the beginning of this section, the three ‘ideal types’ described above are 
theoretical ideal concepts, and all universities in England will have some characteristics 
from each type of university. For example, the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge 
also conceded some adaptations towards the ‘secular’ university in order to maintain 
their monopoly over the high status institutions (Halsey, 1969, p134), although the 
values of the universities remain closer to the ‘doctrinal’ university.  
Another reason for this academic drift is the power of the ideology of the traditional 
university, and its ability to seduce and subvert higher education institutions into 
aspiring to be the same (Salter and Tapper, 1994, p17; Scott, 1995, p23). Prime 
examples are the CATs established in 1956 to take forward the State’s higher education 
agenda for promoting economic growth, these were absorbed into the university sector 
and remoulded into the image of the traditional universities (Salter and Tapper, 1994, 
p17).  
  
                                                 
46 The Council for National Academic Awards operated between 1965 and 1992 as the awarding 
body for degrees delivered at non-university institutions. In this context it had responsibility for 
the oversight of quality and standards of these awards. 
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2.5 Summary 
This chapter shows the complex position of the QAA in between the sector and the 
Government based in part on the antecedents of the QAA’s predecessor bodies. It also 
sets the QAA’s work in the wider context of the stratified and hierarchical higher 
education in England, and considers how the empirical challenge of selecting the 
universities to participate in the research might be overcome.  
The three ‘ideal types’ of universities identified in the chapter, although purely 
theoretical, provide a means of categorising the universities in England at the time of 
the research to provide a framework for selecting the three universities to participate in 
the research. 
The ‘doctrinal’ university is characterised by being a high status, elite university, with a 
long and distinguished history, staffed and governed by an elite community of scholars. 
It predominantly offers traditional subject singulars, such as physics and chemistry, 
where the discipline has very few external reference points and is solely responsible for 
the production of knowledge (Bernstein, 1996, p23). There are more academic staff 
undertaking research in the ‘doctrinal’ university than in either the ‘secular’ or 
‘vocational’ institutions (McLean, Abbas, and Ashwin, 2013, p270). To this end the 
‘doctrinal’ institution is strongly insulated from external influences and pressures. 
Responsibility for setting academic standards and for defining the nature of excellence 
sits exclusively with senior academic staff. The legitimate purpose of the university is a 
desire for knowledge, based on a concern for excellence that emphasises the innate 
worth of a purist, non-utilitarian ethos: the institution is inward rather than outward 
looking.  
The ‘secular’ university, in contrast, is characterised by a broader, more outward 
looking curriculum with greater emphasis on practical/scientific subjects, and stronger 
links with industry and commerce. Institutional classification is weaker as a broader 
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range of external agencies have a legitimate contribution to make to curriculum design, 
assessment and setting academic standards. The university retains its elite positioning 
and an emphasis on both knowledge and skills competency. Its outputs, including 
students, are expected to make a more direct and practical contribution to society.  
The ‘vocational’ institution is characterised by curricula more closely aligned with 
economic, political and social needs. The subject areas offered are predominantly what 
Bernstein refers to as ‘regions’ arising from the recontextualisation of singulars in new 
subject areas with a greater emphasis on the field of practice (1996, p23). These new 
subject areas are weakly insulated and subject to external influences. The ‘vocational’ 
type is also characterised by institutional governance based on a bureaucratised 
structure using professional managers, rather than senior academic staff on a roll-over 
basis traditionally seen in ‘doctrinal’ institutions. The notion of excellence linked to the 
‘worth’ of a particular educational ethos has been replaced with management and 
efficiency. 
The next chapter will set out the analytical framework for exploring the relationships 
between the QAA and the universities, and between the QAA and the Government in 
more detail. It also explores the nature of the mediation process that QAA appears to 
undertake and how the universities implement the nationally agreed guidance and 
external assessment methods for assuring academic standards and quality in higher 
education.  
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CHAPTER THREE  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I describe the analytical framework used in the research, which is based 
on the work of Basil Bernstein and his concepts of the pedagogic device, its rules and in 
particular the notion of recontextualisation. I then use the framework to undertake an 
initial analysis of the QAA, using a series of examples from the Agency’s history and 
more contemporary developments. In doing this I begin to identify the specific areas 
that the research will explore. These are then crystallised at the end of the chapter into 
four research questions.  
3.1 The Analytical Framework 
3.1.1 Rationale for the framework 
Basil Bernstein has been described as providing a radically different and insightful way 
of analysing the hierarchies and divisions of the English education system (Ball, 2001, 
p41; Muller, 2001, p148). His contribution has been to extend the theories of cultural 
reproduction by recognising the influence of society within pedagogy, particularly in 
pre-tertiary education. More specifically he draws on the work primarily of Durkheim, 
but also Marx and Weber, to provide a systematic analysis of knowledge transmission 
and communication to show the way in which the educational system is related to the 
social division of labour (Sadovnik, 2001, p18-19).  
Although much of his work is considered highly abstract (Power, 2010, p244), his 
concept of recontextualisation, where knowledge is selectively appropriated, 
ideologically transformed, and transferred into a new discourse to be reproduced 
(Bernstein, 1996, p116), potentially provides a useful means of looking at the 
relationship between the QAA and the universities. It has the potential to allow me to 
explore the role of the QAA as a possible mediator in developing and implementing a 
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system of external quality assurance in UK higher education, as suggested in the 
previous chapter. The concept should also allow me to identify the location and process 
by which this mediation takes place and determine if the universities undertake a similar 
process, and whether the capacity to do so varies between the different types of 
universities. Finally, the concept should enable me to discuss the autonomy of 
universities, in relation to external quality assurance, from a more theoretical 
perspective. As Bernstein notes (1990, p86) the university system is now engaged in an 
increasing struggle over: ‘what should be transmitted, over the autonomy of 
transmissions, over the conditions of service of those who transmit, and over the 
procedures of evaluation of acquirers’. My research looks at the QAA’s role in this 
struggle. 
3.1.2 Bernstein and higher education 
In relation to higher education, much of the empirical research using Bernstein to date 
has focussed on pedagogic practice, teaching and learning, curriculum and discipline 
related issues47. Researchers have also used Bernstein’s work to look at academic 
professional identity (Beck and Young, 2005; McNamara, 2008), and the structure of 
knowledge itself (Maton, 2006). McLean, Abbas and Ashwin in their research project 
‘Quality and Inequality in University First Degrees’ (November 2008-January 2012) 
used Bernstein’s concepts to explore pedagogic quality and social justice issues in the 
sociology related social science degrees of four universities each with different statuses; 
and in doing so return to the very essence of Bernstein’s ‘project’ of exploring social 
injustice (McLean, Abbas and Ashwin, 2013, p264). This project makes specific 
reference to the QAA as an example of an agent of the Official Recontextualising Field 
(McLean, Abbas and Ashwin, 2013, p271). Research undertaken by Ashwin, Abbas and 
                                                 
47 See for example, Rosie, Bufton and Hirst, 2001; Beck 2002; Breier, 2004; Ensor, 2004; 
Wheelahan, 2007; Luckett 2009; Shay 2008, 2011; Geirsdótttir, 2011; Sarahinioti, Tstatsaroni, 
and Stamelos, 2011; Vorster 2011; Penny 2013; Whitcombe 2013; and Donnelly, 2014. 
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McLean subsequently (2015) considered how high-quality undergraduate education in 
England was represented in a range of policy documents, and again specific reference 
was made to the QAA; in this instance how the Agency represent quality in higher 
education. 
Bernstein is not without his critics, particularly of his early work (Apple, 2001, p91; 
Inglis, 2001, p78; Morais, 2001, p33; Sadovnik, 2001, p12). Even the proponents of 
Bernstein’s work admit that his level of abstraction and complex language make his 
theories challenging to understand (Danzig, 1995, p166; Holland, 2001, p132) and 
difficult to apply empirically (Dowling, 2005, p17; Power, 2010, p246). These 
difficulties, however, helped me to further problematise the professional issue regarding 
the QAA’s relationship with the universities. 
3.1.3 Knowledge structures and recontextualisation 
Before focussing specifically on the concept of recontextualisation, it is worth briefly 
setting out the theoretical context for the research.  
As noted above, Bernstein was interested in the structures of knowledge and its 
creation, transmission and acquisition. His conceptualisation of the pedagogic device 
provides a means of explaining the process by which access to knowledge is stratified 
(Ashwin, Abbas and McLean, 2012, p119). Many researchers, such as Bonal and 
Haavelsrud (2001, p330), Rambla (2003, p173) and Singh and Harris (2010, p253-55) 
discuss the increasing domination of the ‘state’ in regulating and controlling the 
pedagogic device and the PRF in pre-tertiary education. The pedagogic device therefore 
seemed to have the potential to explore the role of the QAA and its relationship with the 
universities and the Government. 
The fields within the pedagogic device are sites where teachers/academics undertake the 
creation, transmission and acquisition of knowledge: the field of production, the field of 
recontextualisation, and the field of reproduction respectively (see Figure 3). Bernstein 
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also suggests that there are a series of rules which regulate these processes/fields 
(Bernstein, 1990, p180-183, p191-192). Overall, the pedagogic device regulates how 
knowledge is distributed and to what effect, in terms of pedagogic identity and/or 
consciousness, and social destiny of the acquirer (Maton and Muller 2007, p19; 
McLean, Abbas and Ashwin, 2013, p269).  
The rules of the pedagogic device allow us to identify which groups in society are 
determining what is legitimate knowledge and who/what is influencing access to that 
knowledge store (the distributive rules); who is allowed to interpret and repackage that 
knowledge into curriculum policy, textbooks etc. (the recontextualising rules); and 
who is allowed to determine the academic legitimacy of those who reproduce 
knowledge by establishing a set of evaluative criteria to be attained (the evaluative 
rules) (see Figure 3 below) (Bernstein, 1996, p43-49; Bernstein, 2000, p28-36; Maton 
and Muller, 2007, p19). The pedagogic device therefore is both powerful and an ‘arena 
of struggle’ in which actors strive to control the device for their own means (Bernstein, 
1990, p206; Maton, 2004, p219; Ashwin, Abbas, and McLean, 2015, p611). 
 
 
 
Figure 3  The process and fields of knowledge and the relevant rules of the 
pedagogic device (adapted from Bernstein, 1996, p52 and Maton and 
Muller, 2007, p18). 
 
  Process Field Activity Site PD Rule 
   Creation Production of 
knowledge 
Research Research papers 
conferences, labs 
 
     
   Transmission Recontextualising Constructing the 
Curriculum 
Curriculum policy 
textbooks 
learning aids 
 
     
   Acquisition Reproduction Teaching Classrooms 
examinations 
 
Distributive 
 Recontextualising 
Evaluation 
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The rules are not ideologically free and are influenced by culture, context, classification 
and framing systems (Bernstein, 1996, p42). Therefore there are different pedagogic 
devices depending on socio-economic, historical, cultural and policy circumstances 
(McLean, Abbas and Ashwin, 2013, p269). The rules are also hierarchical with the 
distribution rules setting the limit on what counts as knowledge and therefore what is 
available to be recontextualised into the curriculum, which in turn limits the pedagogic 
texts that can be produced through the evaluation rules (Bernstein, 2000, p28; Ashwin, 
Abbas, and McLean, 2012, p119). 
In the context of this research and the QAA’s responsibilities in relation to the quality 
assurance of teaching and learning, the recontextualisation process and its rules and the 
degree to which the QAA influences them are the most pertinent.  
In higher education, the distributive rules are influenced at the macro level by the 
research councils (Henkel, 2000, p112) and the higher education funding bodies through 
the external quality assurance of academic research48. The distributive rules also 
determine who has access to the knowledge created, both in terms of teaching and 
learning (Ashwin, 2009, p91-93). While this largely remains the decision of the 
academy, it too is increasingly being influenced by government initiatives, such as 
opening the sector to alternative providers, and other widening participation activities 
(McLean and Abbas, 2010, p6). As discussed later in the chapter, the QAA subject 
benchmark statements might be considered as determining what is ‘valid knowledge’ 
and the QAA’s recognition scheme for subject benchmark statements determines 
                                                 
48 The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and subsequently the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF) are the mechanisms by which the funding bodies through teams of academic 
peers assess the quality of research submissions in order to allocate funds. The RAE was 
established in 1985 by the Universities Grants Committee, and conducted firstly by 
UGC/Universities Funding Council and then managed by HEFCE on behalf of the other funding 
bodies from 1992 onwards (Henkel, 2000, p113; Morley, 2004, p23). The RAE took place in 
1986, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2008. The first REF was took place in 2014 (HEFCE, 2011). 
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‘whether or not it is appropriate for the QAA to support the development of a new 
benchmark statement’ (QAA, 2012c, p1) (see section 5.2.3). 
The evaluative rules determine what is being taught, how it is being taught and what 
counts as the valid acquisition of the curriculum (Singh, 2002, p573) and are heavily 
influenced by the subject networks (Ashwin, 2009, p103). They are also linked to the 
concepts of acceptable social conduct, character and manner (Singh, 2002, p573) and 
more generally, institutional culture. 
The recontextualising rules control the means by which a discourse is moved from 
where it was produced (the field of production) to a new site where it is altered (re-
located, re-focused) as it is pedagogised (taught/shared) and related to other discourses 
(Singh, 2002, p573; Ashwin, 2009, p93-94). Bernstein (1996, p48, p117-118; 2000, 
p33) suggests that this recontextualisation can take place in two places: the official 
recontextualising field (ORF), created and dominated by the State, government 
departments and selected agents; and the pedagogic recontextualising field (PRF). The 
relationship between these two fields is shown in Figure 4 below in the context of 
secondary education. It is worth noting the linear direction of the recontextualising 
process from ORF to PRF. This is not necessarily the case in relation to higher 
education (see section 3.3). 
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Figure 4  Recontextualisation of pedagogic discourse at various levels of the pre-
tertiary education (adapted from Morais and Neves, 2010, p28) 
 
In higher education the PRF includes academic departments, discipline communities, 
research centres, academic journals, and professional organisations (Bernstein, 2000, 
p33). The PRF has a series of agents, for example the representative bodies of the 
higher education institutions such as Universities UK, GuildHE, and the common 
interest (mission) groups such as the Russell Group; the 1994 Group49, the Million+, the 
University Alliance, the Mixed Economy Group, and the Independent Universities 
Group50. These groups promote members’ common interests, respond to key policy 
issues, and share best practice (Filippakou and Tapper, 2015, p2). Universities UK and 
                                                 
49 The 1994 Group terminated in 2013 (Filippakou and Tapper, 2015, p13). 
50 Established in 2015, the Independent Universities Group represents eight institutions with 
degree-awarding powers and/or university title that are not funded by the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England. 
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GuildHE advise and lobby government and the higher education funding bodies; they 
act on behalf of their members in issuing formal responses to government policy, and 
undertake research/consultations on arrangements for quality assurance, often 
conducted in collaboration with the funding bodies. 
In principle, there is no ORF for the construction of the official higher education 
discourse (Bernstein 2000, p60). There is no national curriculum and higher education 
institutions remain autonomous, independent bodies responsible for setting their own 
academic standards (Bernstein, 1996, p74; Brown, 2004, p10). However, Bernstein 
(1996, p48) suggests that the Government is trying to weaken the PRF to reduce the 
autonomy of universities through a number of policy initiatives and agents, such as the 
higher education Funding Councils and the research councils (Bernstein, 2000, p60). 
McLean, Abbas and Ashwin (2013, p271) suggest that the QAA and other professional 
statutory regulatory bodies are also such agents.  
This is important because as Bernstein (2000, p33) notes, academic autonomy exists 
where the PRF has an effect over the pedagogic discourse independently of the ORF. 
Where this is directed or influenced by the ORF, autonomy is diluted; for example 
Bernstein considers the research assessment exercises to be one form of such dilution 
(Bernstein, 2000, p60). Trowler (2012, p27) suggests that academic autonomy has been 
weakened at discipline level by the displacement of the decision making process away 
from the academy as governance structures change and I have already suggested that the 
QAA’s subject benchmark statements might have played a role in that. It will be 
interesting to explore in the empirical data the degree to which the QAA guidance and 
review methods have also contributed to this.  
Bernstein (2000, p60) also suggests that each higher education provider will have its 
own recontextualising field and these will hold a range of ideological positions and be 
in competition with each other. Singh (2002, p577) notes there can be significant 
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contestation within the PRF itself. For example between strongly insulated disciplines, 
or between the different representative and common interest (mission) groups. The 
result is that although academics might be described as a community of scholars, 
responsible for safeguarding the quality and standards of the pedagogic device (Becher, 
1989, p170; Trowler, 2012, p11; McGettigan, 2013, p150), the contested PRF means 
that the academic community does not speak with one voice and remains politically 
weaker than it might potentially be otherwise (Trow, 2005, p8; Becher, 1989, p170-
171). 
Although Bernstein identifies that there might be a number of recontextualising fields 
within a university, his concept of the PRF is used as if it is one homogeneous grouping, 
albeit with a suggestion of this being demarcated along discipline lines. In the context of 
quality assurance of universities I want to suggest that there might be two different 
types of PRF; an Academic-PRF (A-PRF) which is akin to Bernstein’s original concept, 
and a Central-PRF (C-PRF) which comprises the quality professionals and institutional 
level quality assurance committees. Therefore I want to suggest that there are two sites 
of recontextualisation in a university (see section 7.3). 
3.1.4 Singulars, regions and generics  
In Chapter two I identified three ‘ideal types’ of universities. Part of the description of 
each type includes reference to the nature of the institution’s curriculum. It is helpful 
here to draw on Bernstein’s (1996, p65) notion of singulars, regions and generics as a 
means of explaining their characteristics, that is their nature, role in the production, 
recontextualisation and reproduction of knowledge and their insulation to external 
influences.  
Singulars are knowledge structures whose creators control the site of knowledge 
production to establish a unique, specialist and discrete discourse with its own texts, 
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practices, rules, rewards and punishments. Such disciplines are strongly bounded, 
hierarchical, narcissistic and able to determine what is legitimate discourse (Bernstein, 
1996, p46). There is an ‘inwardness’ leading to strong subject identity and loyalty (Beck 
and Young, 2005, p185; Geirsdóttir, 2010, p96-97). Examples include physics, 
chemistry, history, economics, theology and English. Although as Beck and Young 
(2005, p189) note, singulars have become increasingly fragmented and their insulation 
from the market and the new managerialism in universities is weakening.  
Regions result from a recontextualisation and amalgamation of singulars into larger 
units. Examples of regions include engineering, medicine, and architecture. 
Characteristically regions, particularly the newer subject areas, are more diffuse in their 
knowledge base and are required to have a greater cognisance with the outside world 
and a weaker insulation from external influences. In this context they are more 
vulnerable to the impact of new managerialism, market demand, government policy, 
and external intervention, particularly where this is a means of legitimising the region. 
Examples of regions also include anthropology, art and design, management, media 
studies, and tourism.  
Generics relate to the introduction of generic ‘vocational’ skills which reflect the needs 
of employers and the world of work. Initially generics occurred predominantly in 
further education (Bernstein, 2000, p53); however, over the last two decades aspects of 
the generic mode have entered higher education with the increased emphasis on non-
discipline based transferable skills in the undergraduate, postgraduate and even doctoral 
curriculum (Beck and Young, 2005, p190). This introduction is producing an outcomes 
based model of curriculum, rather than one which is reflective, collective, 
developmental and process-oriented. The focus is on the development of skills, where 
teaching itself is considered to be a set of skills (Barnett and Coate, 2005, p18). 
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3.2 Applying Bernstein to the QAA: An Initial Analysis 
In Chapter two, I have already noted the influence of the higher education sector, the 
Funding Councils and the Government in establishing the Agency. To demonstrate how 
such influences continued as the QAA evolved, a number of examples in relation to the 
Agency’s review methods, guidance materials, structures and relationship with the 
HEFCE, merit analysis. 
3.2.1 The end of subject level review 
Perhaps the most well-known example of the sector’s (PRF’s) influence on the work of 
the QAA is in relation to the demise of subject level review in 2001. When the QAA 
was established, the external quality assurance system reviewed at both institutional and 
subject level. CVCP and the higher education sector requested the QAA to undertake 
institutional level audit on their behalf. The process, called Continuation Audit, which 
ran from 1999 to 2001, was based largely on those used by the AAU and HEQC. Its 
purpose was to establish the extent to which institutions were discharging effectively 
their responsibilities for the standards of the awards they granted, and for the quality of 
education provided to enable students to attain those standards (QAA, 1999, p1). Audit 
teams came to conclusions in relation to: 
‘the level of confidence which an informed observer might reasonably 
place in the effectiveness of the processes and procedures used by an 
institution in the discharge of its responsibility for establishing and 
maintaining its academic quality and standards.’ 
(QAA, 1999, p7) 
As can be seen from the quotation above, audit teams were not making direct 
judgements on institutional academic standards or quality, but rather on processes and 
procedures undertaken by the university itself. This focus on process is an important 
distinction from subject level review. 
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At the same time the HEFCE contracted the QAA to undertake reviews at subject level, 
initially continuing Teaching Quality Assessment but on a universal rather than 
sampling scale. The reviews evaluated the quality of educational provision within a 
subject area and were undertaken by subject specialist peer review teams selected by the 
QAA. The review focussed on the quality of the student learning experience and student 
achievement (QAA, 1997, p7). An overall summative judgement about the quality of 
the education was made based on the grading of six aspects: curriculum design, content 
and organisation; teaching, learning and assessment; student progression and 
achievement; student support and guidance; learning resources; and quality 
management and enhancement. In Bernstein’s terms the QAA, albeit using academic 
peers, was assessing pedagogic practice and exerting control over the recontextualising 
and the evaluative rules of the pedagogic device. 
There is no doubt that this extension of the Teaching Quality Assessment from a 
sampling to an universal approach and the subsequent development of the Subject 
Review method (see section 2.2), placed significant demands on the universities, and 
continued to challenge the status of the PRF, who increasingly felt disempowered and 
disenfranchised (Williams, 2009, p11; Newton 2002, p42). Morley (2003, p17) 
describes it as a ‘highly corrosive form of performance and regulation’. Challenges to 
the outcomes of the reviews were frequent and in a number of instances disciplines 
within universities refused to participate, such as the economists at the University of 
Warwick (Filippakou and Tapper, 2010, p485). However, subject review was not 
disliked by all academics. For some subjects it provided them with a stronger voice 
within the university, because a QAA review brought them into the spotlight and 
disrupted the pecking order within the disciplines in the university (Newton, 2002, p50-
51). For some institutions, particularly those akin to the ‘vocational ideal type’ of 
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university, it provided the opportunity to gain legitimacy for their disciplines (Morley, 
2003, p125). 
After seven years of subject level review by the HEFCE and then the QAA, the 
outcomes of which had been predominantly positive, a group of elite universities 
lobbied the Government successfully for their end (Morley, 2004, p17). On 21 March 
2001 the Secretary of State for Education and Skills announced cessation of Subject 
Review and a reduction in burden for those universities that had performed well in the 
reviews.   
While the end of subject level review is seen as a coup for the PRF, Brown (2004, 
p131), Williams (2009, p19) and Filippakou, Salter, and Tapper (2010, p550) suggest 
that there were other broader policy and economic developments which influenced the 
Government’s decision. A perceived lack of value for money was seen to be a key 
driver. This would suggest that the ORF was acting in its own interests as well as 
responding to the demands of the PRF. 
Williams (2009, p19) suggests that the Government’s statement also gave the HEFCE 
and the representative bodies the justification to revisit the whole quality assurance 
framework and this ‘effectively spelled the end of QAA’s autonomy.’ It placed in 
question the authority of the Agency, something that would happen again after the 
publication of the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills (IUSS) Select 
Committee’s report following its review of the Student and Universities in 2009 (see 
later and section 3.2.2). Both of these are prime examples of contestation occurring 
between the agents and within the ORF itself; suggesting that the QAA operates within 
a complex matrix of relationships. 
What emerged from the subsequent discussion, negotiations and consultation, led by the 
HEFCE and the representative bodies, was a review method that focussed primarily on 
institutional level review with a small element of subject review (Brown, 2004, p131). 
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The PRF had secured a review method that was much closer to the one used by HEQC 
(the sector’s own method). The universities and the QAA however, were not going to 
get their way regarding the proposed ‘lighter touch’ audit method. The Minister for 
Higher Education intervened at the last minute to retain an element of regulation at 
subject level through discipline audit trails51 (Morley, 2004, p18), and a shorter three 
year review cycle (Williams, 2009, p20). This provides another example of the ORF 
overriding the QAA and the PRF to retain control over the PRF and is in keeping with 
the Government’s approach to public policy reform and the distrust of professional 
regulation. 
Institutional Audit (transitional arrangements) operated between 2003 and 2005 and it 
was not until the development of Institutional Audit (2006-2009) that review at subject 
level finally ended. The driver for this removal came from the recommendation of the 
Quality Assurance Framework Review Group’s (QAFRG) report into the first phase of 
the evaluation of the Quality Assurance Framework (HEFCE, 2005a, p3)52 53. The 
evaluation of the Framework was sponsored jointly by the HEFCE, UUK and SCOP 
and relied heavily on evidence produced by JM Consulting54 (2005) in its report to the 
QAFRG, HEFCE, representative bodies and the Government on the effectiveness, 
impact and costs of the Quality Assurance Framework. In Bernstein’s terms this is 
another example of the agents of the PRF working with the agents of the ORF to 
develop/modify the quality assurance system. What is difficult to determine at this stage 
                                                 
51 Discipline audit trails looked at 10 per cent of the institutions provision to assess how 
institutional processes and procedures for assuring academic standards and the quality of 
learning opportunities work in practice. 
52 The purpose of the QAFRG was to consider the impacts, benefits and costs of the Quality 
Assurance Framework to which QAA worked and of which institutional audit was one element. 
(HEFCE, 2005a, p20). 
53 The QAFRG’s membership consisted: 5 heads of institutions, 2 senior academics, 1 
representative from the NUS, 1 from HEFCE, 1 from a Professional statutory regulatory body. 
Observers from DfES, DELNI, QAA. 
54 JM Consulting is a private organisational development consultancy established in 2003, and 
commissioned by HEFCE to conduct the review. The report was published by HEFCE. 
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of the thesis is whether the PRF consider the representative bodies, as their agents, to be 
cooperating with the ORF, or protecting the interests of the PRF. 
The Institutional Audit process was revised once more, after consultation by the QAA 
with the sector and the HEFCE, but changes were minor. It operated between 2009 and 
2011.  
The period of Institutional Audit (2006-2011) was fairly stable and resistance to the 
QAA reviews lessened as the PRF retook control of quality assurance at subject level 
and the QAA’s work became a more naturalised part of higher education (Filippakou, 
2011, p22). No longer did universities such as Oxford, Cambridge or the London 
School of Economics refuse to participate in Institutional Audit. By the end of 2011 
only a very few universities did not have at least one senior member of academic or 
administrative staff who were members of the QAA’s review teams.  
3.2.2 Changing scope, tone and language – guidance and reviews 
An example of the ORF influencing the QAA’s work, I suggest, can be seen in 
difference in the scope, tone and language used in the Academic Infrastructure 
compared to its successor, the UK Quality Code for Higher Education (the Quality 
Code). Both guidance documents are described as the nationally agreed sets of reference 
points and were developed with input from the sector under the QAA’s stewardship 
(QAA, 2010, p14).  
The documents were designed to provide all institutions with a shared starting point for 
setting, describing and assuring the quality and academic standards of their higher 
education provision; as well as providing the QAA review teams with key reference 
points in coming to conclusions in the external review methods (QAA, 2009a, 2011b, 
p3).  
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Change of scope/focus 
In 2009/10 the QAA conducted an evaluation of the Academic Infrastructure in order to 
determine it if it remained fit for purpose (QAA, 2010, p2). In principle the Quality 
Code retained many of the features of the Academic Infrastructure; however there were 
some significant changes to its scope and tone. The changes reflected the concerns at 
the time about the standard of teaching and learning in higher education, and the 
Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills (IUSS) Select Committee’s damning report 
about standards in UK higher education. While the Government’s response to the Select 
Committee’s report supported the QAA, it also demanded a new system of quality 
assurance which was ‘more public facing and responsive to the needs of students, and 
sufficiently flexible that it can respond to the changing modes and models of higher 
education’ (DBIS, 2010, p71) (see section 3.2.2). Consequently the Quality Code 
includes two new chapters on ‘Student Engagement’55 and ‘Information about higher 
education56’. The increased emphasis on the student is also evident in the overarching 
values of the Quality Code, the first three of which relate directly to the student57.  
Applying the analytical framework to these events highlights the complex nature of the 
ORF, and the relationship between the House of Commons and government 
ministers/departments. In this instance, the Government supported its agent (the QAA), 
but revised the remit under which it must operate, aligning it even more closely to 
government policy for the further marketisation of higher education provision in 
England. The Government did not acquiesce to the Select Committee’s request for 
                                                 
55 Chapter B5 focusses on the provision of an inclusive environment which enables students to 
engage in learning, to learn independently, and participate in quality assurance and enhancement 
activities (QAA, 2012a, p2). 
56 Part C - describes how higher education providers make information available to students and 
the wider public that is fit for purpose, accessible and trustworthy (QAA, 2012b, p2) 
57 Every student is treated fairly and with dignity, courtesy and respect; every student has the 
opportunity to contribute to the shaping of their learning experience; every student is properly 
and actively informed at appropriate times of matters relevant to their programmes of study. 
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greater control over and more direct regulation of teaching and learning in higher 
education providers.  
Change of tone/language 
There is also a change in the tone of language used in the Quality Code, compared to 
that used in the Academic Infrastructure. I suggest this reflects the need for the Agency 
to appear to be taking a “tougher” stance towards higher education providers, in order to 
appease the ORF. For example, while the Quality Code recognises the autonomous 
nature of higher education institutions and states that there is scope for interpretation in 
how the individual institutions apply the Code, narrow compliance is not expected 
(QAA, 2011b, p7). The references to ‘expectations’58 rather than ‘precepts’59 and to 
institutions being ‘required to meet the expectations’ rather than to ‘engage’ with the 
precepts themselves (QAA, 2011b, p9) are much more regulatory in tone. Such 
differences might seem pedantic, but I suggest they mark a shift in the Agency’s stance 
(changing the ‘face’ it presents to the universities) away from its position as a mediator 
(buffer) between the ORF and the PRF. Such a shift might be a pragmatic one, 
supported by the higher education sector representative bodies (the agents of the PRF) 
in order to safeguard the sector’s reputation in the light of the market being opened to 
new entrants (see later). Nevertheless, there is an increased emphasis on compliance, 
even in the guise of ‘expectations’ and ‘requirements’, and this is likely to limit the 
degree of recontextualisation that some higher education providers will be willing to 
undertake. Some will invariably take a more risk-averse approach. Others will interpret 
this as an increase in the ORF trying to control the pedagogic device and therefore see 
the Quality Code as reducing the autonomy of the PRF. 
                                                 
58 Expectations express key principles that the higher education community has identified as 
essential for the assurance of academic standards and quality. They make clear what HE 
providers are required to do (QAA, 2012a, p4). 
59 Precepts express key matters of principle that the HE community has identified as 
important for areas covered in the Code (QAA, 2004, p1). 
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External review methods: IRENI and HER 
The significance of the changes of tone in the Quality Code is highlighted further when 
the link between the Quality Code and institutional review methods is considered. In 
relation to Institutional Audit (2003-2011), the Academic Infrastructure and more 
specifically the Code of Practice was seen as a useful tool for audit teams to assess the 
extent to which institutions had taken account of the Code and its precepts in managing 
their academic standards and quality of learning opportunities. By the time of 
Institutional Review for England and Northern Ireland (IRENI) (2011/12 to 2012/13) and 
subsequently Higher Education Review (HER) (2013/14 onwards), the Quality Code is 
the reference point against which providers are judged as to whether they have met the 
UK expectations in relation to threshold academic standards, the quality of student 
learning opportunities, the enhancement of those opportunities and the information 
provided about those learning institutions.  
This much closer alignment between the Quality Code and the institutional review 
methods – ‘meeting expectations’ rather than ‘taking account of’ is a significant change 
and despite assurance from the QAA to the contrary, has engendered visions of the 
Agency taking a much more tick box approach to the review of higher education 
providers. Again this will, I suggest, limit the degree of recontextualising that some 
higher education providers will do in translating the Quality Code into institutional 
practice (Raban and Cairns, 2014, p115). The change in the structure of the review 
reports in HER, where the reports are written against each of the expectations in the 
Quality Code, rather than the more descriptive text against a set of headings seen in 
Institutional Audit, reiterates this change of stance.  
I realise that the events above only began to emerge towards the end of the data 
collection period, and I have discussed things that have happened after the data 
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collection period ended. But I thought it important to set out the wider context so that 
the results of the data analysis might be more current.   
Applying the analytical framework to the events above, it would suggest that the PRF, 
or at the very least its agents have cooperated with the ORF in producing this ‘tougher’ 
quality assurance system. It is worth noting that in developing the Quality Code, a 
steering group was established which included membership from the universities and 
other higher education providers. The Code was also consulted on and signed off by the 
QAA’s sponsoring bodies who are agents of the PRF, as well as the HEFCE. What this 
research does not explore is the nature of this consultation process, but this can be found 
in Bohrer (2015) in her professional doctorate thesis. 
I suggest that in return for this cooperation, the universities got a more risk-based 
review method in HER that should reduce the degree of external review for ‘providers 
with a strong track record in managing quality and standards’ (QAA, 2014, p1). This 
was certainly what was being demanded by the Russell Group at the time HER was in 
development (Russell Group 2014). This would suggest that again the ‘doctrinal ideal 
type’ of universities, as with the demise of subject level review, can lobby 
government(s) effectively.  
3.2.3 A changing gaze 
Students have always been an important consideration in the work of the QAA. For 
example the student written submission has been central to all the QAA’s external 
review methods since 2002. After 2009, however, the role of students in the QAA’s 
work has gained increasing prominence. As noted earlier in the thesis a number of 
factors have contributed to this, including: the new managerialism ideology and the 
changes to funding so that the students contribute a greater proportion to the cost of 
their tuition costs; students have been recast as consumers of higher education, rather 
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than the apprentices of the sacred knowledge within the disciplines (Barnett and Coate, 
2005, p37; Brown, 2013, p400). In these contexts, the Government sees students as 
partners within the sector, with their own rights and responsibilities, requiring value for 
money for their investment (tuition fees) and good service (Craft, 1992, p1; DBIS, 
2009, p17, p70). Successive White Papers and policy documents from both sides of the 
House of Commons have reiterated the Government’s commitment to students. The 
implications for the QAA are clear. It has been expected to be more responsive to the 
needs of students, to focus more on the student experience and the service delivered to 
students including more student involvement in the audit process and a more effective 
complaints and appeals systems at institutional levels; provide better and more 
information for the public about how quality and standards are maintained; and a more 
proactive role in ensuring that complaints about standards are properly dealt with 
(DBIS, 2010, p77; DBIS 2011, p36-37). 
Given this renewed focus on students, it is not surprising that the new Chief Executive 
of the QAA, who took up post in October 2009 had significant experience in providing 
services to students in ways that promoted informed decision making for students in his 
roles as deputy and then Chief Executive of the Universities and Colleges Admissions 
Service. His continued commitment to students was evident at the time of his 
appointment:  
‘I feel privileged to be asked to lead QAA at this time of significant 
challenge for UK higher education and the wider society which it 
serves. There is an increasing need to engage with students and to 
assure the public that academic standards are being maintained and 
enhanced.’  
(QAA, 2009c) 
 
Within a very short time of taking up his post in October 2009, the QAA had amended 
the status of the student representative on the QAA’s Board from observer to full 
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member60, appointed by the Board itself in 2009; appointed a student engagement 
officer; established closer working relationships with the National Union of Students; 
commissioned students to write specialist guidance for other students about the QAA’s 
work; and begun to communicate with students (and the wider public) using a broader 
range of channels, including various social media. Over the period of this research a 
Student Engagement team was established and expanded; a Student Sounding Board 
(now the Student Advisory Board) (QAA, 2014c) was set up in 2009 as a consultative 
forum to share best practice to input into the QAA’s work. This Board now has a more 
formal role within the QAA to advise on issues relating to students; meetings are 
attended by the Chief Executive and other members of the QAA Board (QAA, 2014b).  
In 2011, the Agency introduced a student member on to Institutional Audit teams in 
England61, initially on a voluntary basis and then as standard from the beginning of the 
IRENI review method in 2011/12, and continues in the current HER method. The role 
of student in review teams raises an interesting question about what is a “peer” in the 
context of external institutional review. Raban and Cairns (2014, p114) suggests that the 
QAA is extending its definition and principles of peer review rather too far. In the 
context of this research, the question is whether including students on review teams 
changes the nature of the PRF, given that students are evaluating the university against 
the UK Quality Code and making a judgement about the academic standards and quality 
of the provider? I return briefly to this question in the concluding chapter.  
It appears from the description above that the QAA is willing to take forward the ORF’s 
agenda in relation to students and the further marketisation of the higher education 
sector in England. It will be interesting to see how the respondents in the universities 
                                                 
60 The student representative is nominated by the National Union of Students and subject to 
approved by the Board.  
61 Student reviewers have been used in QAA’s Enhancement Led Institutional Review process 
in Scotland since September 2003. They were introduced to Institutional Review team in Wales 
in January 2010. 
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view the QAA’s role in this, and whether all of the QAA are happy to take forward this 
quite radical change in focus for the Agency. I use the term radical because up until 
2009 I would suggest that the primary focus of the Agency in England, and certainly its 
communication, was the higher education providers.  
3.2.4 The relationship with the HEFCE 
The period of 2002-2008 was relatively peaceful for the QAA (Williams, 2009, p21) 
with little significant scrutiny of the Agency from the Government, other than the 
scheduled reviews of aspects of its work. It was business as usual. As I noted in Chapter 
one, however, a series of uncoordinated events in the summer of 2008, some querying 
the academic standards of UK higher education, others focussing on the analysis of the 
recommendations in the QAA’s Outcomes Reports published at the same time, were 
seized on by the media (Williams, 2009, p24). These events resulted in intense media 
and political interest and marked the end of the HEFCE’s more hands-off relationship 
with the QAA. 
Shortly after, the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills (IUSS) Select Committee 
undertook a review: ‘Students and Universities’. The review was wide-ranging 
including views from the sector and comparative international visits. The subsequent 
report was damning about the QAA, stating that the system in England for safeguarding 
consistent national standards in higher education institutions was out of date, 
inadequate, focussed too much on processes rather than academic standards, and was in 
urgent need of replacement (House of Commons, 2009a, p5). It also argued that the 
QAA should be transformed into an independent Quality and Standards Agency with a 
remit, statutory if necessary, to safeguard, monitor and report on standards (House of 
Commons, 2009a, p5). It should focus on the comparability of standards between 
institutions (House of Commons, 2009a, p92). 
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The Government rejected much of the report and its recommendations, noting that: 
‘it did not recognise the committee’s description of our higher 
education sector, which is in fact world class and second only to the 
USA as a top destination for overseas students.’   
(House of Commons, 2009b, p6)  
 
It also noted that both the QAA’s own thematic enquiries into concerns about academic 
quality and standards in higher education and the investigations by the HEFCE’s 
Teaching, Quality and the Student Experience Committee (TQSESC) in response to the 
Select Committee’s review ‘found no evidence of a systemic failure in quality in English 
higher education’ (DBIS, 2010, p71), although it did recognise that there were some 
areas that would benefit from further work. Critically, the Government supported the 
work of the Agency, but made clear that reforms were needed so that it more closely 
met the needs of the market:  
‘the Government’s views about the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) 
have been made clear – that it does a good job but needs to take on a 
more public-facing role and one which allows any concerns about 
quality or standards to be investigated quickly, transparently and 
robustly.’  
(House of Commons, 2009b, p28) 
 
In the end the QAA survived the summer of 2008, but its relationship with the HEFCE 
and to some extent the representative bodies had changed. The Agency’s work would be 
more closely directed by the ORF and the representative bodies of the PRF. 
‘For different reasons, both HEFCE and the representative bodies seem 
to want to keep QAA in its box, letting it out only when they need it to do 
something particular for them.’  
(Williams, 2009, p21). 
 
This was the feeling that also permeated through the Agency at the time. 
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This more hands-on approach by the HEFCE is understandable. It has the statutory 
responsibility to assess the quality of education provided by the institutions that it funds 
(HMSO, 1992, p53; Morley, 2004, p15). During the time of the IUSS Select 
Committee’s review, the HEFCE appeared to receive a dressing down from the 
Government, and subsequently, and understandably, had to demonstrate its control over 
England’s quality assurance arrangements (Williams, 2009, p21). There was a notable 
change in how it treated and spoke of the QAA. For example, the Agency was initially 
excluded from some/part of the meetings of the TQSESC by the HEFCE (former QAA 
colleague, 2009, personal communication). The QAA has also been consistently 
referred to by the HEFCE as having an advisory role, with the HEFCE taking the lead 
on activities which would have previously been given to the QAA to co-ordinate, 
including some developmental and consultation activities. Brown (2013, p431) notes, 
for example, that the definitive statement published by the HEFCE about the post-2011 
quality assurance regime, on behalf of itself and the representative bodies, was 
described as being made ‘with the advice and guidance of the QAA’. The HEFCE is also 
taking responsibility for developing the criteria for the revised risk-based approach to 
external institutional review. In Bernstein’s terms I suggest that this will result in the 
QAA’s scope for recontextualisation in implementing government policy being 
reduced. What is not so evident is the degree to which this will mean that the HEFCE is 
recontextualising the Government’s policy initiatives/directive. Is there going to be an 
enhanced but exclusive recontextualisation site, involving the HEFCE as an agent of the 
ORF, and the representative bodies of the higher education sector as agents of the PRF? 
The QAA’s revised position was sealed when the Government formally designated the 
HEFCE as the ‘lead regulator’ for quality assurance in the White Paper of June 2011. I 
have already commented in this chapter about the notion of contestation within the 
ORF; the events above suggests a pecking order that exists between the agents of the 
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ORF which is obviously determined by statutory responsibilities and responsibility for 
contractual agreements.  
Although outside the data collection period of this research, recent developments in 
relation to the QAA merit some comment. In October 2014 the HEFCE, HEFCW and 
DELI announced a joint review of the existing quality assessment arrangements for 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland (HEFCE, 2015b, p1). Following the review, the 
Funding Councils will invite tenders for developing and delivering the new assessment 
arrangements (HEFCE, 2014). The review is seen as an opportunity to: 
‘step back and ask some important questions of higher education providers, 
of students, of employers, and of other stakeholders in the higher education 
system, about what quality assessment arrangements should be like in the 
future.’  
(HEFCE, 2015b, p1) 
 
The review is being led by the Quality Assessment Review Steering Group chaired by 
the Vice-Chancellor of Loughborough University with membership from the higher 
education sector’s representative bodies, sector representatives from each country, the 
NUS, students, Association of Heads of University Administration, and the three 
funding bodies, with the HEFCE having a majority. It is not clear from the 
documentation if the QAA has observer status on the Steering Group. Personal 
communication from a former QAA colleague (2015) suggests that the HEFCE has kept 
the QAA at arms-length during the review. 
For the first time in the QAA’s 18 year history the Agency might have to tender for its 
contract to the Funding Councils to undertake external review. While this now conforms 
to good governance and procurement practice, it does reiterate the QAA’s position as an 
agent not just of the ORF, but an agent of an agent of the ORF. 
It is also interesting to note that UUK published its own vision for external quality 
assurance in the future in February 2015. The document, ‘Quality, equity, sustainability: 
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the future of higher education regulation’ outlines its proposals to tackle the challenges 
of quality assurance in the context of students being the primary funders of 
undergraduate education in England, the weakening of the traditional link between 
quality assurance and public funding, and the increasing number of higher education 
providers with diverse corporate status and governance (UUK, 2015, p2). Although not 
entirely explicit, the report warns of trying to regulate such diversity of providers within 
a common review framework which the HEFCE and the Government have been trying 
to establish. UUK perceive it as important to take into consideration ‘circumstance or 
history’ of institutions in reviewing them (UUK, 2015, p2). I would suggest that such a 
publication is evidence of the universities within the PRF acting in accordance with the 
status as autonomous institutions with the right to award their own degrees and set their 
own academic standards. I suggest that the report is a “public” means of influencing the 
ORF, but this in itself is interesting, given the prominent role the representative bodies 
have played in sponsoring the QAA’s work to date. Some interesting further work 
would be to explore in more detail the relationship between these bodies and the QAA, 
and between UUK and GuildHE and the PRF to determine the boundaries between the 
PRF and ORF. 
3.3 Research Questions 
Ritchie and McNaughton Nicholls (2014, p50) suggest that the research questions 
should be ‘relevant and useful, whether to policy, practice or the development of social 
theory, [and] informed by and connected to existing research, theory and need, with the 
potential to make an original contribution, or to fill a gap.’ From the initial analysis of 
the QAA’s activity outlined above, and with reference to the relevant literature set out 
in Chapter two and my own personal experiences of working at the QAA, I have begun 
to unpack the professional issue of why the Agency is depicted so variously. It would 
appear that the Agency’s relationship with the PRF and ORF is complex. It also appears 
72 
that, as suggested in Chapter one, the QAA performs some form of recontextualising 
role, but that this too is complex. It appears not to be in the linear direction as seen in 
Figure 4 above, but rather a multi-directional process which is also liable to change, as 
depicted in Figure 5 below. It will be interesting to see if the analysis of the data 
substantiates the accuracy of Figure 5. The model will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter seven. 
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Figure 5  Possible sites of recontextualisation in the external quality assurance of 
higher education in England (adapted from Morais and Neves, 2010, p28) 
Translating these initial thoughts into the research questions was an iterative process. It 
was important to ensure coherence between the questions and the professional issue 
(Lewis and McNaughton Nicholls, 2014, p50). The four research questions were: 
1. how is the role of the QAA understood across and within universities? 
2. what is the nature of the recontextualising process undertaken by the QAA? 
3. what is the capacity of different universities to recontextualise what the QAA 
is saying? 
4. how much influence does the QAA have over what universities actually do? 
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3.4 Summary 
In this chapter I set out the analytical framework for the research and applied it to some 
initial analysis of the QAA’s operation. Although somewhat abstract, Bernstein’s 
concept of the pedagogic device and the creation, transmission and acquisition of 
knowledge, highlights the potential sphere of influence in which the QAA might 
operate. His concepts of recontextualisation, the ORF, and the PRF help to explore the 
role and influence of the QAA over the sites and process of mediation that take place in 
the interpretation and implementation of national policy for the assurance of academic 
standards and quality in higher education.  
The chapter also highlights the continual pushes and pulls that the QAA experiences 
from the PRF and the ORF and their agents. It also suggests an apparent shift in the 
Agency from the more ‘gentlemanly’ approach to external review undertaken by AAU, 
HEQC, and the QAA at the start of the transitional arrangements (see Chapter two) to a 
somewhat more regulatory style, as exemplified by the changes in the tone and language 
of the UK Quality Code, and the tightening of the link between the Code and the 
judgements reached by institutional review teams. However, this shift is not necessarily 
simply a matter of the Agency using its guidance and review methods to reinforce 
government policy (Trow, 2005, p11; Williams, 2010, p5); in this instance, meeting the 
Government’s agenda for a more marketised system. There appears to be some degree 
of cooperation or at the very least perhaps pragmatic acceptance by the PRF of these 
approaches, in order to safeguard the reputation of the sector. There also appears to be 
some quid pro quo between the Government and the sector, with the established 
universities being ‘rewarded’ with a more risk-based external review system, which 
should in theory reduce the burden of external review. 
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CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I outline the methodology adopted for the research. This includes a 
discussion of the overall research approach I elected to take, as well as the research 
methods used. As with most professional doctorates, I was researching within my own 
employing organisation and in a number of the universities which it reviews, an 
approach which Trowler (2011, p1) describes as endogenous research. Researchers, 
such as Hockey (1993) and Trowler (2011), note the benefits of endogenous research, 
including the ability to produce meaningful accounts as the researcher is culturally 
literate; producing research which is more likely to be useful to the organisation and to 
be taken notice of; more pragmatically it is cheaper and easier to undertake. Morse 
(1994, p222) suggests, however, that endogenous research is significantly problematic 
and can place the researcher in an untenable position in view of their role as an 
employee and the expectations which sit alongside that, and their role as a researcher. 
Trowler (2011, p2ff) is less critical of endogenous research, but highlights a number of 
issues that must be considered including: preserving anonymity, protecting the 
interviewees and organisations; gaining access to the interviewees/data; and interview 
or analysis bias. I will discuss each of these at the appropriate points in the chapter. A 
reflection of the strengths, weakness and limitations of the research methodology 
adopted is discussed in Chapter eight. 
4.1  Research Approach 
As noted in Chapter one, underlying the aims and purpose of the research was a very 
personal stimulus for the research. This meant that I was not only to be a researcher in 
conducting the study, but also a participant in the research itself. This position has 
implications for each aspect of the research: for example, reflexivity became a key 
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consideration throughout the research process (King and Horrocks, 2010, p22, p125). I 
will return to this discussion throughout the chapter. 
In deciding what would be the best overall research approach to adopt, I noted that a 
number of the established researchers in the area of quality (assurance) in higher 
education had observed that it was a phenomenon which was socially constructed 
(Morley, 2004, p39; Filippakou and Tapper, 2008, p92). This suggested that the starting 
point for my own research was the recognition/acceptance that knowledge, in relation to 
the professional issue, is socially constructed. Therefore it was more appropriate that I 
adopted a qualitative research approach, rather than a quantitative one. A qualitative 
approach would enable me to explore the experiences of individuals in relation to the 
QAA. 
The next step was to determine the model of qualitative research I was going to follow. 
Silverman (2013, p106-107) suggests that qualitative research can be naturalistic or 
constructivistic. In the former, the researcher focuses on ‘what is going on here’, in the 
latter on ‘how it is happening’. Given that I had already established that quality 
assurance is social constructed and the professional issue was asking the question 
‘why’, adopting a constructivist model seemed the most appropriate. This model also 
fitted with the analytical framework that I proposed to use. 
By adopting this approach there appeared to be congruence between the professional 
issue, the research questions, the analytical framework, the research approach, and the 
research model. 
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4.2  Research Strategy 
The research approach outlined above provided me with a number of options in terms of 
the research strategy I could adopt. Cresswell (2003, p14) and Silverman (2013, p108-
109) suggest five possible strategies, although this list is by no means exhaustive.  
In order to explore the professional issue fully, an important part of the research design 
was the ability to compare data about how individuals perceive the role of the QAA. 
This could have been achieved by comparing data gathered from individuals from 
different levels within one university. In this instance a case study approach would have 
been the most appropriate (Stake, 2000, p436; Cresswell, 2003, p15). However, since I 
thought that one of the reasons why the QAA was viewed in different ways might be 
because of the stratified/hierarchical nature of the university sector in England (see 
Chapter two), the research design had to allow me to look at a minimum of two 
universities. With the development of my ‘ideal type’ of university model, there needed 
to be three universities to reflect each ‘ideal type’ (see Chapter two). In this context 
three case studies would not have been possible with the resources available. I decided 
therefore to use a cross-sectional research strategy (Bryman, 2012, p59, p62). 
According to Bryman (2012, p59) selecting two or more cases (universities) should 
provide sufficient data to identify any variation. Another helpful feature of this strategy 
is that the data is gathered at more or less one single point in time. In my case the 
majority of the data was collected in two tranches (see section 4.6.1). This meant that I 
could collect data in a relatively short time, which was manageable with the demands of 
my full-time role at the QAA and with the resources available. This was particularly 
useful when, due to the demands of organising a move overseas, I did not leave myself 
a great deal of time within which to collect my second tranche of data.  
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4.3 Ethical Approval 
In keeping with the requirements of the School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University, 
my research proposal was considered by the School’s Research Ethics Committee at its 
meeting of 1 June 2009. The research was approved subject to an amendment to the 
research consent form and information sheet62. The amendments were incorporated 
accordingly, were resubmitted and approval was confirmed on 4 June 2009. 
4.4 Research Methods 
4.4.1 Which data collection technique? 
Having decided to adopt a cross-sectional research strategy, there were a number of 
research methods available to me with which to gather the data from individuals in the 
universities and the QAA. These included observation, interviews, focus groups, and 
documentary analysis. As noted earlier, the key to exploring the professional issue for 
me was hearing the ‘voices’ of those working within the universities and the QAA. 
While this would be possible to implement through documentary analysis, I wanted to 
collect primary rather than secondary data, so that I might hear the ‘voices’ more clearly 
and have the flexibility to explore issues as they arose. The decision to collect primary 
data did have some further implications for me as both an employee of the QAA and a 
researcher. 
After considering the advantages and disadvantages of using the remaining options - 
observation and interviews - I elected to gather the data using interviews.  
The option of using observation was attractive given the wealth of rich, naturally 
occurring data that this can produce (Lewis and McNaughton Nicholls, 2014, p53). It 
would have been particularly useful in exploring the recontextualisation process that I 
                                                 
62 I was requested to do the following: ‘In both documents, please remove the statement that 
participants may contact you within 24 hours of the interview to change or recant anything, 
since participants have the right to withdraw at any point during your research’. 
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suspected took place in the QAA and in the universities However, I decided against 
using this method of data collection, for two reasons. Firstly, it relied solely on my 
interpretation as researcher of what I was observing (Lewis and McNaughton Nicholls, 
2014, p55). This caused me some concern, because of the risk of significant research 
bias. When the data collection period began I had been working at the QAA for some 
seven years, and was firmly immersed in the culture and values of the organisation. I 
was concerned that I would not be able to observe what was really there, even using the 
techniques advocated by Delamont and Atkinson (1995, p3) and Delamont (2002) to 
‘make the familiar strange’ (see section 4.6.2). This bias could then be exacerbated in 
the subsequent analysis. The second reason was in relation to the ethical and pragmatic 
issues of me undertaking observation within the universities. As noted earlier (section 
2.2) the QAA has power over the universities, in the sense that its institutional reviews 
result in a judgment and report which are publically available. Gathering data through 
observation was likely to be problematic because of the potential conflict of interest 
between my role as a researcher and my role as an Assistant Director for the QAA. My 
presence, for example, could change the nature of a meeting that I was observing, 
potentially skewing the data, what Bryman (2012, p496) describes as a ‘reactive effect’. 
I might have also been drawn into giving advice when observing committee meetings or 
while in the university generally, which would have been both a conflict of interest and 
unethical. To confirm if my concerns were correct, I had a number of informal 
discussions with contacts in universities which suggested that I was correct in my 
assessment of the situation. Participant observation within the QAA might have been 
more feasible, but I decided that with my very limited skills/experience in that area, I 
would not have been able to do justice to this method of data collection. I was not 
overly experienced in collecting data as a participant observer and was concerned 
whether I could collect data that was of value, while still contributing fully to the 
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‘observed event’ as an employee of the QAA. This did not prevent me from reflecting 
on my experience of working in the Agency during the data collection period, as I have 
done later in the thesis.  
Thirdly, it was likely that I would have needed to undertake a number of observations at 
each university and the QAA; this was not feasible given my full-time employment.  
Lewis and McNaughton Nicholls (2014, p55) note that the value of interviews is that 
‘data can be generated that gives insight into participants’ lives or views via the active 
verbal communication of a group of individual interview’. But as Silverman (2013, 
p202) quoting Holstein and Gubrium (1995) also suggests, there is an important issue in 
respect of interviews as to ‘whether interview responses are to be treated as giving 
direct access to “experience” and “feelings” or as actively constructed “narratives” 
involving activities which themselves demand analysis.’ Given the research model I 
have adopted, the data arising from the interviews were considered to consist of actively 
constructed narratives and, therefore a range of contextual factors needed to be taken 
account of in the analysis.  
Despite these concerns, I noted that both Rubin and Rubin (1995, p51) and Yeo, 
Legard, Keegan, Ward, McNaughton Nicolls and Lewis (2014, p182) suggest that 
interviews are an appropriate and effective means of exploring the ways in which 
respondents experience and construct their lives. To this end interviews are helpful in 
understanding complex processes or relationships. As I have already suggested in 
Chapters two and three, the QAA is in the midst of a series of very complex 
interrelationships. 
Interviews therefore appeared to be an appropriate means of collecting my data, but 
with the caveat that as both researcher, colleague and hence participant, there was still 
the issue of potential bias to consider. I will return to this point later in the chapter.  
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4.4.2 Interviews or focus groups 
In order to hear the ‘voices’ of the respondents clearly, I decided that one-to-one 
interviews were preferable to focus groups, as I was not seeking to explore data that 
were generated through the interaction between the interviewees (Blaikie, 2010, p207; 
Finch, Lewis, Turley, 2014, p212). I was more interested in hearing the views of the 
individual (Silverman, 2013, p212). I decided that having the opportunity to concentrate 
on one individual at a time would help me obtain a more detailed understanding of the 
matters being discussed. It is easier to explore, probe and clarify responses when 
working on a one-to-one, face-to-face basis. This I hoped would lead to a richer pool of 
data to analyse (Lewis and McNaughton Nicholls, 2014, p56). 
In deciding on which style of interview to adopt I considered what the purpose was in 
collecting the data (Punch, 2005, p170; Bryman, 2012, p468ff). As noted in section 4.1 
above, I wanted to hear the perceptions of individuals about the QAA therefore I needed 
to gather reasonably in-depth information. The research also had a comparative element. 
Therefore it was important that the data I collected from the interviewees could be 
compared in its analysis. While one option was to adopt an open style of interviewing 
(Cresswell, 2003, p188), I decided against it as the process can produce a significant 
amount of disparate and extraneous material which would make coding time-consuming 
and comparative analysis problematic (Silverman, 1993, p92-93; Rubin and Rubin, 
1995, p5). Using the semi-structured interview meant that there was sufficient structure 
in the data collection process to make comparative analysis feasible, by providing some 
consistency in the areas discussed, but it also allowed the interviewees to talk personally 
and in-depth about how they viewed the QAA. It was also sufficiently flexible to allow 
me to probe and explore particular points with the interviewees (Bryman, 2012, p324, 
p471-472). By adopting the semi-structured technique there was alignment between the 
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professional issue, the research questions and my research approach (Punch, 2005, 
p170). 
4.4.3 Selecting the research sites  
The universities 
I have already described in Chapter two how I developed the notion of the three ‘ideal 
types’ of universities as a means of categorising some 101 universities in England at 
time of the interviews in the universities (see section 2.4). This categorisation allowed 
me to identify a number of universities to approach with a view to being involved in the 
research. The aim was to secure the participation of three universities: one which most 
closely resembled a ‘doctrinal ideal type’ of university; one a ‘secular ideal type’, and 
one a ‘vocational ideal type’ of university. This would enable me to undertake an intra- 
and inter- comparison of the views of the respondents, which as noted earlier was a key 
consideration for exploring the professional issue.  
In order to achieve this aim, I adopted a ‘purposive sampling’ technique (Silverman, 
2000, p104; Cresswell, 2003, p185; Bryman, 2012, p418) which enabled me to use a 
more strategic approach in selecting the universities in order to ensure that each ‘ideal 
type’ was represented. Once the universities had been categorised into the ‘ideal type’ 
of university they most closely resembled, I then looked for similar sized institutions63 
with which to compare as this should mean that there was less likely to be major 
difference in relation to the quality assurance structures in place. The operational 
distance, for example, between the senior managers, quality professionals and 
academics in a university with small student numbers might be significantly different 
from that of a large university. Such differences would make any comparative analysis 
more difficult.  
                                                 
63 Size was based on the number of undergraduate and postgraduate students as listed in the 
HESA data for 2007/08 (HESA 2009). 
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For each university, I also checked the outcome of the most recent QAA Institutional 
Audit. As there had been so few institutional audits which resulted in anything other 
than a ‘confidence’ judgement, approaching a university with a ‘limited confidence’ or 
‘no confidence’ judgement would be inappropriate as the data gathered might refer to 
the judgement and mean that the university could be identified more easily. Such an 
approach might also be seen to be insensitive.  
A final consideration was whether I had a contact at the university, at an appropriate 
level, who could approach the appropriate gatekeeper, on my behalf, to see if access 
was possible. This strategy was recommended by Punch (1994, p86).  
After undertaking these processes I produced a list of universities to approach to see if 
they would be willing to participate in the research. 
4.4.4 Gaining access and consent 
The QAA 
As part of gaining support of the QAA, as my employer, to undertake the professional 
doctorate, I had to provide an outline of my research proposal. This proposal had to be 
approved by the Directorate of the Agency which included confirmation that permission 
had been given, in principle, for QAA staff to participation in the research. This 
agreement did not, however, oblige any individual employee to participate. Such 
agreement was on an individual basis. The gatekeeper’s continued permission was 
confirmed through the annual review system, where an update of progress with the 
research was considered by the Directorate and reported to the QAA Board as the 
ultimate authority of the Agency.  
In June 2009, once ethical approval had been granted by Cardiff University (see section 
4.3), I approached the then Chief Executive of the QAA and the Chair of the QAA’s 
Board of Directors, through the appropriate protocols, to see if they would be prepared 
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to be interviewed. After agreement in principle, I emailed each of them further 
information about the research, including the purpose of the interview, the areas that the 
interview would cover and the estimated length of time it would take. This was 
presented in an information sheet for the interviewees. I also provided them with a 
consent form, which could be completed prior to the interview (see appendix 2).  
As the Chief Executive of the QAA was due to change on 1 October 2009, I also 
approached the Chief Executive designate for an interview, through the appropriate 
contact at his employing organisation. In his role as Chief Executive of that organisation 
it was not necessary to contact a gatekeeper separately. In the process of securing the 
interview I provided the same information as outlined above. 
The interviews took place in August and October 2009. I also conducted a second 
interview with the ‘new’ Chief Executive 18 months after he had taken up his post at 
the QAA. 
To secure interviews with the Assistant Directors of the QAA, I emailed them as a 
cohort providing the same details about the interviews as I had to the Chief Executive, 
the Chief Executive designate and the Chair of the Board.  
I elected to email them as a single cohort because in this context they are a naturally 
formed group (Cresswell, 2003, p164) and therefore ethically all members should be 
invited to participate. Accordingly, the Assistant Directors that volunteered were self-
selecting, as this would avoid any suggestion of their being coerced into participating in 
my research. 
Another consideration was that the Assistant Directors were also my work colleagues, 
some of whom I had worked with closely for a number of years, others I knew less well 
but with whom I still had a shared professional identity. The advantage of this shared 
identity was a common language and an established relationship which Yeo, Legard, 
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Keegan, Ward, McNaughton Nicholls and Lewis (2014, p180-181) stress as important 
part of the interview process. The disadvantage was that it could have led to 
assumptions being made by the interviewee and myself about the level of understanding 
in what was being said. This would not have been a problem for a researcher from 
outside the organisation. Such a researcher would not necessarily be able to understand 
the nuances embedded in what was being said in the same way I could as an ‘insider’ 
researcher. 
To try to take account of the challenges of endogenous research I adopted a more 
reflective approach to the interviews and the subsequent data analysis (see section 4.7.2 
for the discussion in relation to data analysis). In terms of asking the questions I piloted 
the interview schedules (see section 4.5.1) and in terms of hearing what was being said, 
I was cognisant of techniques developed in ethnographic research and other 
personal/profesional development resources. For example I referred to Hammersley and 
Atkinson (2007) and Klien (1999).  
Of the 22 Assistant Directors who were based at the QAA’s Gloucester office64 at the 
time65, 15 responded to my email (equating to 68 per cent response rate). Twelve 
interviews were arranged and undertaken over a nine day period. The remaining three 
Assistant Directors who had expressed an interest were unable to undertake an interview 
because of diary commitments.  
The universities 
Once a list of potential research sites had been identified, I approached the universities 
where I thought I was most likely to be given access. I emailed my contact in each of 
these institutions explaining the nature of my research, why I was contacting them and 
                                                 
64 The QAA also has an office in Glasgow, out of which QAA Scotland operates.  
65 As the research focussed on universities in England, alone, I only contacted Assistant 
Directors who undertook reviews or developmental work in England, rather than the other 
countries in the UK.  
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what was involved in being part of the study. Once interest in participating had been 
confirmed in principle, or another more appropriate contact identified, I sent them 
further details about the research and the interviews. This information included who I 
would most like to interview in terms of their role within the university, a paper giving a 
more detailed overview of the research, an information sheet for the interviewees and an 
example of the consent form (see appendices 2 and 3).  
King and Horrocks (2010, p31) note the benefits of having ‘insider assistance’ when 
organising the interviews at a distance. They suggest that gaining access and recruiting 
of interviewees are more likely to be successful if an ‘insider’ is involved. Indeed, I had 
expected that I would have to use a staged approach in getting access; contacting a 
different university if the previous one did not wish to participate. However, this was 
not necessary, all of the universities I initially contacted agreed to participate in the 
research. The process of using ‘insider’ contacts to approach the appropriate 
gatekeepers within the universities on my behalf had been successful. In each instance 
the ‘insider’ contact confirmed that authority from the appropriate gatekeeper had been 
given. This formal confirmation allayed some initial concerns I had about using 
‘insider’ contacts in this way. I wondered how I would ensure that appropriate and 
ethical protocols had been followed without causing offence to my contact by implying 
that they were untrustworthy.  
The ‘insider’ contacts also arranged the majority of the interviews for me. To facilitate 
this I provided a role brief of the type of individuals I would like to see, comprising: a 
senior member of staff with responsibility for quality assurance, such as a pro-vice 
chancellor; the head of the office or team responsible for quality assurance66; two heads 
of school (or equivalent); a member of academic staff with no specific responsibility for 
                                                 
66 In two instances this role was held by former academics, and in one instance this was held by an 
individual from an administrative background. 
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quality assurance; and an appropriate sabbatical officers in the Students’ Union. In one 
instance I contacted the sabbatical officer directly to organise the interview.  
Gaining individual consent 
Wiles (2013, p39) notes that gaining informed consent is not always straightforward. To 
this end, I took a number of steps to try and ensure that I had provided all the 
opportunities I could for the interviewees to give their informed consent. As noted 
above, information about the research and the individual interviews was provided to the 
‘insider contacts’ who were approaching the potential interviewees on my behalf. In the 
case of the Assistant Directors this information was provided to them directly.  
The information provided included a clear statement that the research was for a 
professional doctorate and not for the QAA’s own purposes. It was important to make 
this distinction clear because of the power relation that the Agency has with the 
universities, since its external review reports are published. For the QAA employees it 
was also important to assure them that the data was not going to be used in any staff 
assessment process. The information also detailed how the data would be recorded, 
stored, written up and used. It also indicated who would have access to the raw data and 
how anonymity and confidentiality was to be protected (Punch, 1994, p92; Kvale, 1996, 
p113-114; Wiles, 2013, p25, p29, p34). A copy of a consent form was also part of the 
information provided. As noted earlier, both the information sheet and consent form had 
been approved, subject to a minor amendment, by Cardiff University (see section 4.3).  
As I did not have direct control over how the interviewees had been recruited by the 
‘insider’ contact, I emailed the information sheet and consent form to the interviewee 
once the interview dates had been agreed. On the day of the interview, I also carried 
copies of both documents with me and after general introductions, these were discussed 
with the interviewee. I then gave them the opportunity to read the information sheet and 
consent form, and to sign it if they so wished. A small number of respondents brought a 
88 
signed copy of the form with them. In this instance I checked that they had understood 
the content of both documents and that they understood what they had signed. In all 
instances I asked whether the interviewee had any questions for me and also reiterated 
that they could withdraw from the research at any time. This latter point is, according to 
King and Horrocks (2010, p115) is an important ethical consideration.  
4.5 Preparing for the Interviews 
4.5.1 Piloting the interview questions 
Silverman (2013, p207) states that piloting or testing out the styles of questions is a 
feature of good research. I developed three interview schedules: one each for the 
interviews being undertaken at each level within the QAA and the universities. All the 
schedules were based around a set of core questions which were modified to suit the 
setting in which they were being conducted (see appendix 4). Each interview schedule 
was piloted ahead of being used. This was done in a number of different ways 
depending on access to individuals in similar positions to those being interviewed, and 
the time available. 
In relation to the QAA interviews, a pilot interview was conducted with an Assistant 
Director who was not available during the data collection period. The interview was 
conducted as if ‘for real’ and notes taken. At its end I asked the interviewee about the 
questions, the order in which they were given, the pace and length of the interview, and 
my interview skills. The interview was not recorded and this was a mistake (see below). 
After the interview I also produced a set of notes about my reflections on how the 
interview went. This was an approach that I continued to use after each interview 
proper. I reflected on how the interview went, on the questions and on my questioning 
technique/style, the effectiveness of these skills, and how I felt physically and 
emotionally. This proved a useful technique, particularly when I only had a very short 
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time between interviews during one day. At the end of each day I would go back over 
my notes and add to them if necessary. I would then look at these notes against Kvale’s 
(1996, p148-149) and Bryman’s (2012, p425) criteria of a successful interviewer. This 
helped me to identify the areas/skills which I needed to modify before the next groups 
of interviews.  
In relation to the interview schedules to be used in the universities, I used a slightly 
different approach because time was short. A copy of the interview schedule was sent 
for comment to members of staff in universities not involved in the research. The 
schedules were sent to staff in similar roles to those I was planning to interview67. 
Detailed comments were received back from all three individuals.  
While the feedback received back from the university staff was extremely useful and 
helped in finalising the interview schedules (see below), I was not able to pilot the 
interview schedules in situ and I did not have the same degree of experience of 
conducting the interviews in the local setting (the universities) that I had prior to 
conducting the QAA interviews. This was a weakness of the research.  
Both types of piloting and my reflective notes provided feedback that the interview 
schedules were generally suitable. A number of minor changes were made, mainly in 
relation to the ordering of questions.  
Another weakness of the piloting process was that I did not pilot the whole process, just 
the interview schedules. In hindsight, it would have been helpful to have recorded and 
also transcribed part of the pilot interview. This would have allowed me to test the 
transcription and initial coding process, as well as the degree of ‘neutrality’ of the full 
interview process. As I noted in section 4.0 above, being both researcher and participant 
has implications for the level and nature of the bias embedded in the research. Piloting 
                                                 
67 A Pro Vice-Chancellor (PVC) with responsibility for quality assurance, a Head of Quality, 
and an academic without responsibility for quality assurance. 
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the interview schedule helped to identify issues such as any leading questions, but not 
whether I approached the transcription and coding process with preconceptions/bias of 
which I was not aware. Had this also been done, I believe it would have resulted in a 
more refined set of interview questions, even more pertinent to the aims of this research. 
Three interview schedules were devised based on a set of core questions which enabled 
comparison (see appendices 4-6). A schedule was created for the interviews with the 
QAA staff; one for the interviews with staff in the universities and one for the officers 
from the Students’ Union. Where appropriate the schedules were nuanced in the 
language used for a particular respondent group. For example in the interviews with the 
quality professionals compared to the academic staff. 
4.5.2 Provision of transcripts 
Researchers, such as Janesick (1994, p216) and Bell, (1999, p140), suggest that it is 
good research practice to ensure that interviewees see a copy of their interview 
transcript, in order to verify its contents. After considering the practicalities of 
providing all of the interviewees with their transcript automatically after the interview, I 
decided that in the majority of instances a transcript would be provided on the request. 
This offer was stated in the consent form and reiterated at the end of the interview. 
In three cases the transcript(s) were provided as standard however, as I planned to 
present the data by role. In doing this would mean that these interviewees would be 
easily identifiable. The transcript was annotated highlighting the text that was likely to 
be quoted in the thesis in one colour, and text that might be paraphrased and attributed 
to them highlighted in another. To this end the transcripts were provided to back to the 
interviewees fairly close to submission so that the text could be highlighted accurately. 
The interviewees were asked to confirm whether they were willing for the highlighted 
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text to be included in the thesis. All of them confirmed they were happy for this to 
happen. One interviewee amended the text slightly to make it more readable. 
4.6 The Interviews in Practice  
4.6.1 The interviewees 
In total, 32 interviews were conducted between July 2009 and June 2011; 16 at the 
QAA (June – September 2009) and 16 in the universities (May – June 2011) (see Table 
1 below). The current Chief Executive of the QAA was interviewed on two occasions, 
as I was interested to hear what his views were 18 months into his role. The first 
interview was conducted when he was Chief Executive designate. 
Table 1  Interviews conducted in each research site 
 
Universities QAA 
Role 
Generic 
role title 
Lyttelton Opawa Merivale  Role 
Senior academic 
(PVC T&L) Senior 
management 
1 1  1 Chair of Board 
Senior administrative 
(Registrar) 
  1 1 Chief Executive 
(2002-2009) 
Head of Quality Unit 
or equivalent 
Quality 
professional 
 
1 1 1 2 Chief Executive 
(2009-to date) 
Academic staff with 
management 
responsibility 
Academic 
(managers) 
1 2 1 12 Assistant 
Directors 
Academic staff with 
responsibility for 
quality assurance 
Academic 
(quality) 
1 0 1   
Academic staff with 
no quality assurance 
responsibilities 
Academic  1    
Students’ Union 
Officer 
Students’ 
Union 
Officer 
1 1 1   
 Totals 5 6 5 16  
 
In order to protect anonymity each of the universities was given a pseudonym: the 
University of Lyttelton for the university that most closely resembled the ‘doctrinal’ 
university, the University of Opawa the ‘secular’ university and the University of 
92 
Merivale, the ‘vocational’ university68. In relation to the individual interviews, each was 
given a number and the transcripts, subsequent coding and analysis referred to that 
number. Quotes from the interviews that are used later in the thesis are reported by 
generic role title (as seen in Table 1). Differentiation between individuals holding the 
same role within the QAA is denoted by a different letter after the role title. This was 
done to ensure that no one single individual’s views dominated excessively. The 
exception to this method of reporting was in the case of the Chief Executives and Chair 
of the Board of the QAA. I have already discussed how I checked the accuracy of their 
transcripts because protecting anonymity was not feasible (see section 4.5.2).  
As noted in section 4.4.2 above, I wanted, ideally, to undertake six interviews in each of 
the universities, but this was not always possible. In one university it was not possible to 
arrange a mutually convenient date to interview the relevant Pro-Vice Chancellor. The 
Registrar, who was very experienced in quality assurance and to whom the quality unit 
ultimately reported, was interviewed instead. 
The respondents represented a range of ages and length of time working within higher 
education or the QAA. In the QAA, the Assistant Directors came from a variety of 
backgrounds; seven had previously held academic positions in universities, or other 
higher education providers. The remainder had held administrative posts within the 
higher education sector. In the universities, the academic staff interviewed came from a 
range of disciplines within art and design, sciences, and the humanities.  
4.6.2 Conducting the interviews 
Prior to undertaking the interviews at the universities I followed Stake’s (1994, p238) 
suggestion and collected information about the institution including the most recent 
                                                 
68 The names are suburbs of Christchurch, New Zealand through which I travelled on the bus to 
the library at Christchurch Polytechnic Institute of Technology, or at the University of 
Canterbury. Both provided an invaluable space in which to work. The names were allocated 
randomly to each university. 
93 
QAA Institutional Audit report. This provided me with details of the university’s 
mission and focus and the quality assurance processes operating in the institution. Such 
information helped me to familiarise myself with the context of the institution. It also 
meant that I was able to listen with more understanding, if respondents mentioned 
specific institutional policies and procedures, or outcomes of previous interactions with 
the QAA.  
As noted earlier, an important consideration in doing endogenous research is to 
recognise the challenges of being both researcher and participant (Trowler 2011) I had 
two concerns; firstly that the interviewees would not be able to see me as anything other 
than an Assistant Director of the QAA and this might skew what was said to me. For 
example, the interviewees might be more generous in their description about the 
Agency than they might otherwise be to a research independent of the Agency (see 
section 8.3.2). Secondly, I was concerned that I, too, might not be able move away from 
my QAA identity and conduct the interviews as a researcher. Therefore, I decided to 
adopt a technique suggested by Morse (1994, p223) to provide a clear visual statement, 
through what I wore, to the effect that I was not on QAA business when I visited the 
universities to undertake the interviews. My normal attire when visiting a university on 
behalf of the QAA would be formal office wear. For the purposes of the interviews I 
dressed less formally. While this might seem a pedantic measure, it also helped me to 
prepare for the interviews. I was there as a researcher, not as an Assistant Director. I 
employed a similar approach when interviewing the Assistant Directors at the QAA. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p141) and Lofland and Lofland (1995, p55) suggest 
that it is important to portray an appropriate self-image and professional behaviour in 
the context of the interview and the individual being interviewed, therefore I returned to 
more formal office wear when I interviewed the Chief Executives and the Chair of the 
QAA Board.  
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The interviews themselves were usually conducted in the interviewee’s office or a 
meeting room where that was more suitable for the interviewee; for example where 
offices are shared. The interviews lasted between 25 and 65 minutes. The interviewees 
were not interviewed in any specific order, only when they were available. Nisbet and 
Watt (1984, p78) suggest interviewing senior people later rather than earlier in the 
schedule because at that point the researcher is more likely to have a better idea of the 
broader picture. However, I did not think it appropriate to ask the ‘insider’ contact at the 
universities to do this, and in hindsight I think it would have made little difference to the 
nature of the interview undertaken.  
Although the interviewees were informed in the consent form that the interview would 
be recorded, I asked them again at the beginning of the session. In keeping with Lofland 
and Lofland’s view (1995, p86-87), I found recording the interviews and only taking 
brief notes meant that I was more able to focus on what the interviewee was saying. I 
could follow up any points of interest easily, clarify my understanding, and engage with 
the interviewee by maintaining eye contact and using body language to reflect my 
interest in what they were saying. I was also able to note the time and gently bring the 
interviewee back to the interview schedule where necessary. 
As noted in Chapter one, during the data collection period I left the QAA prior to 
moving overseas and the interviews were conducted in slightly different contexts. All 
the interviews with the QAA staff and the interviews in one of the universities were 
conducted while I was working at the Agency. The interviews in the two other 
universities were conducted shortly after I left the QAA. This change of role had little 
notable impact on the nature of the interviews as I was still deeply immersed in the 
language of quality assurance and the QAA.  
  
95 
4.7 Transcription and Analysis 
4.7.1 Transcription 
Where possible the interviews were transcribed as quickly as possible after the 
interview took place. For this to take place an experienced transcriber, with the 
permission of the interviewees, was used for six of the early interviews. I transcribed 
the first two interviews, so that I might get a sense of the transcription process and 
decide on the level of detail needed. This enabled me to provide detailed instructions for 
the other transcriber, as recommended by Kvale (1996, p169). While this was an 
effective use of resources in many respects and cross checking of the transcript against 
the original recording for example resulted in minimal changes, I felt increasingly 
detached from the data and decided once time permitted to transcribe the remaining (24) 
interviews myself. Although relatively time-consuming, I found the process 
invigorating as I was once again immersed in the interviews. Kvale (1996, p164) notes 
that the transcription process is ‘interpretational in character’ and therefore by limiting 
the number of people undertaking the transcription, I tried to limit the degree of 
interpretation. As noted earlier, as a researcher I tried to be aware of what I ‘brought’ to 
the data collection and analysis process, particularly my biases. I could not have known 
in any detail how the values of the other transcriber had influenced the transcription 
process.  
In addition, by transcribing the majority of the interviews the movement into the formal 
data analysis process was blurred and more productive. A benefit highlighted by 
Lofland and Lofland (1995, p88). 
At the start of the transcription process I was not clear about the level of detail I 
required from the interviews. I noted the advice from Kvale (1996, p165) that a 
verbatim transcription is no more objective than one which is more of an idealised 
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realisation of the interviewee’s words. But I appreciated that I needed to try some 
different degrees of transcription before coming to a decision. This is where recording 
and transcribing the pilot interview would have been helpful.  
I tried a number of different levels of detail when I was transcribing. At a minimum, I 
transcribed all the spoken words; I also tried transcribing a number of the non-verbal 
cues, including length of pauses, major facial expression and coughing (Silverman, 
1993, p118; King and Horrocks, 2010, p144). Reflecting on the additional time taken to 
transcribe the interviews and the nature of the extra information provided, I decided that 
the level of detail did not provide anything meaningful for the analysis I wished to 
undertake. I decided, therefore, not to transcribe any non-verbal cues and only to 
transcribe the interviews verbatim to the point where such an approach began to obscure 
or reduce the readability of the text. 
Each transcript was compared against the original interview to check for accuracy. I 
found it helpful to leave a short period of time before undertaking the checking process 
so that I could review the interview afresh. During the checking process, I also 
highlighted any interesting points within the interview itself.  
4.7.2 Coding and analysis  
In undertaking the data analysis, I adopted the method suggested by Rubin and Rubin 
(2005, p207-208) which emphasises the iterative process of reading and rereading the 
interviews. They identified six stages in the process: ‘recognition’ where key concepts, 
themes, events are identified; ‘clarifying’ what is meant by specific concepts and 
themes; ‘synthesising’ where different versions of events are put together. This is 
followed by ‘coding’ the data, where the coding structure is developed and applied and 
the data is ‘sorted’ into groupings or clusters of themes. The final stage is ‘final 
synthesis’ where concepts and themes are combined to suggest identifying relationships, 
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variations and nuances in order to identify explanatory concepts. This leads to an overall 
description of the explanatory concepts for the topic studied, before the broader 
significance is identified. These stages are similar to those outlined by Kvale’s (1996, 
p193-204) description of the coding process ‘meaning condensation’, ‘meaning 
categorisation’, ‘meaning structuring’, ‘meaning interpretation’, ‘ad hoc meaning 
generation’. 
During the transcription process I began to note separately any interesting or recurring 
words or phrases which appeared in the text. This began to form the basis of a coding 
framework which I reviewed and added to on a regular basis. I also began to highlight 
in colour any particularly interesting, novel or unusual views in the transcripts 
themselves. I also added my own thoughts or noted cross linkages I had spotted within 
the interview or in other ones; what Lofland and Lofland (1995, p193) refer to as 
‘memoing’. Therefore each transcript became a working document not only providing 
raw data, but also capturing initial thoughts for the analysis. 
Once all the transcripts for a particular organisation had been completed, I uploaded 
them into NVIVO 8 and began to code them using a combination of the coding 
framework mentioned above, and further free coding, amending the coding framework 
where appropriate.  
During the coding process I reread the transcripts of the interviews on a number of 
occasions to become immersed in the data. I found that the coding process fractured the 
interviews to such a degree that their overall meaning could be lost. At one point I 
realised that the coding had become so specific that the data within nodes was too small 
to be meaningful and the framework too large to be manageable. I subsequently reduced 
the number of nodes by aggregating the categories and recoding.  
In order to move from the coding process to the analytical process, I began to write 
summaries for each of the revised nodes, firstly identifying the characteristics of the 
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node in order to ensure consistency in the coding process, and secondly to draw out the 
analytical themes that emerged from the data, for example: ‘market’, ‘tools’, ‘structures’ 
‘science’ (see Figure 6 below). In this context, an analytical theme was ‘any recurrent 
and distinctive features of participants’ accounts, characterising particular perceptions 
and/or experiences’ (King and Horrocks, 2010, p150). 
 
 
Figure 6  Illustration of the development of analytical and reporting themes 
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The data within the analytical themes were analysed by institutional type and the role of 
the interviewee. In each instance I was looking for differences and similarities in what 
was being said, as well as any apparent contradictions within and across the interviews 
(Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p230; Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p95). I also looked for 
possible reasons for these occurrences. For example, was a particular level in the 
universities saying similar things; was it dependent on the ‘ideal type’ the university 
most closely resembled; or on how long the individual had worked at the QAA; was the 
interviewee speaking about their own experience or the views of others?  
The analytical themes were also reviewed against Bernstein’s concepts identified in 
section 3.1.2 above. Again, I asked a series of questions, for example: Who is QAA 
acting on behalf of, the ORF or PRF? Who is controlling/influencing the three rules of 
the pedagogic device? What direction is the recontextualising/mediating? 
The analytical themes were considered against the research questions to identify the 
reporting themes. In this context the reporting themes were descriptions used to present 
the findings. For example, in Figure 6 above, the analytical themes were considered in 
relation to research question one and how the role of the QAA was perceived, the 
reporting theme therefore was the QAA as ‘Structural Engineer’.  
To help validate the accuracy of the findings as recommended by Creswell (2003, p196) 
I used a ‘peer debriefer’ to review and ask questions about the empirical findings so that 
‘the account will resonate with people other than the researcher’ (2003, p196). To this 
end, the empirical chapters were also shared with two former colleagues from the QAA, 
one who was interviewed as part of the research, and one who was not. Both had 
previously worked in universities as a quality professional and an academic 
respectively. They confirmed that the account reflected their understanding of the 
‘world’.  
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A protracted process 
As the coding and analysis were undertaken over a protracted period of time, I read 
through all the individual interviews again on two occasions to re-engage with the data. 
This provided me with the opportunity to look at the data afresh and where appropriate, 
nodes were recoded or the summaries amended. This approach was particularly useful 
when I returned to the UK and was working for a university in a quality role. I was able 
now to read through the interviews in the universities from a slightly different 
perspective. Although the coding did not need to change in my view, I felt more able to 
identify some of the nuances in the data that I did not necessarily appreciate were 
embedded in my QAA background.  
Making the familiar strange  
After working at the QAA for nine years I was concerned that I was too ingrained in the 
organisation, its culture and discourse to be able to hear all that was being said to me or 
to analyse the data with limited bias. As I undertook the data analysis and writing up I 
also realised that I still felt a sense of responsibility to those with whom I had 
previously worked. This occurrence is highlighted by Lofland and Lofland (1995, p28) 
and Punch’s (1994, p93). 
Aware of the work in ethnographic research on this matter, I looked to Delamont and 
Atkinson (1995, p3) and Delamont (2002) for ideas about how to make the familiar 
strange. Although many of their suggestions were too resource intensive for my 
situation, their use of questions and the examples provided, albeit predominantly in 
ethnographic studies, were helpful. For example because of the contested nature of the 
QAA’s work and my allegiance to the QAA and former colleagues there, I found it 
helpful to follow up Delamont’s (2002, p43) citation of Becker and to retrieve his 
original article. His discussion about the need for researchers to consider ‘whose side 
are we on’ and acknowledge that the researcher’s feelings might distort the findings 
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(1967, p239-241) was illuminating. In analysing the data I questioned whether my 
allegiances to the QAA were clouding what I was hearing from the universities. 
Similarly in writing up the findings I tried to free myself from the cautious approach to 
reporting that had been instilled in me at the QAA and not to supress the findings 
because they were contentious, or potentially damaging to the reputation of the QAA. 
Becker (1967, p241-242) advises that cognisance needs to be taken of the potential to 
treat one interviewee’s view as more credible than another because of their position in 
the hierarchy within an organisation, or identify expected responses because of the 
university’s perceived position in the sector’s hierarchy of prestige. Throughout the 
analysis and reporting I found it helpful to ask myself whose side was I on and whether 
this was distorting my research in such a way as to make it invalid (Becker, 1967, p245-
246). 
The experience of working in a university in England before the end of the research 
period also helped me to look at the data afresh. 
4.8 Summary 
In this chapter I have set out the approach taken to collect and analyse the data for this 
research. I have discussed the pragmatic factors which influenced the approaches 
adopted, including the challenge of undertaking endogenous research. In practice such 
research did not provide any major difficulties or resistance from interviewees, although 
there was some stiltedness in the interviews with some of the academic staff. More 
direct contact with them prior to the interview might have been helpful. My departure 
from the QAA during the research period might have lessened some of the difficulties 
that Hockey (1993) and Le Gallais (2008) allude to regarding reaction to the research 
once it is published, or, in my case, submitted with a summary report provided to the 
Directorate. 
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CHAPTER FIVE FINDINGS I: THE ROLE OF THE QAA 
5.0 Introduction 
This is the first of three chapters that present the findings from the analysis of the 
interview data. This chapter and the next will explore the themes identified in relation to 
the role of the QAA and how it is understood across and within the three universities 
and the QAA itself. The themes identified were: guardian of academic standards and 
autonomy; structural engineer in relation to the structures and power relations within 
universities; the legitimacy of the Agency’s scope of work which I have summarised in 
phrase ‘mission creep’; and mutuality and perceptions and the challenges this brings 
for the QAA. 
In addition, the second empirical chapter (Chapter six) explores the QAA’s relationship 
with the PRF and ORF and discusses the challenges of those relationships and how they 
can be so easily misconstrued.  
In the final empirical chapter (Chapter seven) I highlight the aspects which the QAA 
respondent identified as influencing how the universities perceive the Agency’s role and 
how they recontextualise its messages. In this context I also discuss the capacity of the 
different universities have to undertake this recontextualisation process. 
In setting out the sections in this way and by using Bernstein’s analytical framework, 
identified in Chapter three, the following three chapters will also explore each of the 
research questions as identified in Chapter three. Discussion of the implications for the 
QAA and the overarching professional issue of the data is reserved for the concluding 
chapter (Chapter eight). 
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5.1 Guardian 
In this theme three aspects were identified from the analysis of the data: the QAA’s role 
in safeguarding academic standards, the comparability of standards, and the protection 
of the autonomy of the PRF.  
5.1.1 Safeguarding academic standards 
All the respondents in the universities and the QAA considered that the Agency had a 
legitimate role in safeguarding academic standards across the sector, by acting as ‘an 
underwriter of minimum standards which institutions must meet’ [Senior manager, 
University of Lyttelton]. In doing so, the QAA was considered to be providing 
reassurance to the public and the Government that institutions in receipt of public 
funding and/or holders of degree awarding powers were exercising their authority 
appropriately and were accountable for their actions.  
It is not surprising that the PRF were content with this aspect of the guardian role. As 
noted in Chapter two, the PRF had already ‘bought into’ the idea of external quality 
assurance, whether this was through compliance with the CNAA in the case of the 
public sector institutions, or in the case of the universities through the establishment of 
their own external body: the AAU and then the HEQC. The QAA was therefore 
continuing with these arrangements and indeed, once subject level review had been 
revoked, was operating in the same way as the AAU and HEQC by focussing on 
institutional level review alone. In Bernstein’s terms, the PRF had reclaimed ownership 
of the evaluative rules which determine what is being taught, how it is being taught and 
what counts as the valid acquisition of the curriculum (Singh, 2002, p573), areas which 
subject level review had threatened (see section 3.2.1).  
What was interesting was that all the senior managers and quality professionals spoke of 
the disastrous consequences of a bad institutional review. This suggests that the QAA 
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had significant power over the universities. Five of the QAA respondents also spoke of 
this very real fear contributing to the Agency’s authority; not least because of the risk it 
placed on continued financial support from bodies outside the sector. But in reality this 
was a perceived authority as the Agency does not have any direct sanctions to place on 
failing institutions that remain under the auspices of the HEFCE. It is also a perceived 
fear because, at the time of the interviews, very few universities had received anything 
less than a positive review outcome.  
‘…it’s a perceived authority in so much that we’re looked upon sometimes 
as being the big, bad people but our authority is implied because we know 
we don’t have any; it’s implied by the Funding Council who contract us… 
our authority if you like is indirect because a poor report to the Funding 
Council can have implications… [such as] an institution having to curb its 
expansion plans because the banks downgraded their financial status.’  
[Assistant Director (f)] 
 
‘…the sanctions which it [QAA] has are also very effective in giving the 
Agency authority, like the issuing of a poor judgement would be very 
damaging to the reputation of an institution.’  
[Chair of the Board]  
 
 
The majority of the respondents from the universities acknowledged that the QAA also 
had a legitimate role in protecting the UK higher education brand by using mechanisms 
which evaluate the performance of each higher education provider, “sanctioning” those 
who do not meet the nationally agreed standards and praising those where strong 
evidence exists to support their claims to provide high quality higher education. One 
academic suggested that without the QAA, all kinds of practices could take place: 
‘…we need something that maintains consistency [in standards] and 
assures the quality of what’s going on in higher education. Otherwise all 
kinds of things would probably be going on. “Spend your hundred pounds 
and get a degree” kind of thing… I mean if we didn’t have the QAA we 
would have no idea.’ 
[Academic (manager), University of Merivale] 
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The phrase ‘all kinds of things’ is quite powerful and suggests that there is a real 
mistrust within the PRF of the actions of colleagues if the QAA were not in place to act 
as guardian.  
The Students’ Union sabbatical officer also from the University of Merivale, echoed the 
academic’s comments when she noted that: 
‘[QAA] makes sure that the university is doing things properly I guess. 
Whereas if they were left on their own, things may go wrong…. It’s just 
to keep everything in the right processes.’  
[Students’ Union Sabbatical Officer, University of Merivale] 
 
The similarity in these views and elsewhere between the Students’ Union sabbatical 
officers and also parts of the university is interesting, and suggests that there is a distinct 
cultural position in each university about the QAA and quality assurance more broadly.  
This scepticism was heightened and the guardian role of the QAA considered 
increasingly important in the light of the Government’s desire to extend the sector to 
new providers. In this context, the QAA’s role was described by the majority of the 
respondents as being to protect the sector from ‘rogue institutions’. 
‘… if we are continuing with a move towards more private providers and 
growing the number of institutions, agencies, organisations that are 
going to be providing tertiary education… we need to make sure that they 
are doing the job properly.’  
[Academic (manager), University of Opawa] 
 
 
It might also be suggested that there is concern within the PRF that opening the market 
might introduce a new kind of PRF with a different culture and values which might, in 
turn, weaken the position of the current PRF. 
Similarly the majority of the QAA respondents spoke of the Agency’s role in guarding 
entry into the higher education ‘club’, recommending69 or refusing entry as they saw fit. 
                                                 
69 Recommendations from QAA’s Advisory Committee on Degree Awarding Powers are 
considered by the Privy Council, who has the final decision. 
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Entry could be through by achieving degree awarding powers, or the more exclusive 
achievement or being granted the use of the title ‘university’. The screening and 
assessing of organisations that might wish to enter was seen as increasingly significant 
as the sector was opened to a greater number of new providers70.’ 
‘I think degree awarding powers have become increasingly important 
especially as we’ve gone into the private institutions and lots of new 
institutions [particularly] in London.’  
[Assistant Director (g)] 
 
 
Indeed the Chair of the QAA Board of Directors also spoke of the need for the QAA to 
monitor and raise any issues regarding the new or proposed entrants  
‘I am chair of ACDAP and I am conscious of the way in which all sorts of 
other bodies are now providing degrees and some of the issues arising 
from that. As things are going, it won’t be very long before you can get 
your degree at Tesco; I don’t exaggerate all that much. I think it’s 
plausible.’  
[Chair of the Board] 
 
 
This would suggest that one role of the QAA is also to protect what the higher 
education system should look like, and to control the nature of any changes/expansion 
to the sector. 
For the Students’ Union sabbatical officers, the safeguarding role was important, 
particularly in relation to teaching and learning. The suggestion in the use of the word 
‘exposing’ is that the QAA has a role in relation to establishing the ‘truth’ of what 
exactly is going on in the universities.  
‘I think obviously focussing on each institution’s really key and really 
exposing problems in institutions… if there’s unsatisfactory level of 
teaching and learning across an institution or in certain departments in 
an institution that should be exposed.’ 
 
[Students’ Union sabbatical officer, University of Lyttelton] 
 
                                                 
70 Since the interviews QAA’s remit has been extended and all institutions offering higher 
education, irrespective of the source of funding have to undertake scrutiny by QAA through 
Review for Education Oversight or Review for Specific Course Designation (QAA, 2014a) 
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Although the sabbatical officer from the University of Opawa suggested that Students’  
Unions should have more of consumer protectionist role.  
‘…in the coming years Students’ Unions are going to have to take a 
much stronger role when it comes to helping a student ensure that they 
are getting value for money. I’m speaking to NUS at the moment about 
how Students’ Unions are almost going to have to take on a term of 
watchdog’  
[Students’ Union sabbatical officer, University of Opawa] 
 
 
This would suggest that the QAA’s work in relation to the student agenda is a sensible 
development, if it is to continue to have a role in the changing higher education 
landscape (see section 6.1.2). 
5.1.2 Comparability of standards 
While there was general agreement that the QAA had a legitimate role in safeguarding 
academic standards there were contrasting views about the degree to which the Agency 
promoted the concept of comparable academic standards. The senior manager at the 
University of Lyttelton spoke of the damaging nature of the QAA’s role in promoting 
the myth that there is direct comparability of standards across the sector and in the 
student experience. He noted that although there had been a recent softening of the 
QAA’s language when talking about institutions meeting threshold standards, it was 
insufficient to mitigate against the damage done by the impression of direct 
comparability.  
‘…it [the QAA] has given life to the idea that actually there is a direct 
comparability [between institutions] which is hugely corrosive to 
discussions about quality and standards in the UK.’  
 
[Senior manager, University of Lyttelton]  
 
 
The senior manager also suggested that a number of institutions would not wish this 
notion of direct comparability to be dispelled, because it helped them to promote their 
reputation/status. Nor would such institutions wish the QAA to speak only of 
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minimum/threshold standards or publicise the wide variation in the student experience 
that exists in the sector once baseline standards have been met.  
‘I think there are some in the sector and by that I mean universities, forty 
odd now that have quite a lot to gain from an Agency that gives the 
impression that there is direct comparability and as a result of that do not 
want to see the Agency change; do not want it to do anything that would 
just give a sense of policing de minimis standards and above that line 
there is a wide variation in terms of the learning outcomes, quality of the 
student experience, because that would be damaging to them.’  
 
[Senior manager, University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
This quotation provides an interesting example of the diverse self-interests and lack of 
trust within the PRF, as well as the perception, by those who place their institution at 
the ‘higher’ end of the perceived hierarchy of prestige, that the Agency is appropriated 
by those institutions at the ‘lower’ end of the hierarchy. This findings are echoed by 
Ashwin, Abbas and McLean (2015, p619) who note that some higher education 
providers adopt the language of the ORF to establish the legitimacy of their claims that 
they are of high quality. This also links to my findings in respect of the 
recontextualisation process undertaken by the ‘vocation’ type of universities (see 
section 7.2.1). 
For the University of Lyttelton, as the university which most closely resembles the 
‘doctrinal ideal type’ of university, the QAA was promoting comparability that could 
potentially weaken the status of the perceived hierarchy of prestige in the minds of the 
general public and students. It is unthinkable to a ‘doctrinal’ type of university that any 
external organisation could interfere in the general hierarchical ordering of the sector. It 
also suggests that the Agency is of no real value to the University of Lyttelton and 
‘doctrinal’ type institutions more generally. This will be explored further in Chapter six. 
In contrast, the quality professional at Merivale welcomed the QAA’s role in providing 
a more level playing field/basis on which to judge institutions. This also provides the 
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opportunity to strengthen the position of similar ‘vocational’ type institutions which 
normally hold a position lower in the perceived hierarchy of prestige than the ‘doctrinal’ 
or ‘secular ideal’ type of university. In this context the QAA might be considered to be 
an ‘arbiter’ ensuring fair play. 
The senior manager from the same university, however, suggested that the QAA 
reinforced the differentiation within the perceived higher education hierarchy of prestige 
by how the Agency and review teams treated universities and the subsequent review 
reports based on their pre-existing reputations. 
‘…so if you took all the names off and you went back over the QAA 
reports and you tried to categorise the nature of the particular 
recommendation, you would find that certain things would be treated 
differently… there are things which appear to be, you know, really quite 
serious which don’t seem to be given necessarily the same profile in the 
recommendations’  
[Senior manager, University of Merivale] 
 
 
The contrasting views in the data between the senior managers appear to suggest a link 
between how respondents construct the QAA and the strength of institutional 
reputation. Those in the university which most closely represents the ‘doctrinal ideal 
type’ perceive the QAA as again misrepresenting the hierarchy. The ‘vocational ideal 
types’ conclude that the Agency perpetuates the perceived hierarchy of status by the 
way its review teams are put together and operate. Both views are potentially damaging 
to how the independence of the QAA is viewed by the PRF, the ORF and the public. As 
noted in Chapter three such perceptions can lead to the Agency of being accused of 
failing to do its job. Such views can also inhibit the maturation and refinement of the 
quality assurance system in England because they preclude the universities from 
considering anything other than their own self interests.  
Only one respondent from the QAA mentioned comparability of standards, noting that 
due to the diversity of universities in the sector and a broader range of students studying 
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for higher education awards, there needs to be ‘a more multifarious approach to 
standards and what’s expected of people and I don’t know how QAA can effectively 
monitor and manage that’ [Assistant Director (a)]. This point links to forthcoming 
section 5.2.1 which discusses the notion of the QAA developing a ‘science’ of quality 
assurance.  The implications for the QAA as it moves towards a common review 
method are discussed in the concluding chapter. 
5.1.3 Protecting autonomy 
The majority of the QAA respondents supported whole-heartedly the notion that the 
Agency should operate in such a way that protects the autonomy of the universities. The 
two respondents who did not, called for the QAA to be more inspectoral in its approach. 
Such views appear to be based on personal opinion rather than on another external 
factor. 
The QAA was deemed to protect autonomy in two ways. Firstly, it provides the external 
reference points that are structured in such a way as to provide a series of resources 
which senior academic managers and quality professionals can recontextualise into their 
own institutional settings to safeguard their own academic standards and manage their 
own improvement activities.  
‘…the QAA has supplied a kind of structure to it [quality assurance] and 
not determining what has to be taught and how it has to be taught and 
how it has to be quality assured. It has given us tools…. But it remains 
within the realm of the institution to fill that space with our own 
interpretation of that’.  
[Quality professional, University of Merivale] 
 
‘We’re in a situation where at the moment the QAA lays down its precepts 
for how things should operate and the university says alright the QAA 
says we’ve got to do it like this, this is how we interpret this, this is what 
the university’s approach is to these things and everybody in the 
university has to do it… So it’s difficult to see how you get evolution at 
school level.’  
 
[Academic (manager), University of Opawa] 
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These two quotations exemplify the core of this theme: the importance of the PRF 
operating without or with only minimal interference from the ORF. Retaining 
ownership of its internal quality assurance processes and procedures and, therefore, the 
recontextualising and evaluative rules of the pedagogic device is essential, however 
there might be disagreement within the PRF between the quality professionals and 
academics about the nature of the quality assurance processes themselves and their 
influence on pedagogic practice (see section 7.2.2).  
Secondly, the Agency provides the means to test the universities and what they are 
doing to protect these standards and promote enhancement. At the time the interviews 
were conducted the QAA did not directly assess the standards within institutions such as 
the quality of teaching. Rather it assessed an institution’s ‘management of the academic 
standards of the awards that it offers and the quality of the learning opportunities 
available to students’ (QAA 2009d, p5). Responsibility for academic standards and 
quality therefore lies squarely with the higher education providers with degree awarding 
powers (Raban and Cairns, 2013, p113).   
‘I think QAA does a job of promoting the way in which institutions do that 
[safeguarding quality and standards] because we don’t do it. We make 
sure institutions do it and that, I suppose, is a subtle distinction.’ 
 
[Assistant Director (d)] 
 
 
Another QAA respondent took this further by emphasising the importance of the 
Agency looking at and assessing institutions in the context of that institution. What 
Brown (2013, p425) and Raban and Cairns (2014, p114) refer to as a ‘fitness for 
purpose’ approach; 
‘In the context of this institution, in the context of the type of students 
[they have] and in the context of their ethos and the mission statement 
and everything else that they tell you, now is what they’re doing 
appropriate?’ And that can be quite different from one institution to 
another.’  
[Assistant Director (l)] 
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This quotation suggests that due to this variety the QAA is justified in its role in 
recontextualising the policy directives from the ORF into structures and guidance which 
it can accommodate for this. 
Peer referenced 
Another means of respecting the autonomy of the PRF identified by the majority of 
respondents from across the universities and the QAA was its use of the expertise of 
academic peers to develop materials for the PRF and in its review methods. This 
approach was seen as the only way to achieve legitimacy for the Agency and its 
messages because it is the PRF developing the materials that have the potential to 
influence the recontextualising rules of the pedagogic device and therefore pedagogic 
practice.  
‘It’s something, you know, for the people by the people and in that sense 
the definitions and the rules and the parameters which it seeks to put into 
place, are ones which collaboratively the Sector has defined for itself and 
not ones which have been placed upon it by external or government 
environments.’  
[Senior manager, University of Merivale] 
 
‘I can see that [subject benchmark statements] are produced very much 
in consultation with academics and for the use of academics.... academics 
speaking to academics.’  
[Academic (quality), University of Merivale] 
 
‘The reason subject benchmarks have any status, any validity is because 
it is something that emerges from the academic community, you know, the 
FHEQ, and all the parts of the academic infrastructure. It wouldn’t if it 
was some kind of external imposition in that sense, it wouldn’t actually 
have that kind of authority.’  
[Quality professional, University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
For the QAA respondents it was the only means of working that would get any results 
and allow the Agency to achieve its mandate as set out by the Dearing report (see 
Chapter two) and meet its contract with the HEFCE. Three QAA respondents also 
spoke of the QAA needing to make sure that it kept the sector on side to ensure that the 
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universities agreed to release staff to act as peer reviewers and to contribute to the 
developments, working groups and discussion events.  
It also enabled the Agency to build trust/working relationships (albeit to different 
degrees) with the universities, which safeguards the QAA’s own position, given the 
ability of the more powerful universities through their mission groups to by-pass the 
Agency and lobby government directly (as seen in Chapter three) (Filippakou and 
Tapper, 2015, p3). This, therefore might limit the QAA in the degree and nature of 
recontextualisation it can undertake because it must consider the views of the PRF. 
The QAA respondents also noted the importance of the mutuality with the PRF in the 
development processes:  
‘I’m sure there’s been a massive rise of awareness of the importance of 
quality assurance, I have no doubt about that... and that’s in a large part, 
I’m sure, due to the work that QAA has done and that’s probably partly 
due to the way we work, we’re always using people from the sector, so 
there’s a kind of two way thing going on all the time... I think originally 
we were regarded with that kind of “you’re the police and we’re the 
people that you’re policing”, but I think more and more over time, the 
people that work very closely with us, perceive us more as a collegiate 
body, and one that they can work with and share issues with.’  
 
[Assistant Director (b)] 
 
 
‘…most of the academics who took part in those exercises… most of them 
came away saying “we’ve never done that before, we’ve never actually 
sat down and said what does it mean to have a degree in history in the 
UK”. So they actually found it useful, so there was always a sense of 
working with the sector and always a sense of trust… We built a lot of 
bridges with the sector.’ 
[Assistant Director (k)] 
 
 
The latter quotation is interesting because subject benchmark statements are potentially 
a very controversial development for the Agency. A subject benchmark statement 
describes what gives a discipline its coherence and identity, and defines the abilities and 
skills needed by graduates in order to develop understanding or competence in that 
subject. In doing so the statements set out the expected standards of degrees in that 
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discipline (QAA, 2011c). The benchmark statements could therefore be perceived as a 
direct attack on the PRF and the control of the recontextualisation and evaluative rules 
of the pedagogic device: professionals being told what to do. Indeed, Morley (2003, 
p44) suggests that benchmark statements are strengthening discipline classifications and 
represent a ‘positivistic concept of knowledge based on objective truths to be 
communicated, memorized and measured.’ The question is the degree to which it is the 
PRF who is determining those ‘truths.  
The quotation also suggests another important perspective to this, namely that subject 
benchmark statements also provide a voice for academics and their disciplines. It was 
notable during my time at the QAA that an increasing number of subjects, which 
Bernstein (1996, p65) would have described as regions, wanted to have their own 
benchmark statement as this was seen to give them a voice and credibility within the 
higher education system. In the end the QAA had to establish criteria71 and a procedure 
to assess eligibility for a statement, in part for resource reasons. 
One academic noted, however, that because the development process required 
consensus about the content of the benchmark statement it had to accommodate most 
elements relevant to a discipline, which most institutions would be comfortable that 
they were doing already. The respondent did not decry the benchmark statements and 
valued the opportunity for academics to consider what they wanted the discipline to 
look like, but felt that it could be more challenging. 
‘I think from the way I read this document, it represents academic common 
sense and rigour. I think that’s good. I don’t see anything where an 
academic in their right mind would have to disagree... I don’t want to 
ridicule it, but some of the advice is so common sense it’s like you need to 
show four out of five vital signs and well who would argue with that… I do 
see areas where it might be more stretching than others, to make sure that 
this is actually built on.’ 
[Academic (manager), University of Opawa]  
                                                 
71 The recognition scheme for subject benchmark statements (see 
http://www.qaa.ac.uk/publications/information-and-
guidance/publication?PubID=190#.VWyGfWlwZf0 ) 
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Turning to the use of peers in the QAA review methods, the majority of respondents 
across the universities and the QAA considered the practice to be beneficial. Two 
respondents, one each from the University of Merivale and University of Opawa, 
however warned that the use of academic peers in this context could lead to a ‘cultural 
dissonance’. It was suggested that reviewers from very different institutions often 
‘simply don’t get how an institution works’ [Quality professional, University of Opawa]. 
An example was offered where a review team failed to hear what was being said to 
them by the staff they were meeting because the team was following a particular line in 
their agenda: ‘they [the reviewers] got their teeth into something and what I was going 
to be talking about was irrelevant.’ [Academic (manager), University of Merivale]. In 
Bernstein’s terms this would suggest that there are multiple groupings within the PRF 
which are status bound and linked to the perceived hierarchy of prestige. This will be 
seen in the next chapter when I discuss the recontextualising process undertaken by the 
three universities along institutional lines and the ‘ideal type’ that the universities most 
closely resemble (see section 7.2). 
5.2 Structural Engineer 
In this theme three aspects were identified from the analysis of the data: the ‘science’ of 
quality assurance, the changing shape of universities, and shifting power relations. 
5.2.1 The ‘science’ of quality assurance 
The majority of respondents in the QAA and all three senior university managers talked 
of the Agency’s role in raising awareness of quality assurance within the sector, and 
demonstrating the importance of having a formal and systematic approach to assuring 
academic standards. Two QAA respondents described the QAA as developing a 
‘science of quality assurance’ [Assistant Director (b), Former Chief Executive]. The 
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term ‘science’ is interesting because it suggests that the Agency has developed some 
form of objective technologies with which universities can develop their own solutions 
to their particular issues, appropriate to their own context. Two senior managers at the 
Universities of Opawa and Lyttelton supported this notion by suggesting that the QAA 
had provided universities with a lexicon with which to discuss quality assurance in local 
settings and across the higher education sector as a whole.  
‘It’s produced an almost common language and I think that’s incredibly 
important. I don’t think the language is all always very easy, but I think it 
has produced a common vocabulary about which we can talk about 
things … it confines an area so that we can manage it and work within it 
and develop it.’ 
[Senior manager, University of Opawa] 
 
In this context the QAA might be considered to be a facilitator supporting the 
institutions in developing and operating their own quality assurance mechanisms. What 
the Agency is doing, as noted in section 5.1.3 above, is operating in a manner that 
respects the autonomy of the university and their right to set and maintain academic 
standards. However, in providing the framework within which to work, the Agency is 
creating a form of boundary within which the PRF must operate in relation to teaching 
and learning. Although this framework is devised by the PRF, we have already seen 
from the data that there is disagreement within and across the PRF based on a series of 
different vested interests, and that it is the QAA which mediates these as well as the 
requirements of the ORF and its agents (see section 5.1.2).  
Eight of the respondents from the QAA and the senior managers at the Universities of 
Opawa and Merivale spoke of how the Agency, through its reference points and 
reviews, had enabled/encouraged universities (and subject disciplines in the context of 
subject benchmark statements) to think about how they do things and why.  
‘Most institutions have thought much more carefully about the way in 
which it’s securing its standards… its teaching and learning, [and]…its 
supporting processes. I’m not saying that it’s one hundred per cent in 
every institution… but what it has done is put that [academic standards] 
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firmly on the agenda and provided the opportunity for the really rogue 
areas, that have gone unnoticed for decades, to be rooted out.’ 
[Assistant Director (l)] 
 
 ‘I think it’s [the QAA] been constructive. I think it’s provided a vehicle 
for quite substantial and serious self-criticism, and development of 
processes which you know have clearly been to the benefit of students.’  
 
[Quality professional, University of Opawa] 
 
 
Interestingly a similar view again was noted by the Students’ Union sabbatical officer at 
the University of Opawa, when she said that: 
‘From my perspective their [the QAA] role is to challenge higher 
education institutions, but also kind of encourage them to really look at 
the different kinds of elements of an institution and develop it… I see that 
they’re [the QAA] the driving force behind that.’ 
 
[Students’ Union sabbatical officer, University of Opawa] 
 
 
Again this suggests the existence of a particular quality culture within the universities, 
which is spread through involvement with the internal quality assurance processes and 
particularly institutional level committees. 
Drawing on personal experience of working in a university, one respondent reflected on 
the impact of Institutional Audit and guidance materials: 
‘…the first time institutional audit happened it galvanised the institution 
to produce and draw together and, perhaps for the first time, explain back 
to itself as an organisation what it is doing in all these areas.’ 
 
[Chief Executive of the QAA, interview 1] 
 
 
However, with the ‘science’ has come a very specialist and, according to the senior 
managers at Opawa and Lyttelton, arcane language which is difficult to understand for 
anyone not directly engaged with institutional level quality assurance. In this context, 
the specialist language which Bernstein conceptualises, perpetuates the need for the 
Agency to create/modify and explain the language to the universities; it continues the 
118 
need for the employment of quality assurance professionals in the universities. In turn 
this has changed the power relations in the institutions (see section 5.2.3), but this 
specialist language can be of benefit to the universities and review teams; it allows for 
more fulsome criticisms or advice to be given in the published reports while minimising 
what can be used by the media at the expense of the university. This is a position few 
peer reviewers, as members of the PRF, would wish to place an institution in. 
So while universities can recontextualise the QAA’s messages/guidance into their own 
processes and therefore control the recontextualising rules of the pedagogic device, in 
reality there is pressure to adopt the Agency’s language in some instances. This tends to 
be the case in universities further down the perceived hierarchy of prestige. Morley 
(2003), Coffield, (2006) and Filippakou and Tapper (2010, p480) suggest a broader 
impact noting that the QAA’s specialised discourse has meant that words which would 
not normally be used in higher education have become commonplace.  
The downside of using this specialist language is that it is unintelligible to the majority 
of the public and politicians, leading to possible accusations of collusion between the 
Agency and the universities.  
‘…any specialised activity quality assurance has developed its own 
terminology which is very meaningful to people within QAA and the 
quality officers and PVCs within institutions, but have we found a 
language that we can engage the public with, I’m not sure that that’s 
happened.’ 
 
[Chief Executive of the QAA, interview 1] 
 
 
In relation to the ‘science’ of quality assurance impacting on academics it was clear 
from the interviews with the majority of the academic staff and the Students’ Union 
sabbatical officers that their knowledge of the QAA was relatively limited. Even those 
who were or had previously been engaged centrally or at faculty/department level with 
quality and standards described the Agency as a ‘mysterious entity…[that] influences my 
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life through the university’s procedures rather than directly’ [Academic (quality), 
University of Merivale]. Another conclusion was that on a day-to-day basis academics 
do not really consider the QAA at all. 
‘I think the majority view amongst academics is almost certainly “pppfffttt” 
and that’s about the best expression I can give to it.’ 
 
[Academic (manager), University of Opawa] 
 
 
Two of the Students’ Union sabbatical officers queried whether students needed to 
know about the QAA, suggesting that students considered quality assurance to be the 
responsibility of their respective universities: 
‘There is really no reason, in my opinion, why they [students] need to be 
told about the QAA...it’s done behind the scenes and that’s purely 
because students might not really understand the processes and [also] 
because in some cases they might just not even really care. They just 
want to come and get their degree and go.’  
 
[Students’ Union sabbatical officer, Merivale University] 
 
 
Another officer suggested that if the QAA were to use language that was more 
understandable to students then there might be more engagement and a better 
understanding.  
‘I think if you said quality assurance to the majority of students they’d 
look at you with a fairly bemused expression. If you said something like 
value for money or quality of teaching then you’d all of a sudden hear 
them say “oh, actually yeah, that is a massive problem at the moment” 
[the problem being student contact hours].’ 
 
[Students’ Union sabbatical officer, University of Opawa] 
 
Similarly, several QAA respondents noted a lack of understanding about or disregard 
for the QAA amongst academics: 
‘...there’s a lack of understanding at departmental, subject or individual 
level... I have met individuals who just don’t really understand what the 
QAA is. Their view of the QAA is what they read in the Times Higher and 
that would be their only real engagement.’  
[Assistant Director (e)] 
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‘…you take a slice through any university, you’ve got people who are 
very comfortable with what QAA is trying to deliver, who accept that the 
benefits outweigh the effort… and they typically are members of the 
quality assurance committee at most institutions. You’ll also have people 
who do not see the benefit of systems, whether it be QAA or university 
systems, who just see all this just as an overhead, and if you didn’t have 
all this overhead think how much more you could actually do as an 
academic!’  
[Assistant Director (l)] 
 
One explanation provided by two QAA respondents was that while subject level review 
was not welcomed by many academics72 and had its failings, it brought external 
scrutiny and public comment home to academics (whether it brought quality assurance 
home too is another matter). With a move from subject level to institutional level review 
in 2001, two QAA respondents and one academic noted an increasing dislocation 
between individual academics and the Agency. 
A number of the academics interviewed spoke of their colleagues still viewing the QAA 
negatively as a hindrance to academic freedom through the bureaucratisation of 
teaching and learning; a view that was also described by three QAA respondents when 
talking about academic friends or former colleagues.  
‘…what these kind of external audit and assurance processes have done 
is produced a more instrumental approach to education and that is 
definitely at odds with the academic values of some people who would see 
it as a more organic process, one that requires the building of personal 
relationships, one that is more of a holistic process and not one that can 
be broken down into a series of outcomes and benchmarks and all the rest 
of it.’  
[Academic (manager), University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
 ‘I would very much guess that 95 per cent of my colleagues would say “I 
much rather replace all of this time spent QAing with research activity, 
because I’m not doing anything different as a result of doing the QAing” 
and maybe that’s an important point. The question is how much are we 
doing things differently as result of the QA that goes on? I don’t know 
what the answer is to that. I don’t know how to measure it.’  
[Academic (manager), University of Opawa] 
 
                                                 
72 Some academics welcomed subject review as a means of giving a voice to their discipline 
area within their university (personal communication, a former QAA colleague, 2015).  
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It is interesting that the second quotation only refers to research and not teaching as a 
preferred alternative to undertaking quality assurance activities. This might be expected 
as the University of Opawa most closely resembles the ‘secular’ university, which 
places significant emphasis on research as a legitimate activity. Yet, as seen in Chapter 
six the senior manager of the same university described how the QAA had helped the 
university to promote the value of teaching within the institution. This is an interesting 
example of the dislocation between the different elements within the PRF in the 
priorities of each.  
The tensions between quality assurance processes and academic pedagogic practice seen 
in the first quotation above, was also highlighted by the quality professional at the 
University of Opawa when he spoke of the difficulty in designing sufficiently dynamic 
and sophisticated quality processes and procedures to accommodate the fact that good 
teaching involves relationships. It involves risk taking and a high degree of personal 
engagement which cannot be easily programmed. This too was reflected by an academic 
at the same institution when he noted that even after the QAA’s guidance had been 
recontextualised into the university’s setting, the subsequent quality assurance 
procedures left little scope for evolution in pedagogic practice at departmental level. In 
Bernstein’s terms this suggests that although in theory the PRF retain control of the 
recontextualising rules of the pedagogic device, the recontextualisation process is 
bounded/influenced by the QAA guidance and how that is recontextualised into internal 
quality assurance processes. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter six. 
5.2.2 Changing the shape of the universities 
One area where the QAA might be described as being a structural engineer is in 
reshaping the internal structures of a number of universities. Two QAA respondents and 
four from the universities, including the senior manager at the University of Opawa 
spoke about how the QAA had brought many of the pre-1992 universities more closely 
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in line with the post-1992 ‘vocational’ institutions in terms of their quality assurance 
structures. 
 ‘The pre-92s have been transformed and that’s how they’ve become 
much more like the post-92s so I think we’ve seen a degree of 
convergence there and QAA affects that.’ 
[Senior manager, University of Opawa] 
 
‘QAA has moved institutions, especially in some of the groupings of 
universities, from informal approaches to quality and standards to 
explicit approaches.’  
[Former Chief Executive of the QAA] 
 
 
These quotations provide clear examples of how the Agency, in Bernstein’s terms, has 
taken forward the ORF’s ideology for greater institutional accountability and 
standardisation in relation to quality assurance. The data from the analysis confirms that 
the QAA has been ‘successful’ in doing this, leading to greater convergence in the 
sector (Filippakou and Tapper, 2012, p109). This is interesting given the strength of 
some of the universities as autonomous bodies. I would suggest that there must have 
been a degree of cooperation particularly by the pre-1992 universities for this to have 
occurred. But the question is at what level within the university did the compliance take 
place and why? Unfortunately the data did not help me here explicitly, but it is possible 
to suggest some reasons – for example the convergence might have been a result of a 
natural drift as external quality assurance under the HEQC/HEFCE and then the QAA 
matured and the universities found the most appropriate structures to operate; or as a 
quid pro quo for the move from subject level to institutional level review, or as hinted at 
by the data as a consequence of changing power relations within universities as a result 
of the development of external quality assurance. Such reasons are in addition to those 
instigated by the introduction of managerialism into the higher education sector, as 
outlined earlier in Chapter two. The consequent changing power relations will be 
discussed further in the following section. 
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5.2.3 Changing power relations in the universities 
The shift in power relations within the universities has been identified by researchers 
such as Jackson (1997, p170) and Newton (2010, p53). They note the establishment of 
two types of quality managers and leaders whose roles might be categorised as either 
‘change heroes’ or ‘passive victims’. The former Chief Executive of the QAA also 
spoke of a change in the internal power relationships between academics and 
administrators in institutions that occurred because of the introduction of external 
quality assurance and the work of the QAA. It was suggested that this was because an 
industry for quality and standards had emerged where administrators had taken on the 
mantle of quality experts in order to protect academics against the burden of quality 
assurance and to protect the institutions as a whole. 
‘When I started, there weren’t many people in charge of quality and 
standards and in a way I regret that an industry has emerged. My own 
personal vision was always of academics taking personal responsibility 
for quality and standards and developing their sense of a collective 
responsibility. A collective approach which would have been grass roots 
inspired and bottom-up in its pathways, so that the academics would have 
taken this in hand and then would have created their own structures 
which would have reflected national good practice… I think it was 
largely because of the very high stakes of TQA and the insistence of 
institutions that they should do well in them, that a devil’s pact was 
essentially forged between the administrators and the academics, by 
which administrators would essentially keep them [the QAA] off their 
backs if they did as they were told, and the academics on the whole 
bought into that I think. So that gave immense power to quality experts, to 
the quality assurance units… and that power which may have been 
assumed in order to protect the institutions as a whole has in the end, in 
many institutions, not invariably all, but in many has ended up being a 
major controlling factor which constrains… academic independence and 
action.’    
 
  [Former Chief Executive of the QAA] 
This quotation is interesting because it talks of a time before the QAA and about its 
predecessor bodies and the AAU in particular. The AAU, as I set out in Chapter two, 
was set up by the universities themselves to divert the threat of more direct government 
intervention to promote institutional accountability. The quotation suggests that the PRF 
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failed to grasp the opportunity it had at the time to control the nature of quality 
assurance more fully. This might be for a number of reasons, for example because of the 
diversity of interests at all levels with the PRF as suggested by Bernstein (1990, p198) 
and Singh (2002, p577); or because, at the time, undertaking research was of far more 
significance than teaching and learning across these universities. It was easier to hand 
over responsibility to somebody else, such as the quality professionals rather than have 
to work with other academics within the PRF to develop a set of agreed principles to 
guide quality assurance in the university or the higher education sector more broadly. 
As one of the academic members of staff from the University of Lyttelton suggested, 
the diverse interests of vice-chancellors and academics meant that the PRF could not 
work collectively to articulate an alternative to the external quality assurance framework 
developed by AAU, HEQC and the QAA. A view echoed by Ashwin, Abbas and 
McLean (2015, p619). 
‘…so we’ve all acquiesced in a sense, some positively, enthusiastically, 
and some less so in bringing this [the QAA external review] on ourselves 
and I think the sector has been unable to articulate an alternative 
professional basis for quality assurance unlike, for example the BMA 
[British Medical Association]. So we don’t have the equivalent, you 
know, something like the BMA which has more authority.’  
 
[Academic (manager), University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
It is interesting that the respondent did not associate the sector’s representative bodies, 
UUK and GuildHE, with presenting the views of academics as a profession, only those 
of the vice-chancellors which were deemed to be at odds with the PRF.  
I would suggest that the development of central quality assurance professionals resulted 
from change in the management structures in the majority of the universities and from 
the importance placed on gaining a positive outcome of an external quality assurance 
review. This was particularly true when the review was at subject level; the senior 
management did not trust the academics to take the quality agenda forward at the 
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necessary speed. I suspect this is a view still held by a number of universities across the 
current higher education sector, where the outcome of an institutional review is less 
predictable, or where the status/reputation of the university is less secure. In this context 
it was ‘safer’ for the university to develop quality specialists who could understand and 
recontextualise the QAA’s messages into the local context in preparation for external 
review. It also suited the new ideology of senior managers in the university to develop 
such specialists and weaken the PRF. 
It is not surprising therefore, that the data from the analysis confirmed that academics 
(and the Students’ Union sabbatical officers) saw the QAA as a mysterious entity. I 
would suggest that while the QAA’s way of working respects the autonomy of the 
sector, it perpetuates the power relations in the universities and the need for specialist 
quality assurance professionals. The implications of this for the QAA and for the quality 
professional are discussed further in the concluding chapter. 
5.3 Summary 
In this chapter I have begun to set out how the role of the QAA is understood across and 
within the three universities (research question one). Overall there was considerable 
consensus in views across all universities and the QAA in a number of areas: the 
legitimate role of the Agency in safeguarding academic standards, protecting the 
autonomy of universities and the benefits and appropriateness of the QAA’s peer 
referenced way of working. Differentiation of views between the universities appeared 
to be linked broadly to university type, although the views of the academics and 
students from all the universities are broadly similar and relatively limited in the context 
of the QAA.  
Within the QAA, the relatively limited differentiation in views across the Agency 
appears initially to be based on length of service with the Agency and/or the 
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employment history of that individual, and the culture of the institution in which they 
had worked.  
In the next chapter I continue to discuss two more of the themes arising from the 
analysis of the data: ‘mission creep’ and perceptions before reality. 
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CHAPTER SIX EMPIRICAL FINDINGS II: EXTENDING ROLES AND 
MISUNDERSTANDING 
6.0 Introduction 
In this second empirical chapter I consider the two final themes in respect of how the 
universities view the QAA’s role: ‘mission creep’ and ‘perceptions before reality’. The 
first discusses the scope of the QAA’s work; the second the degree of mutuality 
between the QAA and the universities and the challenges that this brings.  
6.1 ‘Mission Creep’ 
Analysis of the data suggests that the universities and some members of the QAA 
consider that the Agency is extending its role into areas where it does not belong. While 
there was no consensus amongst the respondents about which parts of the QAA’s work 
were outwith its mandate, two aspects received the most comment: the QAA’s 
enhancement activities and its work in relation to students.  
While the senior managers and quality professionals from the University of Merivale 
and University of Opawa acknowledged that there were historical reasons why the QAA 
had become involved in a broad range of activities, respondents from the University of 
Lyttelton saw it as the QAA pursuing a ‘bureaucratic expansionist strategy’ [Senior 
manager, University of Lyttelton] albeit understandable in the current political 
landscape of higher education in England.  
In this context the University of Lyttelton identified the QAA firmly as an agent of the 
ORF establishing a broader, or perhaps more secure, power base. It was notable that the 
senior manager went on to acknowledge the difficult position the Agency was in, 
working to an unclear Government policy. 
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‘…it’s unfair to blame the Agency because actually the Government itself 
is unclear about what higher education is in the United Kingdom and 
without an answer to that … it’s certainly asking a lot of the QAA to be 
able to work out what sort of watchdog it should be.’   
 
[Senior manager, University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
This positioning is in keeping with the identification of the University as most closely 
resembling the ‘doctrinal ideal type’ of university. 
In the context of a lack of policy direction from Government for the regulation of higher 
education, four respondents from the QAA spoke of the Agency’s agenda often being 
added to in order to respond to changes in government policy with little understanding 
of the original purpose of the Agency.  
‘…our elected representatives have only the sketchiest ideas of how 
higher education is organised and were making claims or indicating 
expectations which apart from being illegal, are just not achievable.’  
 
[Former Chief Executive of the QAA] 
 
 
These two quotations highlight the importance of the Agency’s recontextualising such 
policy directives into something which ensures that the HEFCE meets its statutory 
responsibility for assuring the quality of the higher education provision it funds, so that 
the Agency meets it contractual obligations.  
6.1.1 The debate about enhancement 
In the universities and the QAA, concerns were raised about the Agency’s involvement 
in enhancement activities. While both acknowledge that supporting improvement in the 
universities has always been in the Agency’s mission/remit, the formalisation of the 
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concept of ‘enhancement’73 in its guidance, through specific activities, and assessed in 
its review methods was seen for some respondents to be ‘mission creep’.  
Respondents from the University of Lyttelton considered the QAA’s involvement with 
quality enhancement to be ill-conceived and a significant diversion from its regulatory 
function. The senior manager at the University of Lyttelton was particularly emphatic in 
his view that quality enhancement was the sole responsibility of the universities 
themselves as independent autonomous bodies.  
‘…it [the QAA] is in areas it shouldn’t be and I see no role for the QAA 
in quality enhancement, none! You know, it’s mission creep and in my 
view it damages what should be the core mission which is around quality 
and standards.’  
[Senior manager, University of Lyttelton 
 
 
A view echoed by one academic member of staff at the University of Opawa: 
‘There’s a difference between assurance and enhancement and some of 
my colleagues would doubtless say that there should be something in 
there about enhancing education and making it better. I actually think, if 
I’m honest, I think that goes beyond what the remit of the Agency should 
be.’ 
[Academic (manager), University of Opawa] 
 
 
Similarly in the Agency, five respondents expressed concern and suggested that 
elements of the enhancement role would be better done by the Higher Education 
Academy, or should be left to the universities themselves. This included one respondent 
who worked in the department with responsibility for such work. 
‘I would like the DEG [QAA’s Development and Enhancement Group], in 
whatever form it would be, to lose the term ‘enhancement’, because I 
don’t think we do enhancement on a significant level. I think we pay lip 
service to it and I don’t think institutions are expecting us to do 
enhancement.’  
[Assistant Director (m)] 
 
 
  
                                                 
73 The QAA defines enhancement as 'Deliberate steps are being taken at provider level to 
improve the quality of students' learning opportunities' (QAA, 2014b). 
130 
Another Assistant Director noted: 
‘I don’t buy into the enhancement thing, I think that’s emperor’s new 
clothes, and I don’t think it’s our job to contribute to enhancement, 
regardless of the rhetoric in Scotland. That’s the responsibility of the 
universities.  But actually, no one’s in it to make things worse, so it’s just 
giving a name to what everybody’s been doing or should have been doing 
over time.’  
[Assistant Director (c)] 
 
 
In Bernstein’s terms the respondents above see that the QAA is encroaching on the 
responsibilities of the PRF and only the agent of the PRF, such as the Higher Education 
Academy should be providing information to it because only the PRF can legitimately 
interpret the data arising from the Institutional Audit reports.  If the QAA does that 
analysis there is a chance that the Agency might recontextualise the outcomes to convey 
particular messages. 
In contrast, an equal number of respondents from the QAA and the universities of 
Merivale and Opawa considered that the Agency had a legitimate role in sharing 
intelligence identified through its review methods across the sector. This was both in 
terms of good practice, as well as activity that had the potential to put academic 
standards and reputation at risk. In this context the Agency’s role was described as one 
of supporting the development of higher education providers while protecting the 
sector’s reputation. 
‘The main thing is the basic level of assurances that we provide and then 
what flows from that is the finer detail of the messages that help either to 
improve things within a particular institution or across the piece.’  
 
[Assistant Director (j)] 
 
‘I would also hope that it [the QAA] had a role in improvement, not just 
correcting failures or lax institutions, but also by propagating good 
practice.’  
[Chair of the Board] 
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‘Beyond that, I think it’s important that QAA should use the resources 
that it has, or the resource it generates through other parts of its work, to 
assist institutions… to provide them with examples of good practice, to 
give them warnings when things look as if they might be going wrong 
either for themselves or more broadly across the sector.’  
 
[Former Chief Executive of the QAA] 
 
 
For the universities of Merivale and Opawa, the QAA’s role in enhancement might be 
where the senior managers appropriate the QAA in order to change aspects of university 
practice, for example in giving teaching a higher priority/status within the University, as 
in the case of Opawa. Such appropriation of the Agency will be discussed further in the 
next chapter. 
Researchers such as Raban (2007, p79-80) have also suggested that the QAA’s 
enhancement work is the more acceptable part of its role which balances out its more 
regulatory function. Filippakou, Salter and Tapper (2010, p551) suggests that quality 
enhancement is part of the ORF’s strategy of ‘seduction’ to secure the PRF’s 
cooperation. In the future such enhancement activities might maintain some form of 
engagement within the more risk-based approach to external review where institutions 
demonstrating ‘sound’ practice are reviewed less frequently. Although Newton (2010, 
p52) suggests that the ‘Cinderella’ of enhancement will never get to the ‘grand ball’ 
and is in reality a ‘very messy business’ so might not be the seductive enterprise it is 
sometimes advertised as.  
6.1.2 Adopting of the student agenda 
The issue of ‘mission creep’ was also raised in relation to the QAA’s role in promoting 
greater student involvement in internal and external quality assurance, as well as 
providing more information for students – which I have loosely termed the student 
agenda.  
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As can be seen from the quotations below, the deal that students receive while at 
university has always been central to the work of the Agency, but what has changed 
since 2009 as the Government has worked towards changing the funding structure for 
higher education (see Chapter three) is the student agenda coming more to the fore 
within the Agency. 
‘The first [function] is validation…Most of the HEIs clearly receive 
public money and the few that don’t, get student money, and it’s 
important that what they do is validated, so the public and the students 
can be assured of the quality of the offer which they are getting.’  
 
[Chair of the Board] 
 
‘The role of the QAA is, through its review work, to ensure that standards 
or public assurance in the standards is being met and also that students 
are getting a good deal.’  
[Assistant Director (e)] 
 
 
For the PRF this was a matter of concern because students were seen to be very much 
the responsibility of the universities. The senior manager and the quality professional at 
the University of Opawa summed up the views of all the universities when they 
questioned the QAA’s active appropriation of the student (as consumer) agenda as well 
as the Agency’s role in relation to representing the student voice. 
‘I don’t think we want to see the QAA as being the means by which 
students’ voices are projected onto higher education.’ 
 
[Senior manager, University of Opawa] 
 
‘I think capturing the voice of students is hugely difficult. There are so 
many of them, they’re so various and the danger is that actually QAA 
ends up talking to people who are proxies for students, and who I guess 
quite quickly and inevitably become a different sort of establishment quite 
distinct from the student body…. I think that the universities may well 
have a better appreciation of what real students want.’  
 
[Quality professional, University of Opawa]  
 
 
The data from the analysis suggest the PRF not only considers that the QAA is working 
outside its remit in taking forward the student agenda, but that the Agency is at risk of 
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being misappropriated by a particular group of students or representative body to the 
cost of the PRF. It can be seen as the ORF, through the QAA as its agent, telling the 
PRF what to do: in this case how they must engage with students. Ashwin, Abbas and 
McLean (2015, p620) suggest that the QAA’s is promulgating the Government’s 
market-oriented discourse which is detrimental to the position of the PRF and more 
particularly the development of academic knowledge by students. 
If this is considered against the initial analysis of the QAA’s work in Chapter three, it is 
feasible that the PRF considers the QAA to be providing students with the tools 
(through its guidance and training) to critique the universities by using the vocabulary 
and processes of quality assurance. All the interviews with the Students’ Union 
sabbatical officers showed that they considered the National Student Survey (NSS) to 
be a powerful lever to use with the universities to instigate change. 
‘I think it’s had a massive effect… For example, last year the [NSS] 
scores for the library were really, really low and since then the library 
has been mentioned in pretty much every single committee that I’ve sat 
on this year…[including] senior management committee, whereas before 
it wasn’t necessarily being discussed.... we’ve used it to our advantage at 
the Students’ Union, the results let us make arguments for things.’   
 
[Students’ Union sabbatical officer, Opawa] 
 
 
In this context additional involvement or even understanding of quality assurance could 
increase this further. In a sense, the QAA’s work can be considered to be weakening the 
PRF’s control over the recontextualising and evaluative rules of the pedagogic device. 
Not only that, but as seen in Chapter three, students have direct access to the Chief 
Executive of the QAA through the Agency’s Sounding Board and membership of the 
Board of Directors. 
It is interesting to note, however, that the Students’ Union sabbatical officers considered 
the QAA’s reports to be too complex and not effective to generate student change, with 
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one suggesting that Students’ Unions and the NUS should take on more of a consumer 
protection role as fees increase.  
‘…one of the beauties of something like the NSS, and I’m sure this is why 
many people despise it, is its simplicity and the way in which someone 
can really just look at the outcomes easily. Now, QAA is a little bit more 
complex with some of the stuff it looks at, so the outcomes are more 
complex.’  
[Students’ Union sabbatical officer, University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
One Assistant Director suggested that while the QAA has had a significant role in 
changing the ways in which students are perceived in relation to their own learning -
from apprentices to co-producers - it might have only been a symptom of broader 
changes in higher education: 
‘By a long, long way the biggest single change must be students being 
treated as adults …I think there is a notion of treating students as equal 
partners in their own learning is something which didn’t exist previously 
and I think the quality movement has been fundamentally concerned with 
that. QAA has in once sense caused it, in another sense QAA is simply the 
symptom of the political wish which reflects a change in market 
conditions.’  
[Assistant Director (a)] 
 
 
The QAA’s extended work in relation to students is a clear example of the Agency 
acting on behalf of the ORF in preparation for the changes to the way in which the 
higher education sector is funded and the broader marketisation of the sector.  
While both the Chief Executives and the Chair of the Board saw the extension of the 
Agency’s work in relation to students as a logical development; not all the Assistant 
Directors were convinced. Over half of them raised concerns about the degree to which 
the student agenda was beginning to dominate the thinking within the Agency and the 
practicality of greater student involvement in review methods in England. This was both 
in terms of the impact on a review method that was not designed to include student 
reviewers and the structures of the Agency to support students. 
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‘That’s the problem I have with the students, because it’s adding them to 
a method that wasn’t designed to include them. That involves a lot of 
compromise and I think it’s high risk… And I think such bolt-ons are 
dangerous. It’s like in the universities when you talk about the 
incremental changes to a course, by the end you’re not doing what you 
started doing.’ 
[Assistant Director (c)] 
 
 
One Assistant Director thought that review teams’ findings might become sharper with 
the addition of a student member to the panel, as they would bring a fresh and more 
questioning approach to the review. He suspected, however, that the students might 
need to be ‘reined in’ in relation to the nature of the recommendations made, because 
their expectations of the scope of Institutional Audit and what it can do might be 
unrealistic at first [Assistant Director (d)]. The Students’ Union officers thought the 
inclusion of students on review teams was a positive development, but one was not sure 
whether the student reviewers would understand their role, or keep up with what was 
being discussed [Students’ Union sabbatical officer, University of Opawa].  
Four respondents suggested that the decision to have student reviewers was being 
‘pushed through’ by the QAA’s Board, partly in response to Government policy, and 
partly because of the interests of the constituent members the Board was representing.  
‘.. the issue of student auditors was primarily driven by our own Board 
which of course in itself embodies lots of other interests, interest groups 
of institutions for example.’  
[Assistant Director (h)] 
 
‘You know, the whole railroading of bloody students onto audit teams, not 
that I’ve got anything against that as such, but just the way that it was 
done.’  
[Assistant Director (b)] 
 
 
At the time there was a sense in the Agency that the Board was behaving more bullishly 
in response to the criticism raised against the universities and the Agency following the 
quality crisis of the summer 2008 and the fallout from that (see Chapter two). It is 
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interesting that one of the quality professionals interviewed described a ‘turf war’ 
taking place between the HEFCE, the representative bodies of higher education 
(Universities UK and GuildHE) and the QAA, during this time. The first two were 
defending their positions regarding their responsibilities for the quality of higher 
education in the light of the criticisms in the IUSSSC report. The respondent suggested 
that this was significantly undermining the QAA’s position. 
‘…over the last twelve months or so… the last eighteen months shall we 
say, it does feel as though QAA has started to lose that [its 
independence]... HEFCE and UUK undermine its appearance of 
independence. I think that there probably needs to be a greater degree of 
independence in the way that it’s set up and the way that at Board level… 
everything that has happened over the last couple of years to me has just 
emphasised that.’  
 
[Quality professional, University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
While the discussion above demonstrates the difficult position in which the QAA finds 
itself in between the ORF and the PRF, it also demonstrates a number of other things. It 
exemplifies the contestation that can occur within any regulatory organisation where 
staff have an affiliation with those being regulated. It also shows how the Chief 
Executive of the QAA played a key role in leading the Agency in its new agenda. The 
current Chief Executive of the QAA came from UCAS in October 2009 with an 
established reputation for developing mechanisms that supported and focussed on 
students. His commitment to providing accessible information to students was evident 
in both of the interviews with him. 
‘…in my experience of working with students in my current role, students 
don’t find that [the QAA’s] information naturally accessible. We’ve 
virtually given up at UCAS sending letters to students because they just 
don’t read them. Students are accessing information in different ways, 
arguably in bite size ways. They want to link to very specific enquiries 
about particularly institutions they may be thinking of studying at and I 
think there’s probably work that needs to be done on thinking about how 
the information that QAA generates can be conveyed more effectively to 
the student consumer if you like.’  
 
[Chief Executive of the QAA, interview 1] 
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‘It’s absolutely certain that QAA’s role has to be as a much more 
effective provider of information about the quality and standards in 
higher education, than it’s been in the past. What we do, why we do it, 
and why it means that students in this incredibly and increasingly diverse 
sector can nevertheless be assured about the achievement of threshold 
standards and the mechanism for improvement…we’ve responded to that 
in part by creating a Director of Public Engagement and a Public 
Engagement Group, so we’re making a very explicit statement that this is 
really of top table significance to us now.’  
 
[Chief Executive of the QAA, interview 2] 
 
 
As I suggested earlier in this section, in taking forward the Government’s agenda 
regarding students, the QAA can be seen as an agent of the ORF. The current Chief 
Executive of the QAA was clear, however, that the Agency was not a government body 
and remained independent. 
‘In relation to the Government, I think it’s right that it’s not a direct 
relationship. We’re not a government body and David Willets [Minister 
for Business, Innovation and Skills at the time of the interviews] has made 
that very clear…there are a number of safe guards all of which were 
intended to protect our independence and it would be wrong for an 
independent quality assurance agency to be controlled in any sense by the 
Government. I think that most people would agree on that as a principle 
of good quality assurance.  
 
Are we influenced by policy directions that the government take? Yes we 
are, and I think rightly so, because the Government are the elected 
representatives of the public whose interests we’re meant to be 
safeguarding. So when the elected representatives move in a particular 
policy direction, it’s only right that we should respond to that, while at 
the same time not hesitating to draw attention to difficulties that we might 
foresee from our own particular expertise.’  
 
[Chief Executive of the QAA, interview 2] 
 
 
Equally, he noted that the Agency did not support the call by the NUS President (at the 
time) for the QAA to take on a more consumer protectionist role preferring to ‘move 
significantly toward reflecting student interests more centrally, than we do at the 
moment’. Nor did he wish to lose ‘the benefits we get through working with institutions 
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to help them improve their quality’.  However, he also warned against the Agency being 
dominated/directed by the sector ‘So it’s about maintaining that link with institutions, 
but not being controlled by institutions which I think is really important.’ [Chief 
Executive of the QAA, interview 2] 
‘…[we must be] constantly vigilant that we are maintaining an 
appropriate distance from the sector. I think key to that is actually going 
back and reflecting, as we have been doing over the last year, reflecting 
on that key line in our Mission which is about protecting the public 
interest. So that must always be our ultimate aim, and the relationship 
with the institutions reflects the fact that they themselves have 
responsibility for their own quality and standards, and we work with that 
and we respect it. But our job ultimately is to safeguard the public 
interest.’  
 
[Chief Executive of the QAA, interview 2]  
 
 
For those respondents who had worked with the QAA for a significant period of time 
there was a sense that the Agency was moving away from its original ethos and was 
putting its core business of institutional review at risk. It was losing its links with the 
sector and becoming further entrenched in the ORF as an agent of the Government. As 
two respondents stated: 
‘I think our position is changing…. even during the time of Subject 
Review and that whole programme of work right at the beginning of QAA 
when we developed the Academic Infrastructure, those were the hardest 
times, in the sense of being loathed by the sector, but nonetheless behind 
all that there was always a sense of working with the sector. I see that 
changing now. I hear the words “what’s in it for us” a lot more often’  
 
[Assistant Director (k)] 
 
‘From being a sector owned, sector focussed and sector directed activity 
organisation, we have moved to being one where the perceptions of the 
public, perceptions of politicians, the perceptions of students especially 
international students now have very considerable bearing on what we do 
and how we do it.’  
[Former Chief Executive of the QAA] 
 
 
Accompanying this perceived change in focus/positioning was, according to two 
Assistant Directors in the QAA, a de-professionalisation of the role of those managing 
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reviews, including fewer staff entering the Agency with experience of working in higher 
education. This is potentially risky, as one of the key sources of the QAA’s authority 
identified by the respondents in the universities as well as the Agency is the expertise of 
those who work with the universities. 
‘…. but in order to do that [assure the public] effectively they need to 
have an empathy with the values of higher education. They need to have a 
sophisticated understanding of how higher education works and you 
know the delicacy of that organism.’  
[Quality professional, University of Opawa]  
 
 
It was also noted that the work of Assistant Directors was becoming more systematised 
and formulaic, leading to a change in the nature of the role and a reduction in the scope 
these staff had in using their own judgements. 
What is apparent in the latter part of this section is the challenging position the Chief 
Executive of the QAA finds himself in, balancing the Agency’s relationship with the 
PRF, the ORF and their agents, and more recently the representative body of students; 
while also contending with contestation within the Agency itself. The ability to lead the 
Agency while one or more groups are not convinced by the QAA’s agenda is critical. 
One respondent sums this up eloquently:  
‘I know Anthony McClaran has been trying to walk a tightrope really of 
trying to meet different requirements [re what the QAA does] ….while 
retaining the confidence of the institutions, but against huge pressure.’ 
[Senior manager, University of Opawa] 
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6.2 Mutuality and perceptions 
So far, the thesis has provided a number of examples of the difficult position that the 
QAA is in between the PRF and the ORF. This next section discusses this in the light of 
the analysis of the data and the difficulties associated with perception and reality in this 
context. 
6.2.1 Degree of mutuality 
As discussed in Chapter three, the QAA is owned by the higher education sector, but 
funded by the Funding Councils and, specifically, the HEFCE in relation to England. 
For the majority of respondents this means that there is a degree of mutuality between 
the Agency and the PRF. How the extent of the mutuality is viewed by the different 
universities appears to be demarcated along institutional lines and the ‘ideal type’ the 
university most resembles. 
The senior managers and quality professionals from the University of Merivale 
(‘vocational’) and the University of Opawa (‘secular’) place the Agency between the 
Government and the universities, acting as a buffer to mediate government policy 
initiatives where appropriate, and to enable the universities to have an input into their 
own regulation (see section 5.2.1). The senior manager at the University of Opawa 
suggests a sense of mutuality with the Agency: ‘It’s sort of mutual ownership, mutual 
authority. We all buy into a kind of club and it’s kind of good for most of us.’ The senior 
manager at Merivale takes this further by suggesting that the QAA is part of the sector 
particularly through its guardianship of the universities autonomy (see also section 
5.1.3)  
‘I see it as an agency of the sector and therefore because I see it as 
effectively as a form of manifestation of institutional autonomy and self-
regulation in a community sense, then I see it as an honest broker and 
watch dog.’   
 
[Senior manager, University of Merivale] 
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In this context the Agency was described by these respondents as being a conduit 
between the sector and the Government, skilled at looking towards and working with 
both parties in a ‘Janus like function’ [Quality professional, University of Opawa]. One 
face of Janus listens and considers the requirements of the ORF and its agents, while the 
other listens to the universities and respects the autonomy of the PRF. Both faces must 
then come together to translate the messages heard into guidance and reference 
materials, and review methods which ‘safeguard the public interest in sound standards 
of higher education qualifications and to inform and encourage continuous 
improvement in the management of the quality of higher education’ (QAA, 2006, p2). 
In contrast the senior manager and quality professional from the University of Lyttelton 
(which most closely resembles the ‘doctrinal’ university) saw the QAA as being an arm 
of government (the ORF), or moving towards that position, whose role is affected more 
‘by bureaucratic politics than by education itself’ [Senior manager, University of 
Lyttelton]. Interestingly, an academic from Lyttelton sees the QAA in more of the 
buffer role suggested by respondents from the University of Merivale and Opawa, when 
he notes: 
‘I think we’re increasingly seeing the government thinking it decides 
what some of those standards are. I think we probably need something 
between us and government otherwise government will just be deciding 
on policy and the next day we’ll be implementing it. I guess that might 
well mean that the politicians think that the QAA slows down their 
implementation policy, gets in the way of, blocks, obfuscates, whatever.’  
[Academic (quality), University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
There was a similar mixture of views in relation to the position of the Agency within the 
QAA staff interviewed. For the majority there appears to be strong allegiances to the 
universities and the need to respect their autonomy in the way that the Agency 
functions. But there was an acknowledgment that, for contractual reasons, the Agency 
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takes forward specific elements of successive governments’ agenda in relation to higher 
education. This includes embedding the concepts of ‘quality enhancement’, promoting 
students as co-producers within the quality assurance of higher education, and 
amending the criteria for degree awarding powers and University title in order to 
facilitate opening the sector to new providers74. However, there were also examples of 
where the Agency is able to advise the ORF not to go ahead with a particular 
development [Assistant Director (a)]. Remaining independent can often be difficult for 
the Agency. In one of the interviews with the current Chief Executive of the QAA, for 
example, he suggested that it was going to be a challenge to demonstrate that what is 
important for the Agency is assuring academic standards and quality irrespective of 
where the higher education provision is delivered.  
‘We’ve got a real challenge demonstrating very clearly that for us what 
matters fundamentally is quality, regardless of the nature of the 
institution that provides it. In other words, signalling that we are actually 
very much open to the contribution of the private sector.’ 
 
[Chief Executive of the QAA, interview 2] 
 
 
It is possible, however, to see this openness towards the private sector as the Agency 
sanctioning government policy to expand the market and the Agency clearly aligning 
itself with the ORF. While that might very well be the case, it is also worth 
remembering that the Agency, in relation to its work in England, is contracted by the 
HEFCE and for pragmatic reasons will need to be ‘open’ to private providers in the 
context of having the structures, processes and procedures in place to regulate a more 
diverse higher education sector. Unfortunately, I did not probe that statement further in 
the interview. It does however suggest that there is a need to ensure that the Agency 
                                                 
74 At the time of the data collection developments were in train to create assessment regimes for 
any provider, including private organisations, delivering higher education provision (i.e. at 
levels 4 and above of the Framework for Higher Education Qualifications for England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland).   
143 
reflects the changing landscape of the higher education sector in England to safeguard, 
as best it can, its continuance. 
If, however, the current Chief Executive’s statement regarding the Agency not being 
controlled by the universities (see section 6.1.2) and the suggestion from some of the 
university respondents that the QAA is losing its independence are considered (see 
section 6.2.2), then it is feasible to suggest that the Agency has moved from its position 
under the former Chief Executive closer to the PRF, to a position closer to the ORF.   
6.2.2 The challenges of mutuality 
From the QAA’s perspective there is a difficulty with this mutuality and the peer 
referenced way of working, as discussed in section 6.2.1 above, namely the regular 
accusations by the public and politicians that the Agency is too cosy with the sector. 
One respondent suggested that this was problematic because of the belief held by 
politicians that the Agency focuses too much on processes rather than outputs and that 
academic standards and quality can only be assessed if observed directly. I would 
suggest that this position demonstrates the continued lack of trust in the professionalism 
of academics established in the 1980s with the introduction of the ideology of 
managerialism to the higher education sector.  
One respondent from the QAA suggested that the difficulty in convincing the public 
that the QAA was not a ‘soft touch’ was because of a general lack of understanding by 
the public about the nature and status of the higher education sector itself, let alone its 
relationship of mutuality with the Agency. For example, respondents spoke of a 
continued scepticism by the public about the large number of positive review reports 
that the Agency produced which do not conform to the expected bell shaped curve of 
frequency of positive and failing outcomes. But, as the former Chief Executive of the 
QAA noted, the majority of the public are not interested in the philosophy of quality or 
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the restrictions placed on the QAA because of the autonomous nature of higher 
education institutions, therefore misconceptions are inevitable. The Chair of the QAA’s 
Board spoke of the boundaries imposed on the Agency. 
‘The only thing I think that doesn’t seem to be generally appreciated is 
that QAA is after all imprisoned, if you like, in the structures and 
guidance imposed on it by its remit and by the Government. I think it’s 
not generally realised that it’s not a free agent able to invent a process all 
by itself.’ 
 
[Chair of the QAA Board] 
 
 
In terms of trying to determine who was to blame for the lack of understanding by the 
politicians and public about the quality assurance of university provision, the senior 
managers and quality professionals identified two main sources: the universities 
themselves and the QAA.  
The senior managers at the University of Opawa and the University of Merivale and the 
quality professional from University of Lyttelton suggested that the universities had 
failed to articulate clearly to the public and politicians how quality and standards are 
regulated in the sector and the QAA’s role in that regulation. Nor had it conveyed that 
they were ‘scared to death of QAA’ and a poor review outcome because of the 
disastrous implications for the institutions [Senior manager, University of Opawa]. As a 
result the QAA was perceived by the public and the Government to be ‘a soft touch’ 
[Senior manager, University of Opawa] and too close to higher education to regulate 
higher education effectively.  
In addition, the respondents considered that the universities had allowed their 
representative bodies (UUK and GuildHE) to become increasingly politicised, and 
allowed the diverse self-interests of vice-chancellors and mission groups to dilute the 
PRF’s influence over the ORF so that the politicians were not hearing how the 
universities actually viewed the QAA or quality assurance, accurately. One senior 
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manager and a quality professional noted that as a result there was concern that the 
QAA’s work was being increasingly directed by those outside the Agency, away from 
the original purposes of the Agency, and that the voice of the PRF was no longer 
contributing effectively to the QAA’s work. 
 ‘…the purposes for which the QAA was established in the first place are 
being hijacked by various interests groups who have a very simplistic 
view of what universities do and I want to see the QAA remain 
independent… and that it doesn’t become, if you like, a tool to beat 
higher education. Because I think the big problem with this is that the 
public will lose trust in institutions and that internationally we will 
damage ourselves.’  
 
[Senior manager, University of Opawa] 
 
‘I don’t know if this is the reality or not, but the way it felt to me, having 
the response to the consultation exercise [on a review method], was that 
it didn’t really matter what anybody said there were political agendas 
here which meant that the QAA was being pushed around to fulfil them… 
it doesn’t quite have the status, the standing that perhaps it should.’  
 
[Quality professional, University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
In contrast, the senior manager at University of Lyttelton blamed the QAA itself for the 
lack of understanding. He considered that the Agency’s inability to communicate its 
role and purpose clearly to all but the smallest cadre of quality specialists, placed the 
Agency ‘on a back foot in advancing the quality agenda’. This along with the Agency’s 
bureaucratic expansionist approach (see section 6.1), its self-perpetuating culture and its 
‘infinite capacity to write in gobbledegook’ meant that the Agency had created quite ‘a 
toxic sort of environment’ in which the regulation of higher education was supposed to 
operate and evolve [Senior manager, University of Lyttelton].  
Again in this section there appears to be differences within the PRF along institutional 
boundaries and variations in the ‘ideal type’ of university, with the ‘doctrinal’ university 
seeing the QAA as an arm of the ORF, and the other universities seeing the Agency in a 
more supportive role sitting between the ORF and the PRF, mediating. There is also the 
suggestion that the representative bodies of the PRF are taking forward a particular and 
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more politicised agenda potentially to the detriment of the wider PRF. It would have 
been interesting to have interviewed individuals from UUK and GuildHE to gain their 
perspective, or to have explored this issue more specifically with the QAA respondents, 
but this would have required returning to interview them again, which resources did not 
permit. 
6.3 Summary 
I have shown in the first two empirical chapters that the QAA is perceived to undertake 
a series of mediating roles between the various stakeholders in higher education. It also 
performs a complex and sophisticated form of recontextualising that has to be finely 
balanced in order to maintain some sort of effective function. It produces guidance and 
processes which are sufficiently acceptable to the universities to gain their cooperation, 
while still meeting the statutory responsibilities of the HEFCE. This recontextualisation 
process relies heavily on the negotiation skills of senior staff in the Agency to maintain 
the often fragile working relationships with the main stakeholders, which is prone to 
misunderstanding and myth.  
What has become clear from the analysis of the data so far is that for the Agency to 
undertake its various roles effectively, it must be seen to retain a semblance of 
independence. It must be independent from the PRF, if it is to be seen to be 
safeguarding academic standards and quality in the eyes of the politicians, students and 
the public; independent too from the ORF, if it is to be seen to be respecting the 
autonomy of the universities. This in turn should enable the Agency to work more easily 
with the individual institution, mindful of both the PRF and the ORF if it is to have 
peace within its own staff. 
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The next and final empirical chapter considers the recontextualisation process that the 
universities undertake in establishing their relationship with the QAA and developing 
their internal quality processes and procedures. 
  
148 
CHAPTER SEVEN FINDINGS III: THE RECONTEXTUALISATION 
PROCESS 
7.0 Introduction 
This final empirical chapter looks at the recontextualisation process that takes place in 
the universities. I begin by highlighting five factors which appear, from the analysis of 
the QAA interviews, to influence how the Agency is perceived and recontextualised by 
the universities. I will then discuss how the universities of Lyttelton, Opawa and 
Merivale recontextualise the QAA and whether the factors suggested by the QAA 
respondents do have an influence over what the universities do in practice. At the end of 
this discussion about the recontextualisation process consideration will also be given to 
whether my suggestion, in Chapter three that there are two recontextualising sites within 
the PRF is correct. 
7.1 Influences of the Recontextualisation Process 
It appears that how a university recontextualises the QAA is inextricably linked to how 
that university perceives the Agency’s role and both are influenced by a number of 
factors. These factors include: the perceived position of the institution in the higher 
education hierarchy of prestige; the nature of the students recruited; the institutional 
experience of delivering higher education; degree of risk the university is willing to 
carry; and the timing and nature of the last engagement with the QAA. 
7.1.1 Position in the perceived hierarchy of prestige 
Five QAA respondents suggested that the perceived position in the higher education 
sector’s hierarchy affects institutional perception and engagement with the QAA. 
Historically those institutions positioned at or towards the top of the perceived hierarchy 
and with stronger reputations (the ‘doctrinal’ university type), were less inclined to 
engage with the Agency as they perceived there to be little benefit to them in doing so. 
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Two QAA respondents noted that more latterly this had improved and the QAA was 
now tolerated by such institutions, although engagement could be limited.  
‘I think most institutions accept QAA now for what it is and realise that 
things could be a lot worse. So even the Russell Group institutions will 
probably accept QAA for what it is… [although] some will basically have 
very little to do with us other than the bare minimum… Some institutions 
would accept us far more than that, they’d say actually there’s a positive 
impact here and again that’s a specific sort of institution.’  
 
[Assistant Director (k)] 
 
‘I think what institutions think of QAA differs considerably at the 
PVC/DVC level, they very much see the Agency as, I wouldn’t say a 
friend, but someone that helps them in doing their work and making those 
changes that the rest of the institution drag their feet over. It’s not all 
institutions, because some have very particular views on the purpose of 
higher education which I think brings them into conflict with the role that 
we have.’ 
[Assistant Director (j)] 
 
 
The mirror of this tolerance was the notion that there is growing complacency in 
respect of the QAA in certain universities. Three QAA respondents noted that generally 
institutions took the Institutional Audits seriously, a view echoed by the Students’ 
Union sabbatical officers interviewed in the universities. However, seven QAA 
respondents described a growing complacency towards the QAA because institutions 
have got used to the work of the Agency. It was thought that the lack of negative 
outcomes from Institutional Audits had also contributed to this malaise. Two QAA 
respondents gave examples of how this complacency had manifested itself, particularly 
in the universities akin to the ‘doctrinal’ and ‘secular ideal type’ of universities. One 
described how responsibility for arranging the QAA reviews was being delegated to 
increasingly junior staff, a practice that would have been unheard of in the past. Another 
QAA respondent described how the reviews themselves were becoming a series of 
‘semi-scripted dramas’ involving increased game playing between the review team and 
institution.  
150 
Three other QAA staff suggested that the views of the vice-chancellors differed between 
institutions; one suggested that most vice-chancellors recognised the need to provide 
some accountability for public funds and that the QAA had a role in doing this. 
However another suggested that there was evidence of some vice-chancellors 
disengaging from the work of the Agency because its work no longer aligned with the 
institution’s particular view on the purpose of higher education, or because of general 
complacency towards the Agency and what it did. 
‘I get the feeling that VCs are more detached from it now and that there’s 
a general feeling that “oh well, everything was alright [in Institutional 
Audit] so let’s just let this run’….I think there has been a bit of 
disengagement at senior level because the outcomes have been mostly 
positive, and I think there was a misjudging of the ways things were going 
[politically] and there was a sort of “oh, that’s okay then, QAA’s gone 
away for five years, we can slacken off a bit.”’  
[Assistant Director (c)] 
 
 
This growing complacency was attributed to the predictability of the reviews and the 
perception that institutional level reviews were far less threatening than subject level 
reviews and hence required less engagement. It was also suggested that there was a 
diminishing return for institutions, as the reviews, their outcomes and reports became 
more predictable. One QAA respondent queried the value institutions were receiving 
given the amount of time and resources being invested in the review process. A further 
QAA respondent suggested that this might also be because of the more liberal nature of 
the review reports and the opaque style of the language used, which while protecting 
both the institution being reviewed and the Agency, produced dull and difficult to read 
reports.  
‘I think that Institutional Audit has a law of diminishing returns and 
because it is so predictable and the HEIs can prepare so much for it, it is 
not delivering as much conceptually as it could, because of its extreme 
stylisation which of course is something imposed on it basically by the 
system, on QAA by the system.’  
[Chair of the Board] 
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In Bernstein’s terms this would suggest that the PRF has learnt to play the 
Institutional Audit game it retains control of the recontextualisation rules of the 
pedagogic device by understanding how to demonstrate to the QAA that 
internal systems are robust.   
7.1.2 Academic calibre of students 
Two QAA respondents suggested that the academic calibre of students recruited had an 
impact on how the Agency was perceived. Institutions that normally recruit less 
academically able students, or students not so well prepared for higher education, were 
described as tending to rely more heavily on the QAA and its guidance. This was 
because such institutions needed to ensure that appropriate structures were in place to 
support the students and to demonstrate the rigour of their quality assurance 
mechanisms, not least because there was a perception that these were more likely to be 
scrutinised more closely. The QAA respondents suggested that institutions with more 
able students were likely to need less formalised structures, as the students would be 
more able to deal with what was thrown at them.  
‘Because of the type of student they recruit, and clearly they are taking 
very, very able people, regardless of what you throw at them in terms of 
the learning experience, they survive and come out the other end as a 
well-rounded graduate. Because of the nature of that institution, the 
resource base for the student to learn is significant… the whole 
infrastructure will be very strong and even if the person responsible for a 
particular area of delivery of their learning experience is naff, the student 
will still survive…. For less able students whose confidence level of being 
able to do things is already vulnerable… If you then don’t secure a 
learning experience for them which is solid, their ability then to make up 
for the shortcomings and survive is impaired’  
[Assistant Director (l)] 
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7.1.3 Experience of delivering higher education 
Two QAA respondents noted that institutions new to delivering higher education, such 
as private organisations, were more fearful of the Agency and that helped them to focus 
their collective mind on ensuring appropriate systems and procedures were in place. The 
further education colleges, that deliver higher education provision, were described as 
being more positive about the Agency; finding its way of working more collegiate than 
Ofsted, the main external regulator of FE provision. 
‘…the impact of the arrival of the QAA looking at whether they should 
have taught degree awarding powers has concentrated their minds 
enormously on putting their structures and systems together.’   
 
[Chair of the Board] 
 
 
‘…when you speak to FE who have an understanding of Ofsted and you 
talk about QAA, they hold us in high regard.’  
[Assistant Director (m)] 
 
 
7.1.4 Risk and rhetoric 
It is apparent from the discussion above that in the QAA’s view, the more a university 
perceives it is at risk of receiving a poor review outcome, the more it constructs the 
QAA as a quasi-regulatory body. This position is exacerbated further by the high degree 
of rhetoric about ‘what the QAA does and does not want institutions to do’ within the 
sector and the universities themselves. One respondent noted that as a consequence 
some institutions adopt a risk-averse/compliance approach to how they assure their own 
academic standards. In doing so the institutions do significantly more than was actually 
required by the Academic Infrastructure, and this was disproportionate – often referred 
to as ‘gold plating’. Equally, despite the QAA’s best efforts to promote the notion that 
there is not one correct way of doing things and that context was important, many 
institutions wanted to be told what to do. It was suggested that this was because of the 
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culture and values of the senior management team, and/or because of a fear of a 
negative outcome from an Institutional Audit/Review, and/or a lack of institutional 
confidence. The frustration was that often such institutions also complained of the 
Agency imposing too much bureaucracy on them, given that they were autonomous 
institutions. 
7.1.5 Last engagement with the QAA 
The nature of the most recent engagement with the QAA was described by Agency 
respondents as influencing perceptions. Of those respondents in the universities, this 
was particularly so for academic staff, many of whose last engagement with the QAA 
was in relation to the Teaching Quality Assessment method or Subject Review (see 
Chapter three) and not a positive experience. So although the Agency was described as 
doing much to develop and promote the ‘lighter/right touch’ of review methodology and 
change the image of the Agency since 2002, the historical legacy of subject level review 
lingers on. Memories of large amounts of paperwork, including student work being 
produced and deposited in the ‘base room’ for the reviewers to work through, 
accompanied by a large number of meetings, and where necessary the observation of 
teaching, are still raw. The QAA respondents described these reviews as having much 
higher stakes because there was a risk to personal as well as institutional reputations.  
‘…there are still many academics in institutions whose last experience of 
the QAA was in subject review and assume that we still do the same 
thing.’ 
 
[Assistant Director (h)] 
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‘…subject assessment revealed some of the dangers of quality assurance 
and the impact that in some cases was negative… there were two main 
lessons that I saw from that, the first was there was a very real pragmatic 
issue about burden, at any given time you were trying to manage four or 
five subject reviews in your own institution. Just the sheer administrative 
effort of supporting that, even if you thought that the reviews were 
wonderful and ought to happen, it just becomes literally unmanageable. 
The second thing was that it was also clear in some subject reviews… that 
some of the reviewers were not fully credible and not respected by the 
people they were reviewing. There was controversy about whether they 
were competent to do the job and that led to some questions about the 
outcomes of the reviews.’ 
[Chief Executive of the QAA, interview 1] 
 
 
It was telling that the most recently appointed academic interviewed, who had little 
knowledge of the QAA, talked of the disastrous effect that TQA and Subject Review 
had on academic colleagues, some twelve years since the review method ended 
[Academic, University of Opawa]. The long-lasting impact of subject level review was 
also noted by the two QAA respondents who described choosing not to tell people, who 
he knew were academics, that he worked for the QAA, because he did not want the ‘all 
too familiar berating’ that usually followed [Assistant Director, (e)]. Another recounted 
how when telling a friend that he was going to work for the QAA the friend said: ‘Oh 
well, that’ll be a bit of a killer when you go and tell people where you work; it will be a 
bit like telling them you’re a tax inspector!’ [Assistant Director (l)]. 
In contrast, the subsequent review method focussed primarily at institutional level and 
with more of a ‘developmental’ element, was considered by two QAA respondents to be 
less worrisome for many institutions. As a result the sector did not try to control or 
manipulate it in quite the same way as they did with Subject Review. The QAA was 
perceived to be less of a threat.  
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‘In terms of which had the higher stakes, I think TQA and subject review 
were the highest stakes, so Audit could develop its method and could 
develop along a more developmental line for institutions. Institutions 
weren’t so worried about Audit, so they didn’t try to capture it or to 
manipulate it in quite the way that they did with subject review, because 
they didn’t feel that the stakes were so high.’  
 
[Former Chief Executive of the QAA] 
 
 
7.2 The Recontextualisation Process  
It became apparent during the analysis of the interview data that the senior managers 
and particularly the quality professionals undertook one form of recontextualisation, and 
the academic staff another slightly more removed one. This is in keeping with the 
discussion in section 5.2.1 about the arms-length and ‘mysterious’ nature of the QAA 
for academic staff. I have therefore discussed the recontextualising process for each 
group separately, and I will return to the implications of this distinction later in the 
chapter. 
7.2.1 The universities 
Turning to the universities involved in this research specifically, it is possible to see, as 
suggested in previous sections, that how the senior managers and quality professionals 
represent and recontextualise the QAA is demarcated along institutional identities. In 
this instance with University of Lyttelton and the University of Merivale normally 
taking opposing views to each other, and the University of Opawa sitting somewhere in 
between.  
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University of Lyttelton 
It appears that at institutional level, the QAA has little direct influence over University 
of Lyttelton: it is tolerated rather than needed.  
‘…and you know Lyttelton has a very particular value system which is 
around this de minimis role. That will affect the way people talk about it 
[the QAA] at the advanced level…the QAA is not the be all and end all… 
If we can’t make that argument stack up then, we’re on a hiding to 
nothing.’  
 
[Senior manager, University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
Engagement with the QAA and its guidance was perceived to be selective, and only 
undertaken if it was to the benefit of the University or was considered to be non-
negotiable from the QAA’s or HEFCE’s perspective. It was suggested that where the 
Agency is taken account of, its message is recontextualised heavily and anchored within 
the culture and values of the University: as one academic noted:  
‘…most of what comes from the QAA to the University comes to the 
centre, then it comes from the centre to the department and my colleagues 
in the department would perceive that they are being told to do things by 
the centre. They’re not being told to do things by the QAA.’ 
 
[Academic (quality), University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
The University’s approach is to ensure that its discourse about quality and standards 
links with academic discourse and practice, rather than being seen as purely process 
based. Indeed, one respondent spoke of the University making the decision to move 
away from using the term ‘quality assurance’ when in naming the key quality 
administrative units, committees and frameworks, to using one emphasising quality 
management, which was deemed more appropriate and reflected the higher level 
concept that formed the basis of the University’s internal evaluation system.  
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‘What drives us is what we think we should be doing in terms of our 
educational provision and we then make sure that aligns us [with the 
QAA] and doesn’t get us into trouble in terms of audit/review. But that’s 
not the driver. Four years ago now we changed our programme approval 
process quite radically. It wasn’t the fact that a new section seven [of the 
QAA Code of practice] had just been published that drove that… what 
drove it was the fact that we felt that there were problems with our 
existing process and we wanted to align it much more clearly to our 
strategic drivers and other processes planning, resource allocation, all of 
that kind of thing.’  
 
[Quality professional, University of Lyttelton]  
 
 
This section highlights a possible weakness of the research and an interesting point of 
discussion in relation to validity in qualitative research. While the analysis of the 
interviews highlighted important perspectives of how the interviewees perceive and 
recontextualise the QAA, it would have been interesting to contrast them with the 
outcomes of an analysis of key committee minutes. Such an analysis might have 
allowed me to see if the portrayal of the QAA was reflected in the University’s 
documentation at institutional vis-à-vis faculty/school/departmental level. This is not to 
distract from the value of the respondents’ interviews, but recognises that the process of 
triangulation of data is a valid exercise (King and Horrocks, 2010, p164; Silverman, 
2013, p290).  
Returning to the quotation above, while in Bernstein’s terms the PRF with the 
University of Lyttelton controls the rules of the pedagogic device, the respondent’s 
reference to aligning with the QAA guidance and not getting into trouble, suggests that 
even for a ‘doctrinal type’ of university, the Agency holds some power and influence 
over it. Indeed, for all the protestation about the University’s independence from the 
Agency, the senior manager talked of the potentially ‘catastrophic’ consequences of 
getting a poor outcome from a QAA Institutional Audit/Review. 
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From the University of Lyttelton’s perspective the QAA was more pertinent to ‘other 
institutions’ in the sector. Several times the senior manager made explicit reference to 
how other, less prestigious institutions used the QAA as a sort of modernising external 
reference point to force through change, or to promote their status in the sector in the 
eyes of the public (see section 5.1.2). 
In this context, the QAA was seen as a necessary evil which was not that pertinent to 
the functioning of the University. The QAA was a requirement of funding that had to be 
complied with, but only on the University’s terms with heavy recontextualisation by 
senior management and quality professionals on behalf of academic staff. The central 
function had a legitimate role in making external regulation more context-specific for 
academic colleagues and to alleviate/minimise the burden on academic staff.  
University of Opawa 
Reflecting its slightly weaker insulation and boundary of the ‘secular ideal type’ of 
universities (see section 2.4.2) compared with the University of Lyttelton, the 
University of Opawa considered the QAA to be more of a legitimate advisor. It was 
also more accepted by the University’s senior management as an embedded and 
naturalised part of higher education: ‘so I think we’ve all developed and grown up with 
it [the QAA]’ [Senior manager, University of Opawa]. While there remained a tension 
between teaching and research within the institution, it was suggested that research 
intensive universities, such as Opawa, were starting to engage more with the QAA. 
Equally, the mission groups for these institutions, such as the 1994 Group, were 
described as seeking to have more influence with the Agency and in doing so alter the 
historical position of the teaching-led (vocational) institutions alone engaging with the 
QAA. In Bernstein’s terms this demonstrates the struggle, even within the broad notion 
of the PRF, to influence an agent of the ORF in order to retain control over the 
pedagogic device(s). 
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The senior manager and quality professional spoke of using the QAA more proactively 
as a means of encouraging institutional self-reflection and benchmarking. The senior 
manager talked of the QAA providing a vocabulary/lexicon which enabled the 
University to talk about quality and standards, as well as learning from other institutions 
(through individual review reports and the summary reports that the QAA produced 
from the analysis of the review reports) and to benchmark internal performance with the 
view to modifying practice. It was noted that this change process was based on an ethos 
of sharing good practice, rather than on sanctions.  
It was apparent that the University, like Lyttelton, also recontextualises the QAA’s 
guidance into its own context and in a way that builds in some scope for variability in 
academic practice or interpretation of internal processes, in order to reflect the nature of 
teaching and the needs of programmes and students.  
‘There’s still an amazing variation of practice, interpretation and in a 
sense that’s good because some of it reflects the real needs of the 
programmes and the students. But there’s a baseline there for judgement 
of standards.’  
[Senior manager, University of Opawa]  
 
 
The Quality professional noted that most academic staff do not make the link with the 
QAA and see quality assurance as coming from the University’s administrative 
functions. This was seen as a mark of the QAA’s success in embedding quality 
assurance into institutional practice, while still respecting institutional autonomy. 
‘…the whole principle of the QAA is wanting universities to embed a 
culture of quality assurance, to assimilate and naturalise the Code of 
Practice and so on, and that in a sense perhaps an index of its success is 
the extent to which the QAA is not explicitly identified as being the 
originator of these policies.’  
[Quality professional, University of Opawa] 
 
 
Other examples were provided where the QAA was still visible within the University; 
for example, updates about the QAA requirements/publications are provided to staff 
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through a monthly in-house publication on teaching. It seems that in doing this the 
University is reinforcing the QAA’s image as the agency influencing the University’s 
internal quality assurance procedures, and raising the profile of teaching within the 
University. In Bernstein’s terms the senior management/quality professionals appear to 
be using the Agency, as an agent of the ORF, to rebalance the value placed on the 
different fields within the pedagogic device. Greater value is being placed on activity 
within the fields of recontextualisation and reproduction.  
University of Merivale 
Respondents from the University of Merivale perceived the QAA as being a powerful 
entity which has far-reaching and long-term consequences for the University, including 
greater caution towards any academic innovation.  
‘It [the QAA] can be perceived as quite threatening and people are 
cautious of it; careful in how they behave towards it because an 
institution like this is well aware of the negative consequences of getting 
it wrong... That creates the potential for maybe not some of the honesty 
that the system itself would desire.’  
[Senior manager, University of Merivale] 
 
 
The quotation above suggests a particular vulnerability for the ‘vocational ideal type’ of 
universities such as Merivale, with their more vulnerable reputations. It also infers the 
power held by the QAA because of the public nature of its Institutional Audit/Review 
reports. The senior manager considered that the pressure on the University to perform 
well in the QAA reviews would only increase within a more market-based higher 
education system and further stratification of the sector.  
‘At the moment, universities think that if they get a bad QAA report 
they’re sunk and in the sector that is probably the case. [But] with 
regards to the government trying to reduce the sector and make it more 
elitist, that is a huge, huge threat.’  
[Senior manager, University of Merivale] 
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This vulnerability was also highlighted by the Students’ Union sabbatical officer for this 
‘ideal type’ of university who noted that standards were perceived to be lower by some 
employers because of the calibre of the students that it recruited. 
 ‘There shouldn’t be a difference in the value of similar degrees [across 
universities]… but if it comes down to a job maybe then they [a student 
from a ‘higher status’ university] will have a bit of an edge…I’ve looked 
at jobs and they say “you must be from a Russell group university”.’  
 
[Students’ Union sabbatical officer, University of Merivale] 
 
 
McLean. Abbas and Ashwin (2013, p271) suggest that lower-status universities find it 
more difficult to resist the influence of the ORF and its agents, and unsurprisingly the 
University of Merivale’s recontextualising process was more cautionary compared to 
either the University of Opawa or Lyttelton. As a result, Merivale’s institutional quality 
assurance procedures were risk-averse and more compliance-based; often resulting in 
procedures that expected more than the QAA did.  
‘[The QAA’s] processes sometimes may be applied more flexibly by the 
Agency than they are by the institutions, because the institutions are 
being careful and risk averse and can’t afford to take the risk that the 
QAA might not like something or that someone coming in might not like it 
and that then creates a tendency not for innovation but for sluggish 
compliance.’ 
 
[Senior manager, University of Merivale] 
 
In this context internal procedures were perceived by academic staff as being complex, 
bureaucratic and divorced from what is done at the chalk-face. They also spoke of a gap 
in the expectations of what the centre wanted academic staff to do and what was 
practicable. 
‘There are constant suggestions for how to go about doing things to 
enhance the student experience; feedback is the most obvious one. 
There’s all kind of things going on to try and make sure that it happens 
quicker and faster and easier. But it’s a struggle…you have the desire to 
make sure the feedback is good and timely and making sure that the 
students know what part they’ve done wrong and how to improve it etc. 
and you’ve only got two weeks to mark it. You can’t do both and that’s 
the problem.’  
[Academic (manager), University of Merivale]  
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‘…it’s a little bit like getting your bins emptied at the end of the week at 
home. The number of reasons for not getting the bins emptied [by the 
council] seems quite a lot, it’s slightly open, you put the wrong thing in 
and so on; and it’s a little bit like that with [the faculty committee]… the 
regulations are more complex than we can grasp so it’s easy to get it 
wrong. And there isn’t necessarily a sympathetic ear when we do get it 
wrong.’ 
[Academic (quality), University of Merivale] 
 
 
The Quality professional at Merivale noted that perhaps the University had gone too far 
in demonstrating its accountability and ability to quality assure its provision, and 
making it ‘too difficult for academics’. 
The University also appropriated the QAA in a more ‘dynamic’ manner than the other 
two universities; using it to reinforce its legitimate status as a university; to enhance its 
reputation further; and to monitor academic performance. In this instance the QAA is an 
arbiter across the sector, as well as a lever for change. 
‘…the process [Institutional Audit] created significant change in the 
institution, in terms of how it then sought to respond to the criticisms that 
were levelled at it and the extent to which it became different from taking 
on board the issues which were being raised, and so the use of the QAA 
by management to assist it in creating change is also important’.  
 
[Senior manager, University of Merivale] 
 
 
Unfortunately at the time of the interview I did not take the opportunity to explore more 
deeply with the senior manager the nature of the changes that were undertaken. It would 
have been interesting to see if these changes were examples of the senior management 
appropriating the QAA to control other elements of the PRF and the pedagogic device. 
7.2.2 Academics 
While all academics appeared happy for the quality professionals within their university 
to recontextualise the QAA’s messages into local policies and procedures, it appeared 
that some academics play a role in interpreting the recontextualised texts on behalf of 
their academic colleagues. Some appear to take on the role of ‘translator’; for example 
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five of the academic staff from across the universities described how they acted as 
mediators, explaining institutional quality assurance policies and procedures to 
colleagues, and in one instance taking responsibility for completing the necessary 
paperwork on their behalf. 
‘Most of my colleagues just want to do their teaching and then spend all 
the spare time doing research “oh I don’t want to have to do all the paper 
work”. They’re just glad that there’s somebody in the department who 
just deals with the paper work and gets it out of their way.’  
 
[Academic quality, University of Lyttelton] 
 
 
Other respondents described a more ‘protecting’ role where such academics ensure that 
colleagues follow procedures correctly and do not fall foul of central university 
requirements, nor put academic quality at risk. Other respondents described a role 
ensuring that the quality professionals and senior managers have a better understanding 
of the implications of discipline nuances in relation to quality assurance. For example, 
the more subjective nature of assessment in arts and design and ‘the more unpredictable 
way most students work’ [Academic (quality), University of Merivale]. 
‘My most recent course validation event was about [subject] ... that’s not 
my field, [but] what I can do is I can look at the paperwork and ask: have 
you filled in the unit information forms correctly? Is it consistent? Have 
you given us the correct course information forms? Is it clear where 
assessment works? Can we spot bottle necks? All of this kind of stuff. So 
it’s very much looking at the nitty gritty of whether they are complying 
with university procedures and I do that with a clear conscience. It’s not 
just being petty, it’s making sure that they, you know, they work the way 
we do.’ 
 
[Academic (quality), University of Merivale] 
 
 
The examples provided above suggest that some respondents saw, in Bernstein’s terms, 
that their role was to protect the pedagogic device from not only senior managers, but 
also from the academics themselves and the potential damage caused by not getting the 
procedures correct. Such roles also protect the academic’s ownership of the 
recontextualising rules, for example, by trying to defend discipline identities from the 
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systematisation that quality assurance systems can introduce. For some academics their 
engagement with quality assurance provided an additional benefit in relation to career 
progression. 
‘So quality assurance generally was a key driver in my career 
progression in terms of the greater roles and responsibility that I took. 
It’s certainly helped that I was interested and, I would hope, proficient in 
such matters that I got the [senior faculty role re] Teaching and Learning 
role when it came up.’   
[Academic (manager), University of Opawa] 
 
 
7.3 Summary 
In this chapter I have shown, through the empirical findings, that in providing 
institutions with a vocabulary with which to develop the discourse on quality assurance 
and the nationally agreed reference points, the QAA has provided the universities with 
the tools and space within which to recontextualise the official discourse into the 
landscape of their own institutions. It appears that the capacity of the three universities 
to recontextualise the QAA and its messages is based on a number of factors identified 
by the QAA respondents. Of particular relevance to this study is the perceived position 
of the university in the higher education hierarchy of prestige, concomitant with the 
‘ideal type’ of university it most resembles. The closer the university resembles the 
‘doctrinal’ university, the more able it is to keep the QAA at ‘arms-length’, with the 
central administrative function heavily recontextualising the QAA’s discourse. In this 
instance engagement with the QAA is limited and the Agency is constructed as a 
necessary intruder, safeguarding academic standards, protecting the reputation of the 
sector, monitoring the behaviour of ‘other’ institutions, but not interfering with what is 
legitimately the university’s responsibility as an autonomous degree awarding body.  
The more the university resembles the ‘vocational’ university the less likely it is to 
resist the influence of the QAA and, indeed, it might adopt a more risk-averse and 
conservative approach than advocated by the Agency. Such an approach might be 
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considered to reduce the risk of receiving a poor Institutional Review outcome, as well 
as provide an opportunity to drive through internal change.  
The ‘secular type’ of university appears to hold a position somewhere in between the 
‘doctrinal’ and ‘vocational’ universities, and has the capacity to recontextualise many of 
the QAA’s messages into the local context, but equally sees the QAA as a useful and 
legitimate advisor who can be used to bring about internal change in respect of a 
specific project. 
The chapter, therefore, has answered research questions three and four, noting that  the 
capacity of different universities to recontextualise what the QAA is saying and the 
degree of influence the QAA has, is demarcated along institutional boundaries and the 
notions of the ‘ideal types’ of universities. The answer comes with the caveat that the 
universities take the Agency’s institutional level reviews seriously, as a poor outcome 
would have a significant and wide-ranging negative impact.  
In this chapter I have discussed the recontextualisation that is undertaken by the quality 
professionals and directed by the senior management, and the recontextualisation which 
is undertaken by the academic staff. To this end my suggestion in Chapter three that 
there are two sites of recontextualisation within the broader PRF: the Central PRF (C-
PRF) and the Academic-PRF (A-PRF), is correct. The C-PRF, made up of the quality 
professionals and the institutional level quality committees, have primary responsibility 
for recontextualising the messages from the QAA into local quality assurance policies, 
procedures and guidance. With, as Newton (2002, p47) suggests the C-PRF viewing the 
notion of ‘quality’ differently from ‘front-line’ academics, and clearly wedded to the 
notions of managerialism and accountability.  
As noted earlier, the degree to which these messages are mediated is demarcated along 
institutional lines. I have not, however, explored in the research the extent to which the 
institutional-level quality committee contributes or guides the recontextualisation 
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processes, vis-à-vis senior management. Nor have I looked at whether the balance of 
input is also dependent on the ‘ideal type’ of university that the institution most closely 
resembles; each ‘ideal type’ has a different culture of governance. Such cultural 
differences, however, might be misleading if, as suggested in section 5.2.2, a 
consequence of the QAA has been the systematisation of quality structures across the 
universities. 
The A-PRF also undertakes a degree of recontextualisation of the QAA’s messages. 
One way is through reference to the QAA’s subject benchmark statements in the 
development of the curriculum, although I did not explore in any depth the exact nature 
of the recontextualisation process (see section 5.1.3). Secondly, in acting as a 
‘translator’ or a ‘protector’ on behalf of other academics (see section 7.2.2 above), the 
academics are vicariously recontextualising the QAA via the university’s internal 
quality assurance processes. This outcome concurs with Trowler’s (1998, p126) 
suggestion that some academics undertake policy reconstruction. It also supports 
Newton’s (2002, p51) finding that academics take-on specific roles and hence types of 
recontextualisation. 
The concepts of the C-PRF and A-PRF have enabled me to more accurately reflect on 
the roles of the senior managers, quality professionals and the academics within the 
recontextualisation of what the QAA says to universities. It would be beneficial to use 
these concepts in more detailed research into the recontextualisation process that goes 
on in universities. 
The next and concluding chapter for the thesis considers the broader 
implications of the findings, both in the context of the professional issue, and in 
relation to the aims of the research.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSIONS 
8.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I reflect on the different aspects of the research and the degree to which I 
have achieved what I set out to do. In the process of reflection, I consider the strengths, 
weaknesses and limitations of the research, as well as the implications of the empirical 
findings for both the QAA and quality professionals in the universities. 
8.1 The Professional Issue 
I began this research wondering why after more than 10 years since the QAA was 
established, and seven years since its move away from the controversial subject level 
review of universities, was there still variation in how the role of the QAA was 
understood, and how the Agency was perceived by the universities? On the one hand it 
is presented by some universities as Beelzebub incarnate, systematising higher 
education and threatening academic autonomy. By other universities it is portrayed as 
doing a good job in protecting and supporting the higher education sector in maintaining 
academic standards and quality. For the majority, the Agency was seen as an inevitable 
part of current government policy towards higher education but was better than the 
alternatives – the ‘better the devil you know’ scenario. 
These multiple constructions often proved difficult for those working in the Agency 
because it meant a constant assessment and reassessment of what was being faced, in 
order to maximise the working relationships and get the job done. Add to this the 
increasing politicisation and marketisation of higher education, and it often felt as 
though the Agency was walking a precarious tightrope which was subject to various 
unpredictable mistral winds. 
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The professional issue to be explored through the research was therefore: why is the 
QAA viewed and portrayed differently depending on who is making the 
assessment and in what context? 
8.2 Aims 
I identified two aims for the research. The first originated when I worked for the QAA; 
the second arose when I returned to the UK and took up a role as a quality professional 
in a university.  
The aims were: 
i) to provide those working at the QAA with an improved understanding of how 
different types of universities and staff within them perceive, construct and 
appropriate the Agency. 
ii) to provide a reference point against which quality professionals can assess their 
own university’s institutional practice, in order to provide more effective 
support to colleagues in developing and implementing quality assurance 
processes, which are appropriate to the values and culture of the institution and 
contribute to the improvement of the quality and standards of teaching and 
learning in that institution. 
In assessing whether I have achieved both of these aims, I realised that to achieve the 
first aim I would have needed to make an evaluation of whether the outcomes of the 
research had benefitted those working in the QAA. This was not feasible once I had 
ceased working for the Agency and moved to New Zealand. I did not continue the 
regular updates on progress with the research that I would have done as an employee. A 
discussion then could have taken place with the respondents, prior to submission of the 
thesis, to assess if these updates had made any difference to their understanding. 
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What is available to the Agency, however, is the thesis and therefore a resource that 
could be used to enhance the QAA’s understanding of how the universities perceive, 
construct and appropriate the Agency. The assessment of the research’s impact on their 
understanding could be undertaken as a separate piece of research.  
I have achieved the second aim, and have provided a reference point against which 
quality professionals can assess their own university’s institutional practice.  
The analysis of the data identified a number of themes which help articulate how staff 
within the different types of universities perceive and recontextualise the Agency. Such 
differences appear to be demarcated along institutional lines at senior management level 
and the Central-PRF (C-PRF), but less so at the level of the Academic PRF (A-PRF). In 
many respects this finding confirms the anecdotal perceptions that circulate within the 
QAA, which I identified in Chapter two. For the QAA, it also means that their 
activities/communications with higher education providers can be tailored to meet the 
universities’ different needs and in a discourse that has more meaning for them.  
For the quality professional in the universities, the research provides the necessary data 
with which to initiate a discussion about the nature of the relationship it wants with the 
Agency. This also might be accompanied by a discussion about the relationship between 
the A-PRF and the C-PRF internally.  
I return to the discussion about the implications of the empirical findings later in the 
chapter. 
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8.3 Methodology: Strengths, Weaknesses and Limitations 
8.3.1 Reflections on the research approach 
Based on my position that knowledge and the concept of quality assurance is socially 
constructed, I chose to adopt a qualitative research approach in order to compare the 
experiences of those working at different levels in three universities and at the QAA. 
The decision to adopt a qualitative research strategy was the right option. It provided a 
wealth of rich empirical data, which a quantitative survey approach would not have 
provided to the same extent. The disadvantage, however, was the significant amount of 
data to analyse. Thirty-two interviews were, in retrospect, perhaps over-ambitious.  
I adopted a cross-sectional research design as it enabled me to gather a sizeable data set 
relatively easily at more or less one single point in time (Bryman, 2012, p59). It also 
enabled me to undertake intra- and inter-comparison across the universities and the 
QAA. This approach worked well, as seen in the previous two empirical chapters. It is 
worth noting that although the transcription of the 32 interviews took some considerable 
time, it was advantageous that I elected to do the majority of them myself as it made the 
data much more alive and made the coding process easier. 
The cross-sectional approach meant, however, that at times during the analytical process 
I was frustrated because it provided only a snapshot of the respondents’ experience. The 
alternative would have been to adopt a case study approach which might have enabled a 
more in-depth exploration of how the respondents constructed their views of the QAA. 
But this method would have been at the expense of my looking at three universities, as 
my resources were not sufficient to undertake multiple case studies. The comparative 
nature of the study which was central to looking at the professional issue would then 
have been lost.  
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The research was limited to looking at the QAA’s relationship with universities in 
England and this provided a sensible bounded data source from which to recruit 
interviewees. It would be interesting however, to explore some of the issues raised in 
the empirical chapters in a number of different contexts; for example the different 
countries within the UK; different higher education providers such as private for-profit 
institutions, or those specialising in one particular field of provision such as 
postgraduate courses. Equally it would be fascinating to look at the recontextualisation 
process that takes place in other countries, perhaps comparing another mature external 
quality assurance framework, with one which is less mature, and/or where there is a 
very strong ORF, such as Saudi Arabia. 
The development of the model of ‘ideal types’ of universities (see section 2.4) provided 
an effective means of organising the significant number of universities in England into 
categories from which to identify potential data sources. The model also provided a 
greater depth of contextual information which helped to explain why the universities 
take a particular stance in how they perceive the QAA and the nature of their 
relationship with the Agency. 
The decision to talk to individuals from different levels within the universities and the 
QAA was successful in exploring the issues in some depth and in identifying patterns of 
data by type of respondent. It also moved me away from thinking about universities as 
homogenous entities, to thinking about them as collections of subgroups and/or 
individuals. This more differentiated focus was central to exploring the professional 
issue and building up the patterns of experiences.  
A weakness of the research was that I did not take full advantage of the access I had to 
the academic staff. I could have explored in more detail with them the 
recontextualisation process that takes place at the A-PRF level to establish pedagogic 
practice. This data could then have been compared to the findings of other researchers 
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such as Trowler (1998), Henkel (2000) and Newton (2002), and as noted above, at the 
start of the research my focus was on the QAA and I did not appreciate how valuable 
understanding this recontextualising process would have been. This aspect only became 
clear once I had begun analysing the data, which was after I had left the QAA and 
moved to New Zealand. Follow-up interviews were therefore not feasible. This example 
highlights the importance of thinking carefully about the scheduling of the interviews 
and allowing time for the early initial coding of each interview. This method would 
have enabled more of an inductive approach to be taken. 
Other examples of further research are discussed at appropriate points in the rest of the 
chapter (see sections 8.4; 8.5.1; and 8.5.4). 
8.3.2 Reflections on the data collection techniques 
Using semi-structured interviews to gather the data worked well and enabled a 
reasonably large amount of data to be collected quickly. The use of an interview 
schedule as a prompt sheet meant that there was sufficient consistency in the areas 
covered in each interview to enable comparison across the respondents. There was also 
sufficient scope within the interviews to allow for a particular point of discussion to be 
developed. As discussed in Chapter four, I acknowledge that this more systematised 
approach to the data collection might be considered too restrictive for many who 
undertake qualitative research, particularly in the context of ethnographic research. 
However, since comparability of the data was important in exploring the professional 
issue, the approach was appropriate.  
Keeping a reflective diary and noting how each interview went, helped me to review 
whether I was facilitating or inhibiting the discussion through my interaction with the 
respondents. This was particularly important as I was undertaking research within my 
employing organisation and in the universities it reviews. A key learning point for me as 
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the interviews progressed was that silence can encourage the respondent to contribute 
more; a finding which has transferred across to other areas of my professional and 
private life. 
In section 4.6.2 I discussed the potential influence of my affiliation to the QAA on the 
data. Despite using techniques to limit this, the generally positive nature of the data 
about the QAA suggests that the interviewees were more generous in their comments 
than they might have been to a researcher independent of the Agency.  
8.3.3 Using insider contacts and gatekeepers 
In Chapter four, I discussed using ‘insider’ contacts and gatekeepers in order to gain 
access to the respondents in the universities and to some of the respondents at the QAA. 
Selecting the correct gatekeeper proved important and I was fortunate enough that my 
‘insider’ contacts at the universities were able to gain access on my behalf with little 
difficulty. Gaining permission from the gatekeepers at the QAA was part of the 
approval process for undertaking the professional doctorate, but meant that I had to 
renew this on an annual basis and this was subject to what the Agency assessed to be 
reasonable progress with the doctorate. 
Originally, I was concerned that leaving the selection of who to interview in the 
universities to the ‘insider’ contact, might be problematic. However, most of my 
requests were met. The only exception was the request to interview an academic 
member of staff ‘without existing or previous experience of holding positions with 
responsibility for quality assurance at departmental level’ in each university. Only one, 
out of a possible three was available. In hindsight, the provision of such individuals 
might have been problematic for the ‘insider’ contacts, as all were quality professionals 
or linked to the areas responsible for quality assurance, and so would not necessarily be 
in regular contact with such academic staff. In reality, all the academic respondents 
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spoke of the experience of ‘other colleagues’, so I felt able to draw some generalisations 
from what was said and apply them to the wider academic community. Reflecting on 
the interview with the academic member staff with no responsibility for quality 
assurance in their role, it was clear that while the use of a common interview schedule 
across the university interviews helped, the language used was perhaps too submerged 
in the quality assurance discourse and did not express some of the areas for discussion 
particularly well.  
8.4 Reflections on the analytical Framework  
The analytical framework, drawing on Bernstein’s concepts of the pedagogic device and 
its rules, has enabled me to problematise the professional issue by making the link 
between quality assurance and the structure of knowledge. It is all too easy to think 
about the QAA’s work as a bureaucratic process which is pertinent at institutional level 
alone, particularly now that external quality assurance in UK is at the institutional level 
only.  
This is not to say however, that Bernstein’s concepts are easily applicable to empirical 
data. They are abstract and designed for a different context from the one to which I was 
applying them. In Chapter three, I identified that this might be problematic, but with 
careful thought and perseverance it has been possible to use the analytical framework to 
undertake the second stage of the analysis. Going through this process has helped me to 
move from exploring the data as a quality professional, still firmly rooted in the culture 
of the QAA, to a researcher. This is a key development when undertaking endogenous 
(insider) research, as I highlighted in Chapter four. 
The analytical framework enabled me to map the recontextualisation process and the 
contribution of the ORF and PRF and their agents (HEFCE and the QAA, and the 
representative bodies UUK, GuildHE and the mission groups respectively) (see section 
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3.3). The analysis of the data confirmed that this model reflects the complex and 
multidimensional nature of the recontextualisation process that surrounds and includes 
the QAA. 
Bernstein’s notion of recontextualising has enabled me to look at how universities 
translate the messages coming from the QAA and where this translation takes place, as 
discussed in Chapter six. The advantage of Bernstein’s high level of abstraction is that 
his concepts can be extended when applying them to the empirical context. In this 
instance, I extended his concept of the PRF to include the two sites of recontextualising 
that were evident from the data analysis: the Academic PRF (A-PRF) and the Central 
PRF (C-PRF). The latter includes the quality professionals and institutional level quality 
committees. In addition, the analysis indicated there were also members of the A-PRF 
who act as the translators for the messages arising from the C-PRF (see section 7.2.2).   
There might also be another recontextualisation site which is linked to students. A form 
of recontextualisation seems to take place in relation to students’ contribution to quality 
assurance. For example, when students in the universities contribute to the development 
of the curriculum, as highlighted by the Students’ Union officer from the University of 
Opawa; by the NUS as they brief students in their role in quality assurance, and by the 
students who are members of the QAA review teams and have to interpret the QAA’s 
reference points in the course of the Institutional Audit/Review. Further research into 
whether these separate sites exist or whether students influence the C-PRF and the A-
PRF would be interesting. A weakness of the research is that I did not exploit the 
interviews with the students to discuss further the contribution of students to internal 
quality assurance processes. 
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8.5 The Implications for the Professional Issue 
Returning to the professional issue, the empirical findings suggest that there are a 
number of reasons why the QAA is viewed and portrayed differently, depending on 
who is making the assessment and in what context. I have collated these into four main 
areas: i) the position in the perceived hierarchy of prestige; ii) the public nature of the 
QAA review judgements and reports and the impact on institutional reputation; iii) 
contestation within the PRF; and iv) the multidirectional relationships between the 
ORF, the PRF and their agents. 
These reasons have implications for the QAA and the quality professionals in higher 
education providers more broadly and these will be discussed briefly in each of the 
following sections.  
8.5.1 The perceived higher education hierarchy 
The empirical data suggests that institutional position in the hierarchy within the higher 
education sector in England determines how a university views and portrays the QAA. 
As noted earlier (see section 7.2) the views, particularly of the C-PRF, are demarcated 
along institution lines and the ‘ideal type’ of university they most closely resemble. 
Those ‘higher’ up the perceived hierarchy of status and closest to the ‘doctrinal ideal 
type’ see the QAA as a necessary evil which intrudes into certain areas of responsibility. 
In contrast, those towards the ‘lower’ end of the hierarchy and closest to the ‘vocational 
ideal type’ see the QAA as an arbiter and a lever for change (see section 7.2.1). A 
similar demarcation is seen in Chapter six when the process of how the universities 
recontextualise the QAA is discussed.   
This finding confirms much of the anecdotal evidence at the QAA about ways in which 
the universities respond to the Agency. Nevertheless it is an important finding because 
it helps to explain why external quality assurance will remain a contested arena. The 
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analysis of the data suggests that institutional culture and values, accompanied by the 
different self-interests of the senior management, means that the C-PRF and the A-PRF 
are not united in their approach to the issue of external quality assurance. The TINA 
approach (‘there is no alternative’), described by Morley in 2003 (p165) still stands. 
Researchers such as Ashwin, Abbas and McLean (2015, p620) are beginning to suggest 
such alternatives75, but recognise that manifesting this into a meaningful and coherent 
policy will be difficult to achieve given the strength of the dominant and mainly ORF 
determined discourse.  
This situation is, to some extent, to the benefit of the QAA because it means that there is 
no ground swell to challenge its work and no viable alternative suggested from within 
the sector. However, this appearance of apathy/resignation does mean that there is scope 
for the ORF to manipulate the QAA’s remit to push forward a particular policy 
initiative.  
An understanding of how the different universities portray the QAA within their 
institutions, and to the ORF, students and the public, will also help the Agency 
determine its strategic approach to engaging with the different types of universities 
within the sector. As suggested in section 6.1.1 earlier, the QAA could rationalise its 
scope of work to focus just on safeguarding academic standards, with another body such 
as the Higher Education Academy (HEA) undertaking the Agency’s enhancement work. 
For example, the HEA could work with higher education providers to establish the 
(threshold) academic standards. This would then provide resources for the Agency to 
develop a more sophisticated approach to working with the expanding number of 
different types of higher education providers in England.  
                                                 
75 For example, Ashwin, Abbas and McLean (2015, p620) suggest that an alternative to the ORF’s 
definition of what counts as high quality undergraduate higher education should be focussed on the 
‘relations which students develop with particular kinds of academic knowledge through their 
undergraduate education and the impact this has on their identities’. 
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The research suggests that it would not be wise for the QAA to attempt to treat all 
higher education providers the same, as appears to be the case with the development of 
the risk-based, common review method (see Chapter three). As King (2011, p3) notes, 
this is very difficult to operationalise and risky for the QAA itself, particularly in 
relation to the well-established universities disengaging from the QAA’s activities. The 
initial analysis of the QAA’s work in Chapter three and the analysis of empirical data 
have already confirmed a lack of trust by the ORF, the public and politicians in relation 
to the PRF safeguarding academic standards. For a truly risk-based external review 
method to operate effectively, the ORF needs to trust the PRF and the QAA in assessing 
the level of risk and adopting the appropriate review method. The resulting review 
outcomes and reports must also have credibility with the ORF. This level of trust of the 
PRF is not currently the case and the QAA in some parts of the ORF. Indeed, the 
analysis in Chapters three and five have already shown concerns in the QAA and the 
universities about the lack of understanding by politicians and the public about how the 
sector and its quality assurance functions. The move to the common review method 
could exacerbate that lack of understanding further, because the system relies on a fairly 
sophisticated understanding of the concept of ‘risk’ and the meaning of ‘threshold’ 
academic standards.  
The QAA’s development of a common review method has a logic, not least for the 
economies of scale, however, if there are already significant variances in how three 
different types of universities perceive, construct and recontextualise the QAA, these 
distinctions will only be exacerbated across the full and diverse range of higher 
education providers. In this context, the continuing issue is therefore how can the 
common review method be sufficiently flexible to not only deal with the range of 
maturity of institutions providing higher education, but also provide an effective 
external review which contributes to maintaining academic standards and improving 
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quality? The universities, particularly those at the top of the higher education hierarchy 
(the’ doctrinal’ institutions), will continue to demand a reduction in the burden for them, 
as well as demand a rigorous system of quality assurance to protect the higher education 
‘club’ against the behaviour of others and the increasing number of alternative higher 
education providers. 
The empirical data has already highlighted concerns about the occurrence of cultural 
dissonance with the peer review teams. I suggest that this will only get worse under the 
common review method. I suspect that the sheer volume of reviews being undertaken 
will mean that the scope to align the peer review panel with the type of institution being 
reviewed will be very limited. 
Equally, concerns raised by the then Assistant Directors about the systematisation of 
their role (see section 6.1.2) will need to be considered further by the Agency. Such lack 
of flexibility could limit the degree of sophistication in the decision-making which is 
likely to be necessary in a risk-based external quality assurance system. 
For quality professionals in universities, an understanding of the extent to which 
perceived institutional status in the hierarchy can impact on how the university 
perceives and recontextualises the QAA provides a reference point for them to assess 
quality assurance practice in their own institution. It also might reveal practices that are 
culturally embedded in the university which the C-PRF wishes to change. As we saw in 
Chapter two, the UK’s external quality assurance system is based on the notion of 
quality as ‘fitness for purpose’ (Raban and Cairns, 2014, p114), therefore a clearer 
understanding of the rationale for an institution’s approach to quality management can 
help it to reflect on what is ‘fitness for purpose’ in its context. The quality professional 
at the University of Merivale, for example, reflected in her interview on whether the 
University’s internal quality assurance mechanisms had gone too far in their 
requirements, compared with the expectations of the QAA (see Chapter seven). 
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Given the potentially powerful position of the C-PRF (see section 5.2.1) in the 
recontextualisation process, it would be interesting to extend the research to look more 
closely at the role of the C-PRF, perhaps adopting a more ethnographic approach. This 
would also extend the research of Newton (2002). Alternatively it would be interesting 
to look the current data in relation to the C-PRF and look, for example, at how the 
quality professionals operate as a ‘community of practice’ (Wenger, 1998), and the 
impact this might have on the recontextualising process they undertake.  
8.5.2 Public nature of the reports and institutional reputation 
It is clear from the analysis outlined in Chapters five and seven that respondents from 
both the universities and the QAA consider that a main source of power for the QAA 
lies in the publishing of the outcomes of its institutional reviews (see for example 
sections 5.1.1 and 7.1.1). Risk to reputation is uppermost in the minds of the C-PRF 
across the universities in preparing for external review. From the QAA’s perspective it 
is important that its reports have credibility with both the universities and the public. In 
my initial analysis of the QAA in Chapter three, I suggested that the QAA had changed 
its position and was adopting a more inspection style of reporting, tied more closely to 
the UK Quality Code. While this development has taken place since the research data 
were collected, the QAA’s intention to change its style of reviewing and reporting was 
evident in the Handbook for the Institutional Review Method for England and Northern 
Ireland (March 2011), which was published shortly before the interviews in the 
universities took place. The data analysis revealed that the C-PRF across the universities 
and some of the QAA staff were concerned about this development. This more 
inspectoral approach potentially provides the QAA with more influence over the 
pedagogic device, as it could lead some C-PRFs to adopt a more risk-averse style of 
recontextualisation because the perceived risk of a poor outcome is heightened by the 
closer reporting against the expectations of the Quality Code. Alternatively, the risk-
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averse style might be evident through a more cautious presentation of information to be 
reviewed, or more managed engagement between the review team and university staff 
during the review. This approach could cause difficulty for some quality professionals 
in the universities who are trying to develop a constructive link between quality 
assurance and pedagogic practice. 
8.5.3 Differing views within the PRF 
Another reason why the QAA is viewed and portrayed differently depending on who is 
making the assessment is the contestation that exists within the PRF. Similar to the 
stratification that occurs in the higher education sector as a whole, Bernstein notes 
(2000, p60) there are different PRFs across and within the universities and each could 
view and portray the QAA differently.  
I have already discussed the presence of the C-PRF and the A-PRF, the former of which 
is likely to portray the QAA, internally to academics, and externally to the ORFs and 
the public, based on the cultural values and nature of the university and what is in its 
best interest (Newton, 2002, p47). What is clear is that, since subject level review, the 
C-PRF and A-PRF have retained control of the pedagogic device and its rules, but that 
the QAA influences the rules in certain ways, particularly the recontextualising and 
evaluative rules (see sections 5.1.3; 5.2.1; 6.1.2 and 7.2.1).  
The analysis set out in Chapter five indicates that the Agency’s ‘success’ with 
influencing what universities do lies in its use of peer referencing in developing 
guidance materials and conducting reviews. The PRF is content with that, providing 
they consider the peers to be legitimate and appropriate for the university they are 
reviewing. Therefore, it is in the interest of the Agency to ensure it draws on academics 
and quality professionals of high calibre from across the range of higher education 
providers, supporting those who might have less experience of external quality 
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assurance. It will be important that the QAA works with the PRF in defining what is 
meant by high calibre in the changing HE landscape and that this is reflected in the 
criteria for selecting the academics who work with the Agency. The ORF accepts this 
approach currently because it has meant that the universities have cooperated in the 
development and continuation of the external quality assurance system. This point of 
view is not necessarily true for all elements of the ORF and the empirical data and my 
initial analysis of the QAA’s work also provided examples of where politicians do not 
understand why it is appropriate to use academic peers (see sections 6.1 and 6.2.2).  
A question in the light of the data analysis is to what extent should the QAA be 
concerning itself with the nature of the recontextualising process that takes place in the 
universities, and the degree to which A-PRF and C-PRF are involved in it? It can be 
suggested that there are two sites of recontextualisation, because the analysis indicates 
that the recontextualisation process is dominated by the C-PRF. While this is not 
necessarily a problem, in two instances the empirical findings suggested that the 
Agency had lost something by no longer engaging with the academics. In one case (a 
respondent from the QAA), regret was expressed about the failure to get academics to 
take responsibility for quality assurance as part of being a professional academic. So 
should the QAA be encouraging/supporting the C-PRF to be adopting a particular 
approach to encourage academics to engage more in internal quality assurance? The 
empirical findings suggest that the structures and the status of the C-PRF are too well 
established to accept this approach. The QAA’s involvement in this area would be seen 
as another example of ‘mission creep’ by the Agency. While working in a university I 
found it helpful to couch discussion about quality assurance in the context of good 
research practice. This approach often helped to produce a more creative debate and 
moved the discussion away from being process-based. 
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8.5.4 Multidirectional influences 
The analysis supports and extends my initial suggestion that the relationship between 
the QAA, the universities, the HEFCE and the Government is a complex and 
multidirectional one, as set out in Figure 5 in Chapter three. This position is largely 
based on the historical antecedents of the universities and their status as legally 
independent autonomous bodies, responsible for setting their own academic standards 
under the auspices of their right to award their own degrees (Williams, 2009, p4). 
There appears to be disagreement about the nature and ownership of the external quality 
assurance system: not only between the PRF and the ORF, but within each of these 
groupings and their agents. The QAA, as an agent of the ORF but with a (moral) 
contract with the PRF, must become even more sophisticated in developing and wearing 
different ‘faces’ in order to deal with these multifarious self-interests which push and 
pull the Agency’s work. This task is made all the harder because, as the analysis of the 
data appears to confirm, the QAA’s independence as perceived by the universities has 
diminished recently, whereas its advisory role to the agents of the ORF and PRF is 
confirmed (Brown and Carasso, 2013, p122) (see section 6.2.1).  
What was particularly interesting from the data analysis, was a sense that the position of 
the representative bodies (UUK and GuildHE) as agents of the PRF, is changing. I had 
not anticipated the concern raised by some of the university respondents about these 
bodies becoming increasingly politicised and almost acting as an agent of the ORF. The 
role and status of the representative bodies accordingly warrants further exploration 
with the universities, the QAA and the representative bodies themselves, if the 
opportunity to undertake further research arises. 
The empirical findings suggest that there was some appetite for the QAA to modernise 
in order to support the evolving/new landscape of higher education in England. 
However, the empirical data also suggest that the Agency’s historical antecedents and 
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traditions are powerful, and although there has been a significant change in staff within 
the QAA since the interviews, it will take longer for perceptions to change in the sector, 
where staff turnover is likely to be slower. We have already seen that anything which 
threatens the PRF’s control over the pedagogic device is likely to be either protested 
against directly, or captured and manipulated by the PRF as was seen in the subject 
level review era (see section 7.1.5). 
One alternative would be to change the funding mechanism for the QAA to have its 
regulatory function funded directly by the Treasury alone, and have its enhancement 
function (if retained) funded by the higher education providers. This approach might be 
acceptable to the PRF providing that the principle of peer review remained. If that 
principle were removed then, as clearly indicated in the analysis, it would change the 
very essence of collaborative regulation between the PRF and ORF and would be 
unacceptable to the universities. I would suggest that no politician/government would 
be prepared to take this forward at this time.  
Another alternative would be for employers and the National Union of Students to 
contribute to the funding of the Agency, but this would only further complicate the 
relationship between those currently involved. It might also be seen as more 
stakeholders trying to control the pedagogic device albeit at arm’s length.  
My view is that the QAA in its current form and purpose has served its time and has 
been successful in introducing the concept of external review and public accountability 
to the universities. With a potential lifting of the fees cap a radically different 
organisation from the QAA will be demanded, with greater control given to those 
universities who have established effective quality assurance mechanisms (Brown and 
Bekhradnia, 2013, p11). This development, I suggest, will depend on the extent to 
which the issue of academic standards and quality of UK higher education has political 
value for the ORF.  
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8.6 Summary and Final Reflections 
The previous three empirical chapters have begun to link the data to the professional 
issue of why the QAA is viewed and portrayed differently depending on who is making 
the assessment and in what context. I have identified four main reasons why the QAA is 
viewed as being multifaceted with different ‘faces’ which are seen at different times: an 
institution’s position in the higher education hierarchy; the public nature of the QAA 
reports and the impact on institutional reputation; contestation within the PRF; and the 
multidirectional relationships between the ORF, the PRF and their agents. But while the 
presentation of multiple faces makes the position of the QAA complex and challenging, 
it also, to a degree, suits the Agency. This approach has, I am sure, ensured its survival 
over the last 18 years. But this process of developing and refining its multifaceted 
approaches is resource intensive. If it does have to tender for its contract with the 
HEFCE from 2016-17 onwards, as announced in October 2014, then resource 
restrictions could place such investment in jeopardy.  
The research provides a snapshot of the world between July 2009 and June 2011. It has 
taken a while to write the thesis up and the world for the QAA and the universities has 
continued to evolve. The next challenge I think for the QAA is to retain the engagement 
of particularly the’doctrinal’ and ‘secular ideal types’ (King, 2011, p4), while focussing 
on assessing and supporting the quickly expanding group of alternative higher education 
providers. One way to achieve this is to demonstrate a reduction in the ‘burden’ of 
external quality assurance for these types of universities, or they will query what they 
are getting from the Agency, and finally suggest a viable alternative to what the Agency 
does. As noted in Chapter three, this possibility is starting to be seen to some extent 
with UUK’s document published in February 2015 ‘Quality, equity, sustainability: the 
future of higher education regulation’ which outlines its proposals to tackle the 
challenges of quality assurance within the changing funding structures. Perhaps more 
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worryingly for the QAA, is the recent revelation in the Times Higher, 8 June, 2015 of a 
leaked draft HEFCE policy document which suggests that the QAA reviews could be 
abolished (Grove, 2015). The policy document is due for publication at the end of June 
2015 for consultation. 
It is worth reflecting that I began this research unsure of what I would find out by doing 
it, or how helpful it would be to my professional work; despite colleagues at the QAA 
and universities saying that it was an interesting project. For me, it has provided a 
wealth of knowledge which, even before the end of the research, helped me begin to 
think differently about how to support colleagues not only in implementing the 
university’s quality assurance processes, but also in thinking about what sort of 
university the institution wanted to be, and matching the quality assurance processes to 
that. Nine months ago, however, I left the university I was working in to concentrate 
full-time on finishing the thesis. Will I go back to work within the higher education 
sector as a quality assurance professional? I am not sure, but if I do, I will certainly be 
thinking about quality assurance and the QAA in a very different way.  
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APPENDIX 1 EXAMPLE OF EMAIL SENT TO INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTACTS 
 
 
From: Elaine Harries Jenkins 
Sent: 04 April 2011 16:37 
To: [University Contact] 
Subject: A request for my doctoral thesis 
 
Dear [Name of Contact] 
 
I hope you don’t mind me contacting you in my guise as a research student at Cardiff 
University.  
 
I wonder if I might ask your advice.  
I’m currently doing my thesis for a professional doctorate; the aim of the research is to 
undertake an analysis of how the QAA is perceived by a range its stakeholders in 
context of its role, authority and influence in the sector. In doing so I hope to identify 
the QAA's position in the social and political fields. 
 
Obviously, higher education institutions are key to such a study and I’m trying to 
organise three case studies based around the different typologies of institutions based on 
the age of the institution: ancient, pre 1992, post 1992, where I could interview a 
number of staff at different levels of the university structure.  
Ideally I would like to interview: 
 a member of the senior management team with responsibility for teaching and 
learning – such as a Pro-Vice Chancellor 
 the Head of the central administrative department responsible for quality and 
standards 
 two  Heads of Departments 
 a lecturer without management responsibility for quality and standards 
I would also like to interview a sabbatical officer from the Students’ Union, but if you 
think more appropriate I am happy to approach them directly. 
 
Each interview would last approximately 45 minutes to an hour (although could be 
shorter if more convenient for the interviewee) and would be recorded with the 
interviewee’s permission. The interview would explore four broad areas:  
 the role and authority of the QAA 
 the factors which influence teaching and learning, including curriculum design  
 the impact of the QAA and external quality assurance on higher education 
 the purpose of higher education 
 
Ideally I would like to visit the University to conduct the interviews, but they could be 
conducted by telephone if preferred. 
 
All data collected would be used for the sole purpose of my thesis. 
 
Do you think that the relevant colleagues in the University might be interested in 
helping me with this research? 
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If so, who would be the best person to approach to organise the interviews? It would be 
extremely helpful if these could take place between April and June this year.  
 
Many thanks in advance for your help. 
Best wishes 
Elaine 
 
Elaine Harries Jenkins 
Assistant Director 
Reviews Group 
 
Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education 
Southgate House 
Southgate Street 
Gloucester GL1 1UB 
 
Direct line: 01452 557098 
Mobile: 07747636446 
Fax: 01452 557011 
 
 
 
The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education is a company limited by 
guarantee, registered in England and Wales number 3344784. Registered 
office Southgate House, Southgate Street, Gloucester  GL1 1UB. Registered 
charity numbers 1062746 and SC037786 
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APPENDIX 2 INFORMATION SHEET FOR INTERVIEWEES 
Background to the study 
I am a part-time postgraduate research student undertaking a professional doctorate in 
education at the School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University. I am also an assistant 
director in the Reviews group at the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education 
(QAA).  
My research is looking at the how different stakeholders view the role of the QAA, to 
determine the QAA’s position in the political and social fields. The research will form 
the basis of my doctoral thesis. 
I wish to interview a range of individuals including: staff within the QAA; those who 
undertake reviews for the QAA; staff and students from higher education institutions; 
and other external national bodies with whom the QAA works. An examination of 
existing data gathered by the QAA regarding, for example its reviews, and 
environmental scanning will also take place.  
The interviews will last an average of between 30 – 45 minutes and will cover two 
broad areas: the role of the QAA, and its impact on higher education. Each interview 
will be recorded and transcribed fully.  
Confidentiality 
The recordings of the interviews will be stored in a secure location in strict accordance 
with the Data Protection Act. Only the researcher and her two supervisors will have 
access to the data. All data will be anonymised, people’s names and job titles will not be 
included in reports, but participants should be aware that they may be identifiable 
through comments that they make. No interview data will be used in any of the QAA’s 
review methods. A copy of the transcript is available from the researcher on request.  
I hope that you will be able to help in this research. If you agree to take part, please 
complete the consent form. You are still free to withdraw at any time and without 
giving a reason. 
How will the results be used? 
The data from this research will be used for: 
 Professional doctorate thesis 
 Academic research papers and presentations 
 
Please get in touch if you would like further information: 
Elaine Harries Jenkins, 07771877146; JenkinsEH@Cardiff.ac.uk  
Thank you. 
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APPENDIX 3 CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWEES  
 
Research into the role and authority of the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher 
Education. 
 I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study, I have had 
the opportunity to consider the information, and ask any questions.  
 I am willing to take part in the interview for this research and for the interview to 
be recorded. 
 I understand that no-one will have access to the recording beyond the researcher 
and her two supervisors at Cardiff University. 
 I understand that any personal statements made in the interview will be 
confidential. As far as possible, all comments will be anonymised in any report or 
papers that are produced as a result of the research. People’s names or job titles 
will not be included in reports. 
 I understand that a copy of the transcript of the interview is available from the 
researcher on request.  
 I understand that taking part in the research is voluntary and that I may withdraw 
at any time. 
 I understand that the data from this research will be used for three things: 
 Professional doctorate thesis 
 Academic research papers and presentations 
 
Name of respondent (print): …………………………………………………………….. 
Signature of respondent: ………………………………………………………………… 
Date: ………………………………….. 
 
Name of researcher (print): Elaine Jenkins……………………………… 
Signature of researcher: …………………………………………………………………. 
Date: ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX 4 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR UNIVERSITY STAFF 
 
Researcher notes for introduction 
Thank the interviewee for agreeing to undertake this interview. 
Explain that I am currently undertaking a professional doctorate in education in the 
School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University  
Refer to the information sheet and consent form 
Give the interviewee time to read both documents. 
Ask if they have any questions and ask them to sign the form if they are willing to 
participate in the interview. Emphasise to the interviewee that they can withdraw from 
the research at any time. 
Emphasise too that I am not there as a member of staff for the QAA but as student. 
Stress confidentiality. 
Check that they are (still) happy for the interview to be recorded? Anything said in the 
interview is confidential. Refer again to the consent form.  
Ensure that the interview has signed the consent form before asking the first question. 
Questions 
1 Could you tell me a little about your role in the University? 
2 What is your involvement in quality assurance – internally/externally? 
3 What factors influence teaching and learning in the University? 
4 What words do you associate with quality assurance and the QAA? 
5 What do you think are the benefits and drawbacks of using peer review in 
external review? 
6 What do you see as the role and responsibilities of the QAA? 
7 Whose voice(s) does the QAA represent?  
8 How do you think the QAA is perceived by senior management, those 
responsible for quality assurance (ie central function), academic staff?  
9 What has been the QAA’s impact in the higher education sector? 
10 Where do you think this impact has been: institutional level, faculty level, 
departmental level, subject or individual level? What has been the impact on 
your day-to-day role? 
11 Are there tensions between academic values and quality assurance? 
12 Which do you think institution’s give more credence/importance to: the NSS, 
RAE or the QAA Institutional Audit? 
13 Where does the QAA’s authority come from? 
14 Who sets/influences the QAA’s agenda/work? 
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15 What do you see as the purpose of higher education? 
16 Does the QAA’s remit support this purpose? 
17 Do you think the QAA should be abolished? Or what do you think the role of 
the QAA should be, or should it exist at all? 
Thank the interviewee and ask them if there is anything else they would like to add. 
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APPENDIX 5 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR STUDENTS’ UNION 
SABBATICAL OFFICERS 
[Research briefing notes as appendix 4] 
1 Could you tell me a little about your role as SU president for background 
2 What words do you associate with the QAA/quality assurance? 
3 What do you think students want/expect from higher education? 
4 What is the role of students in higher education..............and in its quality 
assurance? 
5 Do you think these roles have changed/are changing? 
6 What information about the institution is important to students? 
7 Are students consumers? 
8 What will be the impact of student fees on student expectations? 
9 What is more important for students NSS scores, RAE/REF rating, the QAA 
report? [why?] 
10 What do you see as the role and responsibilities of the QAA? 
11 Where does the QAA’s authority come from? 
12 Do you think the current model of external quality assurance meets the needs 
of students? [If not why?] 
13 Are students aware of the QAA? 
14 If yes, how do you think they perceive the QAA?  
15 What do you think about the QAA using student reviewers/auditors? 
16 Overall, what has been the QAA’s impact in HE?  [incl. Its publications] 
17 There is a lot of discussion at the moment about the provision of information to 
students about HE – what is the QAA’s role in this/ what should the QAA be 
providing? 
18 Who sets/influences the QAA’s agenda/work? 
 
Thank the interviewee and ask them if there is anything else they would like to add. 
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APPENDIX 6 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR THE QAA STAFF 
[Research briefing notes as appendix 4] 
1 What words do you associate with the QAA? 
2 What do you see as the role and responsibilities of the QAA? 
3 Has this role changed over time? If so, how?  
4 Who are the QAA’s stakeholders? 
5 What is the nature of the QAA’s relationship with these stakeholders? 
6 How do you think the QAA is perceived by these stakeholders?  
7 What has been the QAA’s impact in the higher education sector? 
8 Where do you think this impact has been: institutional level, faculty level, 
departmental level, subject or individual level? 
9 What do you think are the benefits and drawbacks of using peer review? 
10 Do you have any sense how the QAA’s publications such as: the academic 
infrastructure, review reports, outcomes papers are used by the stakeholders?  
11 Which do you think institution’s gives more credence/importance to the RAE 
or the QAA Institutional Audit? 
12 What do you see as the challenges for the QAA? 
13 Where does the QAA’s authority come from? 
14 Who sets/influences the QAA’s work/agenda? 
15 Where do you see the QAA this time next year, in five years’ time and in ten 
years’ time? 
16 What do you see as the purpose of higher education? 
17 Does the QAA’s remit support this purpose? 
 
Thank the interviewee and ask them if there is anything else they would like to add. 
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